Permissibility of Cross-Examination on Trademark Usage Without a Written Statement

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This appeal addresses whether a defendant, whose written statement has not been taken on record, is legally entitled to cross-examine the plaintiff on a question challenging the foundation of a trademark infringement and damages suit. The Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff affirmatively claims trademark and copyright infringement, the defendant retains the right to cross-examine the plaintiff regarding the substantiation of their trademark use, regardless of whether a written statement is on record. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s order that had expunged the question, allowing the trial to proceed with the recall of the plaintiff for recording the answer.

  • Nature of the Dispute:
    • The respondent (plaintiff) filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction against trademark and trade-dress infringement, a declaration of exclusive trademark rights under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and damages.
    • The appellant (defendant) sought to pose a cross-examination question regarding whether the plaintiff had documentation to show since when the brand name “BABA” had been used.
  • High Court vs. Supreme Court Standpoint:
    • The High Court had expunged the question from the record on the grounds that it was a purely factual question beyond permissible cross-examination because the defendant’s written statement was not on record.
    • The Supreme Court disagreed with this restriction, ruling that since the plaintiff’s case is fundamentally built on the assertion of trademark infringement and unique trade-dress usage, the defendant is fully entitled to question the plaintiff on documents substantiating the duration of the brand’s use.
  • Final Directions:
    • The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and reversed the impugned order of the High Court.
    • The trial is directed to proceed after recalling the plaintiff to record the answer to the disputed question.
    • The Court explicitly clarified that it made no observations on the merits of the case, leaving both parties free to agitate their contentions during the trial.

2026 INSC 819

Shabu KN Achary v. Dharampal Premchand Limited (D.O.J. 07.08.2026)

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Ensuring Equitable Child and Spousal Maintenance Amidst Medical Hardship and Income Realities

August 12, 2026 No Comments

This civil appeal challenges the Delhi High Court’s final and clarification orders regarding child maintenance, spousal support, and contempt proceedings. The Supreme Court reviewed the financial capacity of the respondent-husband, noting that voluntary deductions such as Provident Fund contributions and employee stock savings plans (ESPPs) should not be treated as permanent or compulsory deductions to dilute net disposable income for maintenance computations. Recognizing the appellant-wife’s diagnosis of aggressive breast cancer and the documented rising expenses of the two minor children, the Supreme Court enhanced the total child maintenance to Rs. 1,50,000 per month (Rs. 75,000 per child) effective from January 1, 2025, increased the appellant-wife’s maintenance to Rs. 30,000 per month, and directed compliance within three months.

  • Factual & Procedural Background:
    • Following marital discord and separation, the appellant-wife instituted divorce proceedings alongside an application for interim maintenance under Sections 24 and 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
    • The Family Court and subsequently the Delhi High Court incrementally adjusted child maintenance, leading to an enhancement to Rs. 1,25,000 per month for both children by the High Court.
    • During the pendency of the proceedings, the appellant-wife was diagnosed with aggressive breast cancer, prompting the High Court to grant interim maintenance of Rs. 20,000 per month to her, though issues regarding arrears and voluntary salary deductions remained contentious.
  • Supreme Court’s Analysis on Income and Deductions:
    • The Court evaluated the respondent-husband’s gross salary of approximately Rs. 4,50,000 per month, supplemented by an average annual bonus.
    • It accepted the appellant’s submission that deductions towards Provident Fund (PF) and Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) are savings and future benefits rather than mandatory statutory taxes (like Income Tax or professional tax), and thus should not reduce the net disposable income pool available for calculating maintenance.
  • Modifications and Final Directions:
    • Child Maintenance: Enhanced to a total of Rs. 1,50,000 per month (Rs. 75,000 per child per month) effective from January 1, 2025, with liberty reserved for the appellant to seek future enhancements upon changed circumstances.
    • Spousal Support: Factoring in the medical expenses for the appellant-wife’s cancer treatment while looking after both children, her maintenance was increased to Rs. 30,000 per month.
    • Compliance: The respondent-husband was directed to fulfill all pending financial obligations, arrears, and vehicle transfer undertakings in terms of the prior High Court directions within a strict timeline of three months.

2026 INSC 822

Harpreet Sawhney v. Puneet Sharma (D.O.J. 10.08.2026)

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Taxation: Applicability of Omission of Rule 96(10) of the CGST Rules to Pending Proceedings

August 12, 2026 No Comments

This batch of appeals and special leave petitions concerns whether the omission of sub-rule (10) of Rule 96 of the Central Goods and Services Tax (CGST) Rules, 2017—which restricted the refund of integrated tax paid on exported goods and services—applies to all pending proceedings as of the date of its omission. The Supreme Court held that since the provision was omitted without a saving clause or a sunset clause, and because the GST Council’s recommendation for prospective application is merely advisory, the omission completely obliterates the rule from the statute book for pending actions. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court’s view, bringing finality and closure to nationwide litigations surrounding this issue.

  • Core Legal Question:
    • Whether sub-rule (10) of Rule 96 of the CGST Rules, omitted by Notification No. 20/2024 effective October 8, 2024, inures to the benefit of assessees in pending proceedings regarding the refund of integrated tax on exports without the restrictions previously imposed by the sub-rule.
  • Arguments of the Parties:
    • Assessees / Respondents: Argued that the omission of the sub-rule without any saving clause means it applies squarely to all pending proceedings, as the effect of deleting a provision under common law is to completely obliterate it from the statute book as if it never existed (relying on Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India).
    • Union of India / Department: Relied on the 54th GST Council meeting’s recommendations, which suggested that the omission should apply prospectively because the rule was deleted due to “unnecessary complications”.
  • Supreme Court’s Analysis and Findings:
    • Absence of Saving Clause: The Court emphasized that the legislature did not incorporate a saving clause or a sunset clause when omitting Rule 96(10).
    • Advisory Nature of Council Recommendations: The recommendations of the GST Council are purely advisory and do not legally bind the rule-making authority to enforce prospective application.
    • Obliteration of Omitted Rules: Applying the Constitution Bench precedent in Kolhapur Canesugar Works, the Court reiterated that an omitted rule ceases to exist for pending actions unless a legal fiction or saving provision is explicitly enacted to keep it alive. The intention behind omitting a provision that caused “unnecessary complications” could not be to keep those very complications alive for pending cases.
  • Final Directions:
    • The appeals filed by the Union of India were dismissed, and the assessees’ challenges against the vires of the rule were dismissed as infructuous.
    • The Registry of the Supreme Court was directed to send a copy of the order to all High Courts to ensure pending matters on the subject receive prompt closure.

2026 INSC 821

M/s Goodluck India Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (D.O.J. 06.08.2026)

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Modification of Conviction from Murder to Culpable Homicide Due to Prosecutorial Inconsistencies

August 12, 2026 No Comments

This criminal appeal by the State of Andhra Pradesh challenges the High Court’s judgment that altered the respondents’ conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (murder) to Section 304 Part II of the IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder), reducing their sentence to six years of rigorous imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the State’s appeal, noting substantial inconsistencies in the prosecution’s evidence regarding the site of the attack, witness testimonies, and the reliability of the victim’s dying declaration. Although the Supreme Court criticized the High Court’s use of surmises and conjectures in its reasoning, it declined to restore the murder conviction due to the insufficient and flawed evidence, bringing the matter to a quietus as the respondents had already served their modified sentence.

  • Prosecution Case & Trial Court Verdict:
    • The prosecution alleged that on the night of March 8/9, 2006, the respondents (A1 to A4) attacked the victim with sickles and iron pipes while he went to water his crops, due to a long-standing family feud.
    • The victim sustained 22 injuries and passed away shortly after giving a statement to the police.
    • The Sessions Court convicted A1 to A4 under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, sentencing them to life imprisonment.
  • High Court Modification:
    • The High Court of Andhra Pradesh altered the conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC and reduced the sentence to six years of rigorous imprisonment, reasoning on surmises that an intended murder by four armed persons would not have left the victim alive to be shifted to a hospital.
    • The State appealed this modification to the Supreme Court, while the respondents argued for complete acquittal, noting they had already served the six-year sentence.
  • Supreme Court’s Analysis of Evidence:
    • Contradictory Witness Accounts: PW1 claimed the victim was attacked in the fields and carried to a graveyard, whereas PW3 claimed the assault happened at the graveyard and the victim was loaded into a jeep—contradictions that severely undermined the reliability of the site of occurrence and eyewitness presence.
    • Dying Declaration Doubts: The detailed “blow-by-blow” statement recorded by the police (Exhibit P10) alongside overwriting and discrepancies in medical intimation timings (Exhibit P6) created serious doubt regarding the victim’s physical and mental capacity to provide such an elaborate statement given his 22 severe injuries.
    • Critique of High Court’s Reasoning: The Supreme Court explicitly disapproved of the High Court’s reliance on surmises and conjectures (speculating on how attackers would behave) when no witness had deposed on those lines.
  • Final Ruling:
    • Despite pointing out the flaws in the High Court’s theoretical reasoning, the Supreme Court held that the actual evidence on record was fundamentally insufficient to restore the original murder conviction under Section 302 IPC.
    • Because the respondents had already served the six-year rigorous imprisonment sentence imposed by the High Court and did not challenge it further, the Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeal to bring finality to the matter.

2026 INSC 820

The State of Andhra Pradesh Home Department v. Ponthati Siva Rami Reddy and Ors. (D.O.J. 10.08.2026)

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Permissibility of Cross-Examination on Trademark Usage Without a Written Statement

August 12, 2026 No Comments

This appeal addresses whether a defendant, whose written statement has not been taken on record, is legally entitled to cross-examine the plaintiff on a question challenging the foundation of a trademark infringement and damages suit. The Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff affirmatively claims trademark and copyright infringement, the defendant retains the right to cross-examine the plaintiff regarding the substantiation of their trademark use, regardless of whether a written statement is on record. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s order that had expunged the question, allowing the trial to proceed with the recall of the plaintiff for recording the answer.

  • Nature of the Dispute:
    • The respondent (plaintiff) filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction against trademark and trade-dress infringement, a declaration of exclusive trademark rights under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and damages.
    • The appellant (defendant) sought to pose a cross-examination question regarding whether the plaintiff had documentation to show since when the brand name “BABA” had been used.
  • High Court vs. Supreme Court Standpoint:
    • The High Court had expunged the question from the record on the grounds that it was a purely factual question beyond permissible cross-examination because the defendant’s written statement was not on record.
    • The Supreme Court disagreed with this restriction, ruling that since the plaintiff’s case is fundamentally built on the assertion of trademark infringement and unique trade-dress usage, the defendant is fully entitled to question the plaintiff on documents substantiating the duration of the brand’s use.
  • Final Directions:
    • The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and reversed the impugned order of the High Court.
    • The trial is directed to proceed after recalling the plaintiff to record the answer to the disputed question.
    • The Court explicitly clarified that it made no observations on the merits of the case, leaving both parties free to agitate their contentions during the trial.

2026 INSC 819

Shabu KN Achary v. Dharampal Premchand Limited (D.O.J. 07.08.2026)

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