Fishing Rights Agreement Deemed a Lease Subject to Stamp Duty

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The primary question addressed in this appeal was whether a deed granting fishing rights in the Sharda Sagar Jalashya for a period of three years (from 05.09.1998 to 30.06.2001) constituted a lease of immovable property and was consequently chargeable to stamp duty. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the Collector, the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (CCA), and the High Court, which directed the appellant to pay a deficit stamp fee of Rs. 15,72,525/-. The Court ruled that granting rights to catch and rear fish amounts to a profit à prendre, which is legally considered a benefit arising out of land and thus classified as immovable property. Because the agreement spanned three years and exceeded a value of Rs. 100/-, it qualified as a lease requiring compulsory registration and stamp duty under Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908, and Section 2(16) of the Stamp Act, 1899.

  • Nature of Fishing Rights (Profit à Prendre): The right to enter a water body to catch and carry away fish over a specified future period is recognized as a profit à prendre—a benefit arising out of land. Under Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, such benefits are designated as immovable property.
  • Statutory Restrictions vs. License Duration: Although fishing activities were restricted to ten months per year due to statutory breeding season prohibitions under the U.S. Fisheries Act, 1948 and the U.S. Fisheries Rules, 1954, this regulatory suspension did not reduce the actual three-year duration of the license itself.
  • Mandatory Registration and Stamp Duty: Because the agreement was granted for a duration exceeding one year and valued above Rs. 100/-, it operated legally as a lease rather than a mere license. Consequently, it attracted compulsory registration under Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908, and mandated appropriate stamp duty.
  • Distinction from Precedents: The appellant’s reliance on the coordinate bench order in Farookh Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh was rejected. The Supreme Court clarified that Farookh Ahmad was distinguishable because that matter involved a failure by the High Court to examine the specific terms and conditions of the document, whereas the authorities in the present case thoroughly analyzed the agreement to determine its lease character.

2026 INSC 827

Zaki Ullah Khan v. State of U.P. and Ors. (D.O.J. 15.07.2026)

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Supreme Court Upholds Partnership Registration but Dismisses Recovery Suit as Barred by Limitation

August 13, 2026 No Comments

This civil appeal challenged a First Appellate Court judgment that had reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a money recovery suit and decreed the claim in favor of the respondent partnership firm. While the Supreme Court agreed that the plaintiff-firm’s registration had been legally proved via a Memorandum of Registration and additional certified documents, it ruled that the underlying recovery claim based on specific invoices was barred by limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff’s suit on the ground of limitation.

  • Trial Court and First Appeal Findings: The trial court had dismissed the respondent’s recovery suit under Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, holding that the firm’s registration was unproven. However, the First Appellate Court reversed this, held that Exhibit-8 (Memorandum of Registration) and additional documents under Order XLI Rule 27 conclusively established registration, and decreed the suit for 24,36,105/- with interest.
  • Status of Partnership Registration: The Supreme Court affirmed the First Appellate Court’s finding on the firm’s registration, noting that Exhibit-8 issued by the Registrar of Firms, West Bengal, along with the certified copy of Form-VIII, clearly established that the respondent was a registered partnership firm with registration number L73931.
  • Analysis of Limitation and Invoices: Examining the nature of the suit, the Court observed that the recovery was sought on the strength of individual bills/invoices rather than a mutual, open, and current running account.
  • Inapplicability of Section 14 and Acknowledgment: The Court noted that even if the time spent prosecuting a prior winding-up petition before the Company Court was excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the filing date (10.02.2009) still fell outside the limitation period for the primary bills dated 30.01.2006, while the remaining unpaid bills dated up to 06.03.2007 were similarly time-bound when the suit was instituted on 05.06.2010. Furthermore, reply communication (Annexure P-18) did not constitute an acknowledgment of the disputed debt.
  • Final Ruling: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the First Appellate Court’s judgment granting recovery, and firmly dismissed the respondent’s suit as barred by limitation, despite ruling in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of partnership registration.

2026 INSC 839

Mageba Bridge Products Private Limited v. M/s. Trade Centre (D.O.J. 12.08.2026)

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Supreme Court Upholds Maintainability of Composite Appeal Against Common Judgment in Consolidated Suits

August 13, 2026 No Comments

This civil appeal addresses whether a composite appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is maintainable against a common judgment rendered in two civil suits filed by the same plaintiff that were clubbed together and tried on common evidence. The Supreme Court held that where all necessary requirements—such as payment of requisite court fees for both decrees, filing certified copies of both decrees, and a clear prayer to set aside the common judgment—are fulfilled, a composite appeal is entirely maintainable. The Court set aside the High Court’s decision which had non-suited the appellants on technical grounds, emphasizing that procedural rules are the handmaid of justice and form must not override substance.

  • Filing of Suits and Consolidation: The plaintiff filed two separate suits—one for declaring a registered sale deed null and void, and another for permanent injunction. Upon request, both suits were clubbed by the trial court, common evidence was recorded, and both were dismissed via a common judgment dated 07.12.1990.
  • Composite Appeal and First Appellate Court Ruling: The unsuccessful plaintiff filed a single composite appeal under Section 96 of the Code, paying court fees for both decrees, attaching certified copies of both decrees, and praying to set aside the common judgment. The first appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed both suits.
  • High Court Interference: The High Court of Karnataka allowed the second appeals filed by the defendants, holding that a single composite appeal against a common judgment in two separate suits was untenable, thereby leaving the appellants remediless without a decision on merits.
  • Validity of Composite Appeal: The Supreme Court observed that all statutory prerequisites under Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 1 of the Code were fully met, and any missing separate memorandum was merely a curable defect of form rather than substance.
  • Inapplicability of Res Judicata: Citing precedents such as Narhari v. Shankar, the Court reiterated that the principle of res judicata does not apply within the same consolidated proceedings or where a common judgment is appealed against, as there are no independent prior decisions.
  • Final Ruling: The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeals, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and restored the second appeals to the High Court for fresh adjudication on merits.

2026 INSC 838

Bassanna Since Deceased by LRs. and Others v. Bhimanna and Others (D.O.J. 12.08.2026)

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This appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, which had mistakenly accepted a self-serving statement of account produced by a debtor trust and scaled down loan dues based on an isolated bank certificate. The Supreme Court examined the standard accounting practices of banking institutions—specifically the maintenance of suspense accounts for interest accrued post-NPA classification—and corrected the financial ledger calculations, ultimately setting aside the High Court’s orders and restoring the order passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), Kolkata. Loan Disbursal and NPA Classification: United Bank of India (predecessor of Punjab National Bank/PNB) sanctioned a loan of 5 crore to the Trust on 27.06.2011, which later became a non-performing asset (NPA) on 30.06.2017. Proceedings Before the DRT: The bank filed O.A. No. 258 of 2018 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Cuttack, to recover outstanding dues. On 05.02.2021, the DRT allowed the application directing recovery of a specified residual sum. Appellate Intervention (DRAT): Upon appeal, the DRAT, Kolkata, factored in subsequent deposits and calculated the total dues payable by the Trust as 54,90,413/-, along with pendente lite and future simple interest at 9% per annum from 05.02.2018 until realization. PNB accepted this appellate order. High Court Error: The Trust challenged the DRAT order before the High Court via W.P. (C) No. 32036 of 2023. The High Court relied heavily on a certificate dated 24.12.2020 issued by PNB and reduced the liability to 29,55,678.02 paisa, subsequently dismissing PNB’s recall application. Supreme Court’s Analysis of Accounts: The Supreme Court evaluated the statement of account and noted that as of 30.06.2017 (the NPA date), the principal loan amount plus interest stood at 1,25,30,842/-. Following banking norms, interest after NPA classification is maintained separately in a suspense account and does not vanish. Rejection of Debtor’s Calculation: The Supreme Court held that the Trust’s attempt to present a self-serving statement showing a negative balance and claiming an excess refund was patently erroneous and mischievous. Final Ruling: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s orders dated 11.01.2024 and 14.05.2024, and fully restored the DRAT’s order dated 01.09.2023 determining the dues at 54,90,413/- with 9% simple interest. 2026 INSC 836 Punjab National Bank v. M/s. Allied Educational Trust & Ors. (D.O.J. 12.08.2026)

August 13, 2026 No Comments

This appeal addressed the correct customs tariff classification of imported ‘Dryview 6850 Laser Imagers W/3D’ under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. After facing concurrent adverse findings from the Assistant Commissioner, the Commissioner (Appeals), and the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), the importer approached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court evaluated whether the laser imagers qualified as independent diagnostic apparatus or as accessories compatible with machines spanning different tariff headings, ultimately dismissing the appeal and upholding their re-classification under the residuary heading CTH 9033 00 00.

  • Import and Dispute: Carestream Health India Pvt. Ltd. imported laser imagers from China and initially classified them under Customs Tariff Heading (CTH) 9018 90 19 as “other diagnostic instruments and apparatus”. Revenue authorities rejected this, re-classifying them under residuary CTH 9033 00 00 as unspecified accessories for Chapter 90 machines.
  • Functionality of the Laser Imager: The imported device uses photothermographic technology to develop digital images onto film from inputs received from diagnostic equipment like MRIs, CT scans, and X-ray systems. However, it possesses no independent diagnostic skills or capabilities of its own.
  • Rejection of Importer’s Stand: The Supreme Court held that the laser imager cannot be termed a “diagnostic apparatus” per se because it lacks independent diagnostic capabilities, functioning instead as an accessory that prints data transmitted from diagnostic machinery.
  • Application of Chapter 90 Rules: Examining Note 2(b) and Rule 2(c) of Chapter 90, the Court noted that Rule 2(b) applies to accessories suitable for use “solely or principally” with machines under the same tariff heading.
  • Multi-Heading Compatibility: Because the laser imagers were compatible with machines falling under disparate tariff headings (such as CTH 9018 for MRIs/Ultrasound and CTH 9022 for CT/X-ray apparatus), they could not be funneled into CTH 9018 under Rule 2(b).
  • Final Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower authorities and CESTAT, ruling that multi-heading compatible accessories naturally fall under the residuary heading CTH 9033 00 00, thereby dismissing the importer’s appeal.

2026 INSC 837

M/s. Carestream Health India Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs (D.O.J. 12.08.2026)

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Supreme Court Restores DRAT’s Calculation on Bank Dues and Suspense Accounts

August 13, 2026 No Comments

This appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, which had mistakenly accepted a self-serving statement of account produced by a debtor trust and scaled down loan dues based on an isolated bank certificate. The Supreme Court examined the standard accounting practices of banking institutions—specifically the maintenance of suspense accounts for interest accrued post-NPA classification—and corrected the financial ledger calculations, ultimately setting aside the High Court’s orders and restoring the order passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), Kolkata.

  • Loan Disbursal and NPA Classification: United Bank of India (predecessor of Punjab National Bank/PNB) sanctioned a loan of 5 crore to the Trust on 27.06.2011, which later became a non-performing asset (NPA) on 30.06.2017.
  • Proceedings Before the DRT: The bank filed O.A. No. 258 of 2018 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Cuttack, to recover outstanding dues. On 05.02.2021, the DRT allowed the application directing recovery of a specified residual sum.
  • Appellate Intervention (DRAT): Upon appeal, the DRAT, Kolkata, factored in subsequent deposits and calculated the total dues payable by the Trust as 54,90,413/-, along with pendente lite and future simple interest at 9% per annum from 05.02.2018 until realization. PNB accepted this appellate order.
  • High Court Error: The Trust challenged the DRAT order before the High Court via W.P. (C) No. 32036 of 2023. The High Court relied heavily on a certificate dated 24.12.2020 issued by PNB and reduced the liability to 29,55,678.02 paisa, subsequently dismissing PNB’s recall application.
  • Supreme Court’s Analysis of Accounts: The Supreme Court evaluated the statement of account and noted that as of 30.06.2017 (the NPA date), the principal loan amount plus interest stood at 1,25,30,842/-. Following banking norms, interest after NPA classification is maintained separately in a suspense account and does not vanish.
  • Rejection of Debtor’s Calculation: The Supreme Court held that the Trust’s attempt to present a self-serving statement showing a negative balance and claiming an excess refund was patently erroneous and mischievous.
  • Final Ruling: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s orders dated 11.01.2024 and 14.05.2024, and fully restored the DRAT’s order dated 01.09.2023 determining the dues at 54,90,413/- with 9% simple interest.

2026 INSC 836

Punjab National Bank v. M/s. Allied Educational Trust & Ors. (D.O.J. 12.08.2026)

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This appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, which had mistakenly accepted a self-serving statement of account produced by a debtor trust and scaled down loan dues based on an isolated bank certificate. The Supreme Court examined the standard accounting practices of banking institutions—specifically the maintenance of suspense accounts for interest accrued post-NPA classification—and corrected the financial ledger calculations, ultimately setting aside the High Court’s orders and restoring the order passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), Kolkata. Loan Disbursal and NPA Classification: United Bank of India (predecessor of Punjab National Bank/PNB) sanctioned a loan of 5 crore to the Trust on 27.06.2011, which later became a non-performing asset (NPA) on 30.06.2017. Proceedings Before the DRT: The bank filed O.A. No. 258 of 2018 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Cuttack, to recover outstanding dues. On 05.02.2021, the DRT allowed the application directing recovery of a specified residual sum. Appellate Intervention (DRAT): Upon appeal, the DRAT, Kolkata, factored in subsequent deposits and calculated the total dues payable by the Trust as 54,90,413/-, along with pendente lite and future simple interest at 9% per annum from 05.02.2018 until realization. PNB accepted this appellate order. High Court Error: The Trust challenged the DRAT order before the High Court via W.P. (C) No. 32036 of 2023. The High Court relied heavily on a certificate dated 24.12.2020 issued by PNB and reduced the liability to 29,55,678.02 paisa, subsequently dismissing PNB’s recall application. Supreme Court’s Analysis of Accounts: The Supreme Court evaluated the statement of account and noted that as of 30.06.2017 (the NPA date), the principal loan amount plus interest stood at 1,25,30,842/-. Following banking norms, interest after NPA classification is maintained separately in a suspense account and does not vanish. Rejection of Debtor’s Calculation: The Supreme Court held that the Trust’s attempt to present a self-serving statement showing a negative balance and claiming an excess refund was patently erroneous and mischievous. Final Ruling: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s orders dated 11.01.2024 and 14.05.2024, and fully restored the DRAT’s order dated 01.09.2023 determining the dues at 54,90,413/- with 9% simple interest. 2026 INSC 836 Punjab National Bank v. M/s. Allied Educational Trust & Ors. (D.O.J. 12.08.2026)

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