Supreme Court Sets Aside Demolition Directive Amid Pending Regularization Proceedings

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This appeal addresses whether a High Court can direct the immediate demolition of alleged unauthorized constructions while a statutory regularization application and related larger issues regarding the validity of governing Government Orders are sub judice before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Madras High Court’s division bench order, holding that issuing coercive demolition directions runs contrary to earlier binding interim protections granted to the property owners and creates judicial inconsistency while the main regularization framework is still pending final adjudication.

  • Conflict with Prior Orders: The impugned High Court order directing the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) to remove unauthorized structures within eight weeks ignored its own prior coordinate bench order dated September 27, 2023, which explicitly restrained coercive steps pending the outcome of the Supreme Court proceedings.
  • Pending Regularization Status: The appellants’ applications for regularization filed under Section 113-C of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971, alongside related matters challenging the validity of relevant Government Orders, remain actively pending before the Supreme Court.
  • Avoidance of Judicial Inconsistency: The Supreme Court emphasized that courts must avoid passing conflicting orders on the same subject matter between the same parties and regulatory authorities while a core legal issue is awaiting a final verdict.
  • Restoration of Status Quo: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s demolition directive and directed that all parties remain governed by the earlier interim protective order.
  • Liberty to Agitate Later: Parties maintain the liberty to take appropriate further steps only after the central issues concerning regularization are finally resolved by the Supreme Court, with strict status quo to be maintained in the interim.

2026 INSC 912

G. Sathyanarayana Bothra & Others Versus M.D. Lokeswari & Another (D.O.J. 22.08.2026)

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Supreme Court Upholds Settlement and Reaffirms Limits of Third-Party Locus Standi in Execution Proceedings

August 29, 2026 No Comments

This civil appeal arose from a multi-layered litigation originating from a partition suit filed way back in 1940. The core controversy centered around an execution proceeding initiated in 1979 concerning a property in Solapur, where the original decree-holder entered into a compromise and settlement with third-party purchasers (predecessors of the appellants) who had bought a portion of the land from a co-sharer. While the High Court of Karnataka had interfered with and set aside the executing court’s acceptance of the compromise based on jurisdictional and third-party objections, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal. The Supreme Court held that since the contesting respondents did not claim through the original decree-holder and asserted an independent share, they lacked the locus standi to challenge a compromise that solely concerned the decree-holder’s personal rights and concessions made to the purchasers.

  • Validity of Compromise in Execution:
    • The Supreme Court held that although Section 39(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regulates the transfer of execution cases, a court executing a decree is fully competent to accept a bona fide compromise entered into between a decree-holder and specific judgment debtors or purchasers regarding their respective shares, obviating the need for further transfer.
  • Lack of Locus Standi to Challenge Settlements:
    • The respondents, claiming independent rights or status as legal heirs of other branches, had no right to challenge the compromise reached by the original decree-holder.
    • Because they did not claim through the decree-holder, they possessed no locus standi to question the lawful relinquishment or concession of the decree-holder’s share to the third-party purchasers.
  • Rights of Third-Party Purchasers and Co-Sharers:
    • The purchasers (appellants’ predecessors) who bought land from a co-sharer (Judgment Debtor No. 3A) and subsequently settled with the decree-holder effectively stepped into the shoes of the co-sharer to the extent of the land purchased.
    • Any broader claims of partition or separate allotment by other claimants must be independently agitated before the proper jurisdictional court at Solapur, subject to law.
  • Final Relief Granted by the Supreme Court:
    • The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the Karnataka High Court and dismissed the respondents’ writ petition.
    • The compromise accepted by the executing court at Belgaum was upheld and affirmed.
    • The Court explicitly clarified that the respondents have no claim whatsoever against the specific property parcel lawfully held in the possession of the appellants (derived from JD Nos. 12 to 15), as the execution proceedings had attained absolute finality as against them.

2026 INSC 921

Pradeep and Ors. v. Jagadishwari and Ors. (D.O.J. 20.08.2026)

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Supreme Court Quashes GST Notices Issued Under Extended Period Without Foundational Facts of Fraud

August 29, 2026 No Comments

This civil appeal challenged the validity of a Show Cause Notice (SCN) and subsequent Order-in-Original issued under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act), concerning financial years 2018-2019 to 2020-2021. The Supreme Court evaluated whether the Revenue can invoke the extended five-year period of limitation under Section 74—reserved for cases involving fraud, willful misstatement, or suppression of facts—through a mechanical recital of statutory keywords without establishing concrete foundational facts. Allowing the appeal, the Court held that the SCNs and consequential orders were unsustainable due to the absence of the requisite independent satisfaction and foundational facts demonstrating deliberate evasion, though it granted liberty to the Department to initiate fresh proceedings under Section 74 if supported by proper foundational facts before the outer limitation expires.

  • Requirement of Foundational Facts for Extended Limitation:
    • The Supreme Court emphasized that invoking the extended five-year limitation period under Section 74 of the CGST Act requires more than a mere mechanical recitation or lip service to terms like “fraud,” “willful misstatement,” or “suppression of facts”.
    • The notice itself must explicitly state the foundational facts that demonstrate a deliberate device employed by the assessee to evade tax or avail excess benefits.
  • Prerequisite of Proper Officer’s Satisfaction:
    • Initiating proceedings under Section 73 or 74 requires the independent satisfaction of the Assessing Officer.
    • The fact that the Department kept the audit objections under the “call book” (abeyance) and contested them before the Public Accounts Committee indicated that the Assessing Officer lacked the requisite satisfaction regarding any short payment or tax mismatch, invalidating the sudden turnaround to issue a protective demand.
  • Inadmissibility of “Protective” Demands and Limitation Misconceptions:
    • The Court clarified that the concept of a “protective measure” or “protective assessment” is alien to the GST statutory regime.
    • Furthermore, the limitation period under Section 73(10) governs the issuance of the adjudication order itself rather than merely the initial notice, and proceedings cannot be sustained by erroneously relying on omitted provisions like Explanation 2 to Section 74.
  • Final Relief Granted by the Supreme Court:
    • The Supreme Court set aside both the impugned SCN dated June 13, 2025, and the consequential Order-in-Original dated December 26, 2025.
    • However, because the extended period of limitation had not yet expired (with the normal three-year limitation for the subject years concluding on February 28, 2025), the Court granted liberty to the Department to initiate fresh proceedings under Section 74—provided proper foundational facts are clearly made out in the notice—with an order to be passed before February 28, 2027.

2026 INSC 920

M/s Tata Steel Limited v. Union of India through the Secretary Ministry of Finance and Ors. (D.O.J. 25.08.2026)

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Supreme Court Upholds Port Trust’s Liability for Customs Duty on Pilfered Goods

August 29, 2026 No Comments

This civil appeal arose from an order passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, which had allowed a writ petition filed by the respondent-Port of Bombay Trust and quashed both a customs notification dated October 11, 2000, and show cause-cum-demand notices for customs duty on pilfered goods. The Supreme Court examined the intersection between the custody of imported goods under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, and the statutory obligation to pay customs duty on pilfered goods under Section 45 of the Customs Act, 1962. Reversing the High Court’s view in part, the Supreme Court held that the Commissioner of Customs is legally empowered under Section 45(1) of the Customs Act to approve a Port Trust as a custodian, and that Section 45(3) validly fastens an independent statutory liability to pay customs duty on pilfered goods, overriding any conflicting civil liability frameworks under separate enactments through its non-obstante clause.

  • Validity of Custodian Notification:
    • The Supreme Court held that the Notification dated October 11, 2000, issued by the Commissioner of Customs (Import) designating the Mumbai Port Trust as a custodian under Section 45(1) of the Customs Act is valid and well within jurisdiction.
  • Distinction Between Civil Liability and Statutory Tax Liability:
    • The Court clarified that the responsibility of a Port Trust under the Major Port Trusts Act is merely that of a bailee to compensate the cargo owner for loss under principles of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
    • Conversely, the liability under Section 45(3) of the Customs Act is a distinct, absolute statutory obligation owed to the Revenue to pay customs duty on goods pilfered while in custody, serving to prevent loss of state revenue since the importer stands absolved under Section 13.
  • Operation of the Non-Obstante Clause:
    • The non-obstante clause in Section 45(3) of the Customs Act (“notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force”) effectively overrides other statutory arrangements because the Major Port Trusts Act does not provide for any tax liability in the event of cargo pilferage.
  • Relief and Final Outcome:
    • The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment to the extent that it quashed the notification dated October 11, 2000.
    • However, because the appellants’ counsel did not press the challenge regarding pre-notification show cause notices (dating between 1996 and 2000), the quashing of demands for the period prior to the October 11, 2000 notification remained undisturbed due to the absence of a prior Section 45(1) approval.

2026 INSC 919

Union of India & Others v. The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay (D.O.J. 25.08.2026)

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Supreme Court Quashes Domestic Violence Proceedings Post-Mutual Divorce Agreement

August 29, 2026 No Comments

This criminal appeal challenged the judgment and order dated October 26, 2018, passed by the High Court of Kerala, which had dismissed the appellant-husband’s petition to quash a complaint filed under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act). The Supreme Court evaluated whether proceedings under the DV Act could be legally maintained after the parties had voluntarily executed a comprehensive Settlement Agreement and obtained a mutual consent divorce decree under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869, wherein the wife had relinquished all future monetary and maintenance claims. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that continuing the DV proceedings against the husband constituted an abuse of the process of law, though it carved out an exception for the adult daughter who was not a party to the original settlement.

  • Validity of Voluntary Settlements:
    • The Supreme Court emphasized that once a party voluntarily enters into a settlement agreement—substantiated by an affidavit before the Family Court relinquishing all maintenance claims—they cannot later attempt to reagitate those claims through subsequent complaints without instituting a legal proceeding to set aside the divorce decree or settlement on grounds like duress.
  • Subsuming of Original Grievances:
    • Citing precedents such as Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi and Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, the Court reiterated that a valid compromise or settlement agreement subsumes original disputes, and unsubstantiated, belated claims of coercion by educated parties are legally untenable. Furthermore, the domestic violence complaint in question pertained to alleged acts predating the settlement agreement with no fresh cause of action arising post-divorce.
  • Exclusion of Non-Parties (The Daughter):
    • The Court noted that respondent No. 2 (the daughter) had attained the age of majority prior to the execution of the settlement and was not a party to it. Consequently, she had not waived her rights to monetary claims.
  • Final Relief Granted by the Supreme Court:
    • The appeal was allowed, and the Kerala High Court’s judgment was set aside.
    • The domestic violence proceedings (M.C. No. 23/2017) pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kalamassery, were quashed as against respondent No. 1-wife.
    • However, the Court clarified that respondent No. 2-daughter retains the liberty to initiate fresh proceedings seeking monetary relief against the appellant in accordance with law, if so advised.

2026 INSC 918

Reji Baby v. Subi Mary & Ors. (D.O.J. 24.08.2026)

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