Service Law: Entitlement to ACPS Benefits and the Principle of Continuing Wrong

In these writ petitions, employees of the Himachal Pradesh State Co-operative Bank contested the denial of financial upgradation under the Assured Career Progression Scheme (ACPS) upon completing four years of service without promotion. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh reaffirmed that even if a cooperative bank is not a “State” under Article 12, a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable against it when arbitrary or illegal service actions are challenged. The Court held that general pay revisions or initial pay fixations cannot be substituted for or equated with ACPS benefits, which are specifically designed to provide relief in the absence of promotional avenues. Furthermore, because the erroneous denial of salary increments under ACPS affects an employee every month, it constitutes a “recurring cause of action” and a continuing wrong, rendering the defense of delay and laches inapplicable to the core claim, though monetary arrears are restricted to three years prior to filing. Consequently, the petitions were allowed with directions to grant ACPS benefits and calculate arrears accordingly.

  • Maintainability of Writ Against Co-operative Banks: Relying on Full Bench precedents (Vikram Chauhan v. Managing Director), the Court underscored that while a co-operative bank may not qualify as a “State” under Article 12, a writ petition under Article 226 remains maintainable against it if the factual situation and arbitrary administrative actions warrant judicial intervention.
  • Entitlement to ACPS: Employees who complete four years of service in a cadre without receiving a promotion are statutorily and scheme-wise entitled to placement in the next higher grade pay under the ACPS, and denying this while granting it to other similarly situated counterparts is discriminatory under Articles 14 and 16.
  • Distinction Between Pay Revision and ACPS: Financial enhancements resulting from general pay commission recommendations or initial pay fixations do not constitute “financial upgradation” under ACPS and cannot be used as a ground to deny ACPS entitlements that become due after completion of the prescribed years of service.
  • Recurring Cause of Action / Continuing Wrong: Citing the Supreme Court dictum in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, the Court ruled that the wrongful withholding of pay increments via ACPS creates a continuing source of injury every month; hence, the claim cannot be defeated by delay and laches, though arrears are restricted to a period of three years prior to the filing of the writ petition.
  • Final Directions: The petitions were allowed, and the respondent-Bank was directed to grant the benefit of ACPS to the petitioners upon completion of four years of service with all consequential benefits, restricting actual monetary arrears to three years prior to the petition’s filing and awarding 6% annual interest in the event of default within three months.

STPL (Web) 2026 HP 521

Ajay Kumar and Others v. Himachal Pradesh State Co-operative Bank Ltd. (D.O.J. 22.06.2026)

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Arbitration: Nullity of Unilateral Appointments: High Court Sets Aside Arbitral Award

The petitioner and the respondent-Department cross-challenged an arbitral award dated 24.09.2022 passed in a dispute arising from a public works contract. The sole arbitrator had been unilaterally appointed by a serving Chief Engineer of the HPPWD, who is an employee of one of the contesting parties. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh set aside the arbitral award, holding that under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an official who is an employee of a contesting party is statutorily ineligible to act as an arbitrator, and consequently lacks the legal competence to appoint or nominate any other person as a sole arbitrator. The Court ruled that an award rendered by an arbitrator so appointed is void ab initio, non est in the eyes of the law, and in direct conflict with public policy.

  • Ineligibility of Appointing Authorities and Nominees:
    • Under Section 12(5) and the Seventh Schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an employee, consultant, or person having a business relationship with a contesting party is statutorily ineligible to act as an arbitrator.
    • As settled in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Limited, an authority that is itself disqualified from acting as an arbitrator is equally disqualified from appointing or nominating any other person as a sole arbitrator.
  • Strict Requirement for Waiver under Proviso to Section 12(5):
    • The statutory bar under Section 12(5) can only be waived pursuant to the proviso if there is an express agreement in writing executed after the disputes have arisen.
    • Conduct, oral consent, or mere participation in proceedings (such as a ‘no objection’ recorded in a procedural order) cannot substitute the mandatory requirement of an express written agreement, and is inconsequential.

STPL (Web) 2026 HP 550

Balbir Singh Versus Executive Engineer, B & R Division, HPPWD, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, HP. (D.O.J. 13.07.2026)

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Absence of Holograms: High Court Quashes FIR Under Section 39 and Directs Compounding

The petitioner, proprietor of a liquor bottling plant, sought the quashing of an FIR registered under Sections 39(1) and 39(2) of the Himachal Pradesh Excise Act after search operations revealed that certain liquor bottles in his possession lacked requisite holograms. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petition under Section 482 of the CrPC, holding that the failure to affix holograms does not constitute unlawful production, manufacture, possession, transport, or sale under Section 39 of the Act, but rather constitutes a breach of license conditions punishable under Section 43, which is compoundable. Ruling that continuing criminal proceedings under Section 39 was an abuse of process, the Court quashed the FIR and, to bring finality to the matter, imposed a composite penalty of ₹1.00 lakh in lieu of pending Section 43 proceedings.

  • Distinction Between Section 39 and Section 43 of the Himachal Pradesh Excise Act:
    • The omission or failure on the part of a licensee or manufacturer to affix requisite holograms on liquor bottles does not attract penal consequences under Sections 39(1) and 39(2) of the Himachal Pradesh Excise Act, which target unlawful production, manufacture, possession, import, export, transport, or sale.
    • Such a statutory or license omission falls squarely under Section 43 of the Act, which deals with breaches of license conditions by a licensee and is compoundable under the statute.
  • Quashing of Criminal Proceedings:
    • Prosecuting a licensee under Section 39 for missing holograms is legally unsustainable and constitutes an abuse of the process of the court.
    • Noting that co-accused individuals similarly situated had already obtained relief from the High Court, the criminal proceedings against the petitioner were ordered to be quashed.
  • Settlement and Imposition of Penalty:
    • To put a quietus to the litigation and bypass protracted departmental proceedings, the High Court exercised its authority to impose a penalty of ₹1.00 lakh upon the petitioner under Section 43 of the Act, directing payment to the Excise Department within four weeks to conclude all pending proceedings.

STPL (Web) 2026 HP 549

Manik Kumar Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. (D.O.J. 14.07.2026)

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Misinterpretation of Disability Rights: High Court Denies Mandamus for Supernumerary Post Creation

The petitioner, a 100% visually impaired employee serving as a District Inspector/District Audit Officer, sought a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to create a supernumerary post at Rampur under Section 20(4) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and to adjust him at that station. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the writ petition, holding that Section 20(4) and its provisos regarding supernumerary posts apply strictly to employees who acquire a disability during their service and do not apply to individuals who were initially appointed directly under the quota reserved for persons with benchmark disabilities. The Court ruled that the statute does not mandate or provide for the creation of supernumerary posts for persons with disabilities appointed as such ab initio.

  • Scope and Applicability of Section 20(4) of the RPwD Act, 2016:
    • Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and its provisos (including the provision for supernumerary posts) apply strictly to employees who acquire a disability during their service.
    • These provisions are entirely inapplicable to an employee who was initially appointed to service against the quota reserved for persons with benchmark disabilities.
  • Absence of Statutory Mandate for Supernumerary Posts in Initial Appointments:
    • The statutory framework of the RPwD Act, 2016, does not contemplate or provide for the creation of supernumerary posts to accommodate a person with a disability who entered service as such.
    • A mandamus cannot be issued to compel authorities to create a supernumerary post or to post an officer at a station where the sanctioned post does not exist.

STPL (Web) 2026 HP 548

Shishu Pal Mehta Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Another (D.O.J. 14.07.2026)

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Service Law: High Court Quashes Premature Transfer of Employee Posted via Judicial Order

The petitioner, who had been posted to PHC Pragpur only a few months earlier pursuant to a judicial order, challenged a subsequent transfer order issued via a triangular arrangement that moved her to PHC Dhaliara. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the writ petition and quashed the premature transfer order, holding that the displacement was arbitrary and lacked administrative logic since the private respondent could have been adjusted directly at the alternative station located merely 10 kilometers away without disturbing the petitioner’s normal tenure.

  • Protection of Normal Tenure against Arbitrary Displacement:
    • Where an employee is posted to a station pursuant to an earlier judicial order and has completed only a few months of service, a subsequent transfer effected via a triangular arrangement without valid administrative justification is arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
    • The State cannot disrupt an employee’s normal tenure when simpler, direct administrative alternatives are available.
  • Absence of Administrative Logic in Triangular Transfers:
    • When a private respondent can be adjusted directly at a nearby alternative station (such as 10 kilometers away) and a simple two-way transfer between other parties is feasible, roping in a recently-placed employee through a complex triangular arrangement is unjustified.
  • Final Relief and Directions:
    • The impugned transfer order moving the petitioner from Pragpur to Dhaliara was quashed and set aside.
    • The respondent-authorities were directed to allow the petitioner to complete her normal tenure at Pragpur, while leaving the Department at liberty to post the private respondent directly at Dhaliara.

STPL (Web) 2026 HP 547

Smt. Anjana Kumari Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Others (D.O.J. 14.07.2026)

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