A Judicial Review: Constitutional Validity of Hanging as a Sole Method of Execution

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The Supreme Court of India dismissed a public interest litigation filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the constitutional validity of Section 354(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (and its equivalent Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The petitioner contended that hanging by the neck as the sole method of executing a death sentence is barbaric, cruel, and violates the right to live and die with dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court, speaking through Justice Sandeep Mehta, reaffirmed the binding precedent set by the three-judge bench in Deena v. Union of India (1983) and approved by a Constitution Bench in Shashi Nayar v. Union of India, which held that hanging does not violate Article 21. The Court held that the petitioners failed to provide concrete, unimpeachable scientific or empirical evidence demonstrating that alternative methods, such as lethal injection or shooting, are demonstrably superior, less painful, or free from systemic flaws. Consequently, the challenge was dismissed, leaving any future policy changes regarding penal methods to the domain of the Legislature and the Executive.

Core Challenge to Section 354(5) CrPC / Section 393(5) BNSS: The petition sought to declare hanging by the neck as unconstitutional, arguing that it causes intense physical torture, mental agony, and violates the modern constitutional standard of a dignified death under Article 21.
Application of Stare Decisis: The validity of hanging was thoroughly evaluated and upheld in Deena v. Union of India (1983), a stance later approved by a Constitution Bench in Shashi Nayar v. Union of India (1992). The current two-judge bench noted that a bench of lesser strength cannot depart from this settled precedent without robust, definitive evidence of changed scientific or constitutional realities.
Flaws in Proposed Alternatives:
The Court examined alternative execution modes (electrocution, lethal gas, shooting, and lethal injection) and noted that Deena previously established that none of these alternatives possess a distinct or demonstrable advantage over hanging.
Material introduced regarding lethal injections in the United States highlighted high rates of botched executions and practical difficulties, showing that it is not a universally reliable or painless alternative.
Arguments regarding the use of shooting under military laws (Army, Air Force, and Navy Acts) were rejected as irrelevant because military statutes operate in a distinct legal category separate from ordinary civilian criminal jurisprudence.
Role of the Legislature & Executive: The Court observed that the Law Commission’s 187th Report recommending alternative options is purely recommendatory. Parliament was presumed to have considered these aspects when enacting the updated Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, consciously retaining hanging.
Final Ruling and Future Scope: The writ petition was dismissed. However, the Court clarified that this dismissal does not foreclose future challenges if compelling, robust medical or empirical evidence emerges later, and noted that the Union Government retains the policy freedom to establish an expert committee to study penal execution methods if deemed appropriate.

2026 INSC 873

Rishi Malhotra & Anr. v. Union of India (D.O.J. 18.08.2026)

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No Bail to Principal Conspirator in Brutal Murder Case

August 23, 2026 No Comments

This special leave petition challenged an order of the High Court of Bombay at Goa, which had rejected the petitioner’s second application for bail in connection with a gruesome murder case registered under Sections 302, 201, 342, and 120-B of the IPC. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, motivated by a property dispute, lured the victim to his residence, wrongfully confined and brutally assaulted him, and then disposed of his body tied to a heavy stone in a river with the help of co-accused persons. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the principle of parity cannot be applied mechanically when the petitioner stands on a distinct footing as the principal architect of the crime, whereas co-accused granted bail played lesser or facilitating roles. While refusing bail due to the gravity of the offense and the risk of witness tampering, the Court directed the Sessions Court to expedite the trial by recording the testimonies of eight sensitive vulnerable witnesses within one year, granting liberty to the petitioner to renew his bail plea thereafter.

Limits of the Principle of Parity: Grant of bail to one co-accused does not automatically entitle another to bail; parity is not a mechanical formula and must be assessed based on the specific, distinct role attributed to each individual in the criminal conspiracy.
Distinction in Criminal Roles: Prima facie material established that the petitioner was the principal architect who masterminded and executed the plan to eliminate the victim, setting him apart from co-accused individuals who were earlier enlarged on bail.
Incarceration vs. Gravity of Offense: Prolonged incarceration of nearly three years, when the trial has already commenced and only a fraction of witnesses have been examined, does not by itself override the gravity of a pre-planned murder and the potential threat of witness tampering.
Safeguards for Vulnerable Witnesses: To protect sensitive employee-witnesses and associates from being influenced, the Supreme Court prioritized the out-of-turn recording of their testimonies.
Time-Bound Trial Direction: The Sessions Court was requested to conclude the examination of eight specific vulnerable witnesses within one year from the communication of the order.
Liberty to Re-apply: The petitioner was granted liberty to approach the appropriate forum afresh for bail either after the completion of the testimony of the eight specified witnesses or upon the expiration of the one-year period, provided the delay is not attributable to him.

2026 INSC 891
Rajendra Prasad v. State of Goa & Anr. (D.O.J. 18.08.2026)

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Supreme Court Acquits Public Servants in Anti-Corruption Appeal

August 23, 2026 No Comments

This criminal appeal challenged the common judgment of the High Court of Gujarat, which had upheld the conviction of the appellants—a Talati-cum-Mantri and a Panchayat Peon—under Sections 7, 12, and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The prosecution alleged that the appellants demanded a bribe of Rs. 120 (Rs. 100 for the first appellant and Rs. 20 for the second appellant) for issuing an income certificate to the complainant. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the conviction, holding that the foundational element of an initial demand was never proven beyond reasonable doubt, as the complainant’s versions were contradictory and the official certificate had already been handed over before the money was passed. The Court emphasized that statutory presumptions under Section 20 of the Act cannot be invoked without proof of a valid demand, and additionally noted that the sanction for prosecution granted by a Deputy District Development Officer was legally defective.

Proof of Initial Demand: The prosecution failed to establish a consistent or reliable demand for a bribe, given serious variances between the complainant’s deposition and his statements in prior parallel proceedings.
Inapplicability of Statutory Presumption: Under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, legal presumptions cannot be drawn unless the initial demand for illegal gratification is first proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.
Post-Delivery Payment Doubt: The handling of money after the official certificate had already been prepared and handed over to the complainant naturally raises severe suspicions that the payment was not pursuant to a bribe demand.
Defective Prosecution Sanction: Under Section 19(1)(c) of the Act, valid prosecution of a substantive Talati-cum-Mantri requires sanction from the District Development Officer (the removing authority) rather than a Deputy District Development Officer.
Absence of Conspiracy: Both lower courts concurrently acquitted the accused of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC, further weakening the fragmented allegations against individual public servants.
Final Verdict: The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the trial court and the High Court, fully acquitting the appellants of all charges and canceling their bail bonds.

2026 INSC 890
Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat (D.O.J. 19.08.2026)

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Lok Adalat Awards Cannot Override Statutory Adortionment and Title Adjudication in Land Acquisition

August 23, 2026 No Comments

This civil appeal challenged the judgment and order of the High Court of Telangana, which had dismissed the appellants’ writ petition and upheld multiple Lok Adalat awards concerning land acquisition compensation. Following the acquisition of land for mining operations by the Singareni Collieries Company Ltd., the Land Acquisition Officer referred a title and apportionment dispute to the jurisdictional civil court under Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. During a separate writ petition challenging the acquisition, the matter was referred to the Legal Services Committee, resulting in Lok Adalat awards based on a physical “enjoyment survey”. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that an enjoyment survey cannot determine legal title, that a Lok Adalat cannot adjudicate inter se title disputes without the active participation and signatures of all conflicting claimants, and that principles of representative suits (Order I Rule 8 CPC) do not apply to adversary title disputes. The matter was remitted to the Principal District Judge for a de novo hearing and determination of the apportionment reference.

Scope of Section 30 References: The Land Acquisition Officer lacks the authority to decide conflicting rights of interested persons and is legally mandated to refer title and apportionment disputes to the civil court.
Validity of Section 29 Agreements: An agreement on apportionment under Section 1894 Act requires the absolute concurrence of all persons interested; a truncated consensus involving only some claimants cannot operate as a binding agreement.
Nature of Enjoyment Surveys: An enjoyment survey only captures physical possession at a given time and cannot substitute for legal title or determine rightful entitlement to compensation funds.
Inapplicability of Order I Rule 8 CPC: Lok Adalat proceedings involving competing, adversary claimants cannot be legally characterized or treated as a class action or representative suit under Order I Rule 8 CPC.
Mandatory Signature Requirements: Under Regulation 17(2) of the NALSA Lok Adalat Regulations, an award is invalid and non-binding on non-signatories who are actively disputing title.
Final Verdict: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and remanded the matter back to the Principal District Judge for a fresh decision on apportionment within six months.

2026 INSC 888
Singapogu Babu Rao & Ors. v. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) & Ors. (D.O.J. 19.08.2026)

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Rejection of an Initial Section 156(3) CrPC Application Does Not Bar a Subsequent FIR

August 23, 2026 No Comments

This criminal appeal challenged an order passed by the Allahabad High Court, which had dismissed the appellant’s petition seeking to quash criminal proceedings arising from an FIR registered for cheating, forgery, extortion, and criminal intimidation. The complainant alleged that the appellant had taken substantial amounts of money under the false pretense of securing public employment for his son and grandson, subsequently furnishing forged examination results and issuing threats. Although an earlier application filed by the complainant under Section 156(3) of the CrPC had been rejected by the Magistrate based on a preliminary police report suggesting a land dispute, a subsequent FIR was registered. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the dismissal of a Section 156(3) application does not operate as an adjudication on merits or attract res judicata, and it does not extinguish the independent statutory duty of the police to register and investigate an FIR when fresh material disclosing a cognizable offense is presented.

Nature of Section 156(3) Orders: An order declining an application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC is rendered at the threshold and does not constitute a final adjudication on the merits or a determination of rights and liabilities.
Inapplicability of Res Judicata: The rejection of a Section 156(3) application does not possess the character of finality required to attract the doctrine of res judicata, meaning it does not legally bar the subsequent registration of an FIR or continuation of criminal proceedings.
Independent Statutory Duty of Police: The police’s obligation under Section 154 of the CrPC to register and investigate a cognizable offense is mandatory and independent of any prior judicial action or refusal under Section 156(3).
Prima Facie Cognizable Offense: The FIR contained detailed allegations of job fraud, acceptance of money in bank accounts, provision of forged recruitment documents, and criminal intimidation, which ex facie disclosed cognizable offenses.
Scope of Section 482 CrPC Quashing: At the stage of a quashing petition, courts cannot examine the evidentiary reliability, probative value, or rival defenses (such as claims of land transactions or audio/document validity), which are matters reserved strictly for trial.
Final Verdict: The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s judgment, ruling that the criminal proceedings and investigation against the appellant must proceed in accordance with law.

2026 INSC 887

Pramod Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (D.O.J. 19.08.2026)

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