In Rajesh Kumar Sharma vs. M/S PDC Healthcare, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh upheld the conviction of a proprietor for a dishonored cheque of ₹1,65,000, ruling that the statutory bar on unregistered firms under Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act applies strictly to civil suits and does not preclude criminal prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act. The Court established that any partner is legally competent to initiate a complaint on behalf of the firm without a formal power of attorney or specific authorization, as each partner acts as an agent for the firm’s business. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed that a demand notice returned as “unclaimed” constitutes deemed service, and an accused who fails to pay the cheque amount within 15 days of receiving a court summons is legally barred from challenging the non-receipt of the initial notice.
- Maintainability of Complaints by Unregistered Firms
The petitioner challenged the complaint on the grounds that the respondent-firm was unregistered. The High Court rejected this, clarifying that Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, only bars civil proceedings for the recovery of money or the enforcement of contractual rights. Because proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments (NI) Act are criminal in nature and do not constitute civil recovery suits, an unregistered partnership firm is fully competent to maintain such a prosecution.
- Partner’s Authority to Represent the Firm
The Court addressed the objection that the managing partner filed the complaint without a specific power of attorney. It held that under Sections 19 and 22 of the Partnership Act, every partner is an agent of the firm for the purpose of its business. Unless specifically barred by the partnership deed, a partner has an enforceable right to act on behalf of the firm and does not require a separate resolution or authorization to initiate criminal proceedings for the firm’s benefit.
- Statutory Presumptions and the “Security Cheque” Defense
Once the accused admits their signature and the issuance of a cheque, the Court must apply the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act.
- Reverse Onus: The law presumes the cheque was issued for a legally enforceable debt, shifting the burden to the accused to prove a “probable defense”.
- Insufficient Rebuttal: The Court ruled that a bare assertion that a cheque was issued merely as “security” is insufficient to rebut the presumption. In this case, the accused failed to lead any evidence—beyond a mere denial in his Section 313 statement—to prove that the underlying debt for pharma products was non-existent.
- Deemed Service of Demand Notice
The petitioner argued the notice was never served as it was returned “unclaimed”. The Court held:
- Presumption of Delivery: If a notice is sent by registered post to the correct address, it is deemed served under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, even if returned “unclaimed”.
- The 15-Day Summons Rule: A drawer who genuinely claims non-receipt of notice has the opportunity to pay within 15 days of receiving the court summons. If they fail to pay upon receiving the summons and the complaint, they are legally barred from contending that there was no proper service.
- Punitive and Compensatory Sentencing
The High Court upheld the sentence of one year of simple imprisonment and a fine/compensation of ₹2,00,000. It emphasized that the object of the NI Act is both deterrent and restitutive. The Court reaffirmed that in the absence of exceptional circumstances, it is appropriate to levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount and include simple interest (typically 9% per annum) to ensure the complainant is properly compensated.
STPL (Web) 2026 HP 330
Rajesh Kumar Sharma V. M/S Pdc Healthcare (D.O.J. 15.06.2026)
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