High Court Strikes Down Electricity Duty on Diesel Generating Sets for Self-Consumption

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The petitioner approached the High Court of Himachal Pradesh challenging Section 3(1)(xi) of the Himachal Pradesh Electricity (Duty) Act, 2009, and the subsequent notification dated September 1, 2023, which increased the electricity duty rate from 30 paisa to 45 paisa per unit on diesel generating (DG) sets used for captive or standby consumption. The petitioner argued that utilizing DG sets is a compulsion during frequent power cuts by the electricity board to prevent industrial losses, and levying a duty on self-consumed energy exceeds the scope of the charging section. The State defended the duty as a fiscal policy matter under Entry 53 of List II aimed at curbing air pollution and promoting sustainable energy alternatives.

The High Court held that under the charging provisions of Section 3 of the 2009 Act, electricity duty is only leviable on energy consumed by the Board, licensees, electricity traders, or generating companies, or supplied by them to consumers. The statute does not empower the State to levy electricity duty on energy generated by a consumer through diesel generating sets or other modes for standalone, captive consumption. Consequently, Section 3(1)(xi) was found to be outside the scope of the charging section and legally unsustainable.

  • Scope of the Charging Section: Section 3 of the 2009 Act strictly limits the levy of electricity duty to energy consumed by specific entities (the Board, licensees, electricity traders, or generating companies) or energy supplied by those entities to consumers.
  • Exclusion of Captive Consumers: A consumer generating electricity via diesel generating sets for self-consumption or standby purposes does not fall within the category of entities authorized by the charging provision to be taxed for generation.
  • Inapplicability of Precedents: Apex Court judgments cited by the State—such as Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills and Swaroop Vegetables—were distinguished because the governing statutes in those cases explicitly included “producers consuming their own energy” or “any person consuming energy from his own source” within their respective charging sections.
  • Validity of Remaining Provisions: While the court acknowledged the State’s overall legislative competence under Entry 53 to tax the consumption or sale of electricity, the specific mechanics of Section 3(1)(xi) failed due to a drafting lacuna in the charging section. As a result, Section 3(1)(xi)—to the extent it permits charging duty on diesel generating sets for own consumption—was quashed, while the remainder of the Act stayed in force.

STPL (Web) 2026 HP 585

M/s Ruchira Papers Ltd. v. HPSEBL & Another (D.O.J. 07.08.2026)

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Limitation: High Court Affirms Dismissal of Cheque Dishonour Complaint Due to Delayed Legal Notice

August 9, 2026 No Comments

The applicant/complainant filed an application seeking leave to appeal against the judgment dated November 7, 2024, passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1, Kangra, which resulted in the acquittal of the accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). The trial court had dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the statutory legal notice of demand was issued beyond the mandatory 30-day period stipulated under Section 138(b) of the NI Act.

The High Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, upholding the trial court’s decision. The Court reiterated that while computing the 30-day limitation period for issuing a legal notice following the dishonour of a cheque, the starting date (the date of receipt of the bank intimation/memo) must be excluded. In this case, even after excluding the date of receipt (August 6, 2018), the legal notice issued on September 6, 2018, fell on the 31st day, thereby violating the mandatory statutory requirement and rendering the complaint not maintainable.

  • Computation of Limitation Period under Section 138(b) NI Act:
    • While computing the 30-day window prescribed under Section 138(b) of the NI Act for issuing a valid legal demand notice, the date on which the complainant receives intimation of dishonour from the bank must be excluded.
  • Calculation in the Present Case:
    • The bank memo of dishonour was received on August 6, 2018, and the legal notice was dispatched on September 6, 2018.
    • Even after excluding the initial date of receipt, the notice was issued on the 31st day, which exceeded the mandatory 30-day statutory limit.
  • Maintainability of Complaint:
    • Issuance of a legal notice within 30 days of receiving information about the unpaid cheque is an indispensable condition precedent for maintaining a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. Because this condition was unfulfilled, the trial court was fully justified in dismissing the complaint.

STPL (Web) 2026 HP 591

Ravinder Kumar v. Anil Kumar (D.O.J. 07.08.2026)

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NDPS: Conviction Upheld for Charas Possession:State Appeal Against Acquittal also Dismised

August 9, 2026 No Comments

The State/Appellant challenged the judgment of conviction and sentence dated January 2, 2024, passed by the Special Judge, Solan, whereby the respondent-accused was convicted under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act) and sentenced to undergo six years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 60,000. The prosecution case was that during patrolling on January 2, 2018, police intercepted the accused upon seeing him turn back suspiciously, leading to the recovery of 680 grams of charas from a carry bag in his possession.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court’s appreciation of evidence was sound and free from legal infirmity. The Court reaffirmed that Section 50 of the NDPS Act is strictly confined to personal searches and does not extend to bags or baggage. It further held that official testimonies of police personnel are credible unless malafides are proven, that non-production of the seal is not fatal when safe custody and intact seals are established, and that procedural gaps under Section 52A do not invalidate a conviction if the primary evidence and chain of custody inspire full confidence.

  • Applicability of Section 50 (NDPS Act):
    • Section 50 is strictly applicable only to the search of the person of an accused and does not apply to searches of articles, bags, briefcases, or vehicles carried by them.
    • Failure to apprise an accused of their right under Section 50 during the search of a carry bag does not vitiate the recovery.
  • Credibility of Official Witnesses and Independent Witnesses:
    • The testimonies of police officials carry the same evidentiary value as those of other witnesses and cannot be discarded merely due to the absence of independent witnesses, especially during chance recoveries on patrolling duty.
    • In the absence of proof of motive for false implication, trustworthy police testimonies provide a valid foundation for a conviction.
  • Effect of Non-Production of Seals and Compliance under Section 52A:
    • There is no mandatory legal provision requiring the physical production of the seal during trial, provided trustworthy evidence proves the case property remained intact and free from tampering.
    • Minor procedural lapses or non-compliance under Section 52A are not fatal to a trial if other oral and documentary evidence establishes recovery, safe custody, and conscious possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

STPL (Web) 2026 HP 590

State of H.P. v. Rahul (D.O.J. 07.08.2026)

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Proving Title and Matrimonial Status:Court Restores Trial Court Judgment in Long-Standing Property Dispute

August 9, 2026 No Comments

The appellants (defendants) challenged the appellate court judgment which had reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s civil suit. The plaintiff had claimed ownership of the estate of the deceased Garibu, asserting she was his legally wedded wife, whereas the defendants contended they were the natural brothers and sister of the deceased. The lower appellate court had relied upon an unregistered agreement, voter lists, and an unproved gift deed to establish the plaintiff’s marital status and rule in her favour.

The High Court allowed the second appeal, setting aside the appellate court’s decree and restoring the trial court’s dismissal of the suit. The Court ruled that a registered gift deed cannot be admitted into evidence or relied upon through a mere certified copy or summoned Sub-Registrar’s volume without fulfilling the mandatory requirements of examining an attesting witness under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that strict rules of evidence enacted by the legislature cannot be bypassed under the guise of “technical grounds,” and unproved documents or inadmissible admissions cannot establish a valid marriage without proof of customary or traditional rites.

  • Mandatory Proof of Gift Deeds:
    • A gift deed is a document required by law to be attested, and its execution must be proved by examining at least one attesting witness under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act.
    • Merely summoning Volume-I from the Sub-Registrar’s office or producing a certified copy does not dispense with foundational secondary evidence requirements or statutory attestation proof.
  • Strict Application of the Evidence Act:
    • The Indian Evidence Act prohibits the employment of any evidence not specifically authorized by the statute.
    • Judges possess no dispensing power to admit inadmissible or irrelevant evidence based on a subjective view of advancing “substantial justice,” and rejecting inadmissible evidence is a binding legal duty rather than acting on “technical grounds”.
  • Proof of Marriage and Relationships:
    • Electoral rolls and self-serving agreements do not constitute conclusive substantive proof of marriage or legal relationships unless backed by proper foundational testimony or recognized customary rites (such as traditional ceremonies or recognized forms like Chaderandanzi).

STPL (Web) 2026 HP 589

Roshan Lal & Others v. Des Raj (Deceased) through LRs (D.O.J. 06.08.2026)

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Service Law: High Court Dismisses Plea Against Upgraded ACRs and Supersession by Co-employee

August 9, 2026 No Comments

The petitioner, a medical professional, filed a writ petition challenging the modification and upgrading of five annual confidential reports (ACRs) of a private colleague (respondent No. 7) from “Very Good” to “Outstanding” by the accepting authority, which subsequently enabled the colleague to supersede him in a 2015 Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) meeting for the post of Assistant Professor. The petitioner sought to quash the ACR upgrades, the DPC minutes, and prayed for a comprehensive inquiry into the process.

The High Court dismissed the petition, ruling that a co-employee lacks the locus standi to challenge the subjective grading or up-gradation of a colleague’s ACRs. The Court emphasized that ACR assessments are strictly matters between the employer and the employee, and courts will not conduct roving inquiries or substitute subjective performance evaluations in the absence of concrete, cogent material establishing mala fides or lack of statutory authority. Furthermore, the Court held that the petition was severely hit by delay and laches.

  • Locus Standi to Challenge ACRs of Co-Employees:
    • While an employee whose promotional prospects are affected may challenge the expungement of adverse remarks, a co-employee has no locus standi or legal right to question the positive grading, subjective assessment, or up-gradation of a colleague’s performance ratings (such as from “Very Good” to “Outstanding”).
    • ACR evaluations represent a confidential matter between the employer and the individual employee, and no third-party colleague can dictate how another’s performance should be rated.
  • Scope of Judicial Review over Subjective Assessments:
    • Courts will not act as an appellate body to review or second-guess the subjective performance evaluations and up-gradations made by reporting, reviewing, and accepting authorities unless clear arbitrariness, statutory violation, or proven mala fides are demonstrated with cogent evidence.
    • Allegations that an accepting authority was “hand in glove” with a candidate cannot be entertained when based purely on assumptions without supporting documentation.
  • Delay and Laches:
    • A challenge to promotion decisions and DPC proceedings brought forward after an inordinate delay (nearly five years) without a plausible, credible explanation is barred by the principles of delay and laches.

STPL (Web) 2026 HP 588

Dr. Mukesh Surya v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others (D.O.J. 05.08.2026)

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