Nominal Index

Abdul Ansar V. State of Kerala
2023 STPL(WEB) 45 SC : Attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Not made out

Ankita Bhati Vs. Dev Raj Singh Bhati
2023 Stpl(Web) 83 SC : Transfer Of Cases – Matrimonial Dispute

Arun Dev Upadhyaya V. Ntegrated Sales Service Ltd. 
2023 STPL(WEB) 49 SC : Review  – Error on the face of record

Commissioner, Central Excise And Customs V. Reliance Industries Ltd.
2023 STPL(WEB) 32 SC : Central Excise

Central Bureau Of Investigation, Bhopal Vs. Abhishek Sachan @ Abhishek Singh
2023 Stpl(Web) 92 SC : Criminal Procedure – Supply Of Hard Copies Of The Documents Relied On By The Prosecution

Central Bureau Of Investigation Vs. S.R. Ramamani & Ors.
2023 Stpl(Web) 97 SC : Appeal Against Acquittal – Statutory Compliance Is Necessary And Not Discretionary

Delhi Development Authority Vs. Jagan Singh & ors.
2023 STPL(Web) 63 SC : Land Acquisition

Dheeraj Singh V. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority
2023 STPL(WEB) 33 SC  : Land acquisition – Cross objections

Ford India Private Limited Vs. M/S. Medical Eleborate Concept Private Limited & Ors.
2023 Stpl(Web) 91 SC : Consumer – Manufacturing Defect In Car

Girisha Chandra Mishra & Ors. Vs. Union Of India
2023 Stpl(Web) 100 SC : National Award For Teachers (Nat) – Guidelines

Gurudeep Singh Vs. Regonda Srinivas & ors.
2023 STPL(Web) 65 SC  : Contempt of Court – Conviction set aside

Hari Prakash Shukla V. State of Uttar Pradesh
2023 STPL(WEB) 44 SC  : Forest

Indira Devi V. Veena Gupta
2023 STPL(WEB) 40 SC  : Specific Performance – Conditional sale deed with right to purchase

Dr. Jaya Thakur Vs. Union of India & ors.
2023 STPL(WEB) 60 SC  : Extension of Tenure of ED Director + Constitutional Validity of Amendment

Ketan Kantilal Modi Vs. Union Of India & Ors.
2023 Stpl(Web) 118 SC : Reward To Informer – Tax Evasion

Madras Aluminium Co. Ltd. V. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board
2023 STPL(WEB) 51 SC : Electricity – Refund on reduction of load

Mangilal Vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh
2023 Stpl(Web) 75 SC : Ndps – Search And Seizure

Mathew Alexander Vs. Mohammed Shafi and anr.
2023 STPL(Web) 64 SC : Quashing + MACT

Naushad V. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi)
2023 STPL(WEB) 52 SC : Terrorist – Circumstantial evidence

Neeraj Kumar V. State of Haryana
2023 STPL(WEB) 29 SC  : Service Law – Equivalence of qualification

Narahari V. S.R. Kumar
2023 STPL(WEB) 46 SC  : Person with disability – Reservation in Promotion

Om Prakash Ahuja V. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd
2023 STPL(WEB) 42 SC  : Consumer – Renewal of health insurance policy

Pradeep V. State of Haryana
2023 STPL(WEB) 48 SC : Murder

Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana
2023 STPL(WEB) 55 SC  : Anticipatory bail – Land Scam

Pritinder Singh @ Lovely Vs. State of Punjab
2023 STPL(WEB) 58 SC  : Murder – Circumstantial evidence

M/S. Phoenix Arc Private Limited Vs. V. Ganesh Murthy & Anr.
2023 Stpl(Web) 93 SC : Sarfaesi  – Quashing Of Order U/S 482 Cr PC

Prakash Chandra Yadav @ Mungeri Yadav Vs. The State Of Jharkhand & Ors.
2023 Stpl(Web) 94 SC : Preventive Detention – Non Consideration Of Representation

Rahul Ganpatrao Sable V. Laxman Maruti Jadhav
2023 STPL(WEB) 50 SC  : MACT – Permanent disablement

Ravi Khandelwal Vs. M/S. Taluka Stores
2023 STPL(WEB) 59 SC  : Eviction petition – Restriction on eviction

Ramesh Chand V. Management of Delhi Transport Corporation
2023 STPL(WEB) 35 SC  : Industrial Dispute – Back wages

Ramesh Kumar V. State of Nct of Delhi
2023 STPL(WEB) 34 SC : Anticipatory bail order – Onerous condition

Reserve Bank of India & ors. Vs. A. K. Nair & ors.
2023 STPL(WEB) 57 SC  : Person with disability – Reservation in Promotion

Rabi Prakash Vs. The State Of Odisha
2023 Stpl(Web) 99 SC : Bail – Prolonged Incarceration Override Embargo Under Ndps

Raman Kumar & Ors. Vs. Union Of India & Ors.
2023 Stpl(Web) 90 SC : Service Law – Discrimination

Ranjeet Singh Vs. State Of Chhattisgarh
2023 Stpl(Web) 76 Sc : Murder – Conviction Set Aside

Registrar General, High Court Of Delhi Vs. Ravinder Singh
2023 Stpl(Web) 98 SC : Service Law – Revaluation Of Answer Script

Dr. Sachchida Nand Pandey Vs. Union Of India & Ors.
2023 Stpl(Web) 95 SC : Service Law – Cancelation Of Appointment For Violation Of Reservation

Santhosh Maize & Industries Limited V. State of Tamil Nadu
2023 STPL(WEB) 39 SC  : Sales Tax – Exemption notification

Sanvira Industries V. Rain Cii Carbon (Vizag) Ltd.
2023 STPL(WEB) 30 SC : Allocation of quantities of raw pet-coke (RPC) – Appeal fails

Sarnam Singh V. Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd.
2023 STPL(WEB) 41 SC  : MACT – Assessment of Disability

Shantabai Ananda Jagtap V. Jayram Ganpati Jagtap
2023 STPL(WEB) 43 SC  : Employee Compensation – Death case

Singrauli Super Thermal Power Station Vs. Ashwani Kumar Dubey & ors.
2023 STPL(Web) 62 SC  : National Green Tribunal – Principle of Natural Justice

Sri Lakshmana Gowda B.N. V. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Co. Ltd.
2023 STPL(WEB) 54 SC  : MACT – Loss of earning

State of orissa & anr. Vs. Laxmi Narayan Das (Dead) Thr. Lrs & ors.
2023 STPL(Web) 61 SC  : Writ jurisdiction – Delay and Laches

State of U.P. V. Sonu Kushwaha
2023 STPL(WEB) 47 SC  : POCSO – Aggravated penetrative sexual assault

Supriya Jain V. State of Haryana
2023 STPL(WEB) 38 SC  : Quashing of FIR – Petition for

Trust Estate Khimji Keshawji & Anr. Vs. Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Ors.
2023 Stpl(Web) 78 SC : Municipality – Domestic Water Connection Used For Other Purpose

Uggarsain V. State of Haryana
2023 STPL(WEB) 31 SC  : Quashing of FIR – Petition for

Vinod Kumar v. District Magistrate Mau
2023 STPL(WEB) 53 SC  : Land acquisition – Apportionment of compensation

Vijay Kumar Shukla Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
2023 Stpl(Web) 96 SC : Clearing Outstanding Bills – Service Rendered To Government

Workmen V. Employer In Relation
2023 STPL(WEB) 28 SC  : Labour Law – Absorption

 Subject Index

Bail

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 438 – Penal Code, 1860, Section 420, 406, 34 – Anticipatory bail order – Onerous condition – Imposition of – Challenge as to – Counsel on behalf of the appellant to secure anticipatory bail had submitted before the High Court that he was ready to deposit a sum Rs. 22,00,000/- yet he was unable to deposit the same within extended time also and challenge the condition of deposit of Rs. 22,00,000/- as being onerous – Held that even if the appellant had undertaken to make payment, which was a last ditch effort to avert losing his liberty, such undertaking could not have weighed in the mind of the High Court to decide the question of grant of anticipatory bail – The tests for grant of anticipatory bail are well delineated and stand recognized by passage of time – High Court would have been well-advised to examine whether the appellant was to be denied anticipatory bail on his failure to satisfy any of such tests – It does seem that the submission made by counsel on behalf of the appellant before the High Court had its own effect, although it was far from being a relevant consideration for the purpose of grant of bail – Does not appear from the record if the complainant has filed any civil suit for recovery of the aforesaid amount – If at all the offence alleged against the appellant is proved resulting in his conviction, he would be bound to suffer penal consequence(s) but despite such conviction he may not be under any obligation to repay the amount allegedly received from the complainants – This too is an aspect which the High Court exercising jurisdiction under section 438 of the Cr. PC did not bear in mind – Held that the High Court fell in grave error in proceeding on the basis of the undertaking of the appellant and imposing payment of Rs.22,00,000/- as a condition precedent for grant of bail – Matter remitted to the High Court for reconsideration of the pre-arrest bail application on its own merits. (Para 27 to 29) Ramesh Kumar V. State of Nct of Delhi: 2023 STPL(WEB) 34 SC

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 438 – Penal Code, 1860, Section 420, 406, 34 – Anticipatory bail – Complainant no right to assist court – Challenge to grant of anticipatory bail – Intervention application on behalf of complaint to assist the Court – Held that at this stage, the complainant have no right of audience before this Court or even the High Court having regard to the nature of offence alleged to have committed by the appellant unless, of course, a situation for compounding of offence under Section 420 IPC, with the permission of the Court arises – Application for intervention liable to be dismissed. (Para 32 to 34) Ramesh Kumar V. State of Nct of Delhi: 2023 STPL(WEB) 34 SC

Civil

 Constitution of India, Article 136 – Allocation of quantities of raw pet-coke (RPC) – Appeal fails – Contention on behalf of the appellant that there was a change of criteria adopted in the Public Notice dated 17.04.2020 issued by the GOI – Contrary to the earlier requirement of certification of production capacity by the Unit, the Public Notice dated 17.04.2020, required certification by the SPCB – In this case, the APPCB certified Sanvira’s production capacity as on 09.10.2018 to be 3,30,000 MT and that figure was correctly considered while making allocation of RPC in its favour – It was urged that in the absence of any challenge to the Public Notice dated 17.04.2020 or the certificate issued by the APPCB regarding Sanvira’s production capacity (as 3,30,000 MT as on 09.10.2018), the challenge by Rain CII was untenable and was liable to be rejected – It is argued that the orders dated 28.01.2019 and 08.07.2019 of this court merely clarified that the overall import of RPC has to be confined to 1.4 MMTPA – Contention that this court did not consider Sanvira’s claim that as on 09.10.2018 its production capacity was in fact, 3.30 lakh MT –Reasoning of the impugned judgment is that there was no distinction (contrary to the conclusion of the single judge) regarding the public notice dated 17.04.2020 -between the certificate in the first part and the consent to operate in the second part –Held that the Division Bench noted, correctly that the annual total limit of import of 1.4 Million Metric Tonnes was based on the total production capacity as on 09.10.2018 which had been fixed by this court on the basis of the capacity disclosed by all the calciners – It was also observed that an SPCB could indicate the permissible limit of production of calcined petroleum coke – For Sanvira it was 2,00,000 MTPA; the consent to produce 3,30,000 MTPA of coke was given only after 29th November 2018 – Therefore, it could not have been considered by the court – The certificate dated 04.05.2020 issued by the APPCB merely certified that the installed capacity of Sanvira, as on 09.10.2018, for manufacturing calcined petroleum coke, was 3,30,000 Metric Tonnes per annum in terms of the consent to operate (CTO) – The total figure of 1.4 Million Metric Tonnes of RPC was based on the permissible capacity as on 09.10.2018 – The Division Bench, therefore, concluded that if production capacity had increased, the proportionate share to be given was after clearance by this court – View expressed by the impugned judgment held to be correct – Barring the fact that a clarification was issued on 04.05.2020, by the APPCB, there was no change in circumstance; the material document to be considered was the CTO, which for the relevant period (i.e. as on 09.10.2018) was 2,00,000 MT per annum, for Sanvira – Even according to it, the claim for enhancement was made later, and the CTO for the increased capacity was issued on 26.12.2019 – In these circumstances, the clarification of APPCB, that as on a particular date, the production capacity was 3,30,000 MTPA was of no consequence, because it was the CTO that was considered all along, in all previous meetings – Therefore, the findings and conclusions of the Division Bench cannot be faulted – The appeals fail, and are, liable to be dismissed. (Para 28 to 30) Sanvira Industries V. Rain Cii Carbon (Vizag) Ltd : 2023 STPL(WEB) 30 SC 

Specific Relief Act , 1963, Section 15(b) – Specific Performance – Conditional sale deed with right to purchase –Held that condition of right to repurchase in sale deed will not be personal to the vendor unless the terms in the documents specifically state so – Such a right can always be assigned and the contract containing such condition shall be enforceable – The only exception being that such a right should not be personal in nature – The assignment of obligations in a document is not possible without the consent of the other party – No implied prohibition of transfer or assignment can be inferred in a document – The benefit of contract is assignable in cases where it does not make any difference to the person on whom the obligations lies, to which of two persons he is to discharge – Do not find that there is any term in the conditional Sale Deed which debars its assignment to any other person – The clause only mentions regarding right of repurchase – The option is given to the vendors with the obligations on the vendee – The right to repurchase in the present case has been assigned by ‘K’ (now deceased) in favour of respondent no.1 who is none else than his daughter-in-law to whom other properties have also been gifted – Even the argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant that such an assignment of a right cannot be treated as a gift as consideration money is involved, is also noticed and liable to be rejected for the reason that the executor of the Gift Deed i.e. ‘K’ (now deceased) had transferred his right to repurchase the property in favour of respondent no.1 – That right could always be assigned by him with whatever conditions attached to it – Further in the suit filed, he was also a plaintiff, who died later – Held that do not find any error in the judgment of the High Court -Appeal liable to be dismissed. (Para 21 to 24) Indira Devi V. Veena Gupta: 2023 STPL(WEB) 40 SC 

Indian Forest Act, 1927, Section 4 – Forest – Right to enjoy possession – Notification constituting forest land – Land in possession of the Appellants since 1952 as Bhoomidars – Declared as reserved forest – Drive to evict Bhoomidars – Right to be heard – Whether the relief granted in the Judgment of Banwasi Seva Ashram vs State Of Uttar Pradesh[1986 4 SCC 753] is only applicable to SC/ST/ other backward communities? – Held that right to be heard must be granted to all claiming possession of the subject land, and the substantial right of possession can be granted or denied during the said hearing, by the competent authority – Right to be heard must be enjoyed by all, and the right to possess, must be enjoyed by those who have a legitimate claim – Further, the right to enjoy possession of any land notified under Section 4 of the Forest Act is not only limited to Adivasi communities and other forest dwelling communities, but is also based on proof of residence, date of original possession, etc. – If the right to inhabit the said lands is not restricted only to certain communities, how can the right to be heard on such claims be restricted to the same – Issue held in favour of the Appellants. (Para 16, 22 to 24) Hari Prakash Shukla V. State of Uttar Pradesh: 2023 STPL(WEB) 44 SC 

 Constitution of India, Article 226 – Indian Forest Act, 1927, Section 4 – Writ – Re appreciation of evidence – Land in possession of the Appellants since 1952 as Bhoomidars – Declared as reserved forest – Drive to evict Bhoomidars – Concurrent findings – Whether the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, could have re-appreciated the evidence adduced to come to its findings? – Two concurrent findings in favour of appellants by way of decisions rendered by the lower courts – Appellants had proved their possession over the subject land by leading evidence, and the veracity of the same, by way of proper procedure, was tested by both the lower courts – High Court without evidence being led by the respondents, set aside the concurrent findings vide impugned order and judgment – Concurrent findings of the lower courts are neither perverse, nor the said courts have over stepped their jurisdiction – Held that the High Court could not have re-appreciated the evidence in writ jurisdiction and come to a different conclusion – Issue held in favour of the Appellants – Impugned order and judgment passed by High Court not liable to be sustained and is set aside – The orders passed by the Forest Settlement Officer and Additional District Judge confirmed.(Para 16, 34 and 35) Hari Prakash Shukla V. State of Uttar Pradesh: 2023 STPL(WEB) 44 SC 

 Constitution of India, Article 14 – Electricity – Refund on reduction of load – Whether the action of the Respondents in taking considerable time from when the application was made for reduction to 10000 KVA, to when the revised agreement was entered into, was arbitrary and unreasonable? – Contingently, whether the Appellant is entitled to refund of the amount of difference between the amounts payable for 23000 KVA and10000 KVA which, have been paid under protest? – Held that State action irrespective of being in the contractual realm must abide by Article 14 – Request made by appellant on 24th December,2001, to reduce the contracted maximum demand to 10000KVA with effect from 27th January, 2002, along with an offer to pay the one-time charge payable on effecting such a reduction – After passage of a considerable period of time, in July, 2004 the reduction to10000 KVA was agreed to and a new agreement to that effect was entered into -Irrespective of the amount of reduction in KVA sought other applications were considered within a reasonable period of time – No reason has been put forth for keeping such application pending – Appellant duly and repeatedly followed up with the authorities to effectuate such reduction – Appellant has been unjustifiably asked to furnish costs for unutilized electricity which, in any case should not have extended beyond the period of six months (considering ‘reasonable period’ to consider an application, to be so), for a period much larger thereto, rendering such action unquestionably unreasonable and arbitrary – It would not be open for the Respondents to contend that the petitioner is not liable for the refund of the amount deposited under protest towards the bills so generated taking the maximum load to be 23000KVAparticularly, when at no point in time, the Appellant neither sought for nor consumed the electricity more than the maximum demand of 10000 KVA – Acknowledging the financial health of the Appellant, in the1999 agreement, the Respondent ought to have taken a decision on the Appellant request with a reasonable dispatch and terms which ought to have been within a period latest by six months and not two and a half years as was so eventually done – Judgment passed by the High Court liable to be set aside – Respondent namely Tamil Nadu Electricity Board to return the amount as may be calculated and verified, paid by the Appellant to it for 13000 KVA, in excess to its request of maximum sanctioned demand of 10000 KVA(23000-10000 = 13000 KVA) – Such amount shall be calculable six months post making of application, i.e. on 24thDecember, 2001, till the date of execution of the new agreement in July, 2004 – Period is to commence from 23rd June, 2002 till 1st July, 2004 (both inclusive) – Interest applicable thereupon would be simple in nature @ 6 per cent per annum – All payments be made within two months from today. (Para 36 to 40) Madras Aluminium Co. Ltd. V. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board: 2023 STPL(WEB) 51 SC 

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002; Section 14 – SARFAESI  – Quashing of order u/s 482 Cr PC – Quashing of Magistrate order under section 14 of SARFAESI-  Not Permissible – as any remedy against such order can be availed only under the SARFAESI ACT’, 2002. (Para 2) M/S. Phoenix Arc Private Limited Vs. V. Ganesh Murthy & Anr. : 2023 Stpl(Web) 93 Sc

Clearing outstanding Bills – Service rendered to Government – Writ for – Disputed matter – Plea of State that all the outstanding bills have been disbursed to the petitioner. Held: A serious doubt whether a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India should be entertained at the instance of an advocate representing the State for recovery of his fees and that also when there is a serious dispute about the entitlement of the petitioner to receive fees based on certain bills. Therefore, unable to pass any further orders on this Writ Petition and the same is accordingly disposed of. However, the other available remedies of the petitioner are expressly kept open which he can avail in accordance with law. (Para 5, 6) Vijay Kumar Shukla Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors. : 2023 Stpl(Web) 96 SC

National Award for Teachers (NAT) – Guidelines – Matter of policy – Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner contending inter-alia that the Revised Guidelines, 2018 had made the system opaque and discriminatory – Held: the only relief that we can grant to the petitioners herein is to grant liberty to make a detailed representation to the respondent so that the same could be taken into consideration, in the event, the respondent intends to revise the selection procedure in future. It is needless to observe that if the respondent finds that the representation has certain aspects which could be considered for revision of the selection procedure and implemented, the same may be accordingly considered. (Para 11, 12) Girisha Chandra Mishra & Ors. Vs. Union Of India : 2023 Stpl(Web) 100 SC

Reward to informer – Tax evasion – Plea for enhancement of reward as reward granted not as per policy – Supreme Court observed that there is no application of mind in allowing reward – Direction to committee to give opportunity of being heard to the appellant and then decide whether the appellant is entitled to any amount over and above already paid to him. Needless to add that if the committee finds that appellant is entitled to additional amount, the Committee will recommend payment of reasonable interest to the appellant. Appropriate decision shall be taken by the Committee within a period of six months from today and shall be communicated to the appellant. (Para 7, 8) Ketan Kantilal Modi Vs. Union Of India & Ors. : 2023 Stpl(Web) 118 SC

 Compensation

 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 166 – MACT – Assessment of Disability – Appellant was working as a gunman with Bharat Hotel Limited – On account of amputation of his right leg above the knee, he was terminated from service w.e.f. 31.05.2015 -Not a matter of dispute that a person with his right leg amputated cannot perform the duty of a gunman – This is his functional disability – He was 50 years & 5 months old at the time of accident – Considering the aforesaid facts the Tribunal was right in assessing the loss of earning capacity of the appellant at 100% and assessing the compensation accordingly – High Court was in error in reducing the loss of earning capacity to 80%, relying upon the judgment of High Court, despite there being a judgment of this Court available on the issue – Impugned order passed by the High Court liable to be set aside and the award passed by the Tribunal restored. (Para 10 to 12) Sarnam Singh V. Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd.: 2023 STPL(WEB) 41 SC 

 Motor Vehicles Act, 1973, Section 166, 168 – MACT – Permanent disablement – Injury case –  Five injuries which are permanent in nature apparently make him unfit for any employment even though the disability may be 60% or 85% – The compression fractures of seven cervical vertebra resulting into Paraplegia and further loss of bladder function make it absolutely impossible for a person to work and be gainfully employed – Considering the nature of disability, loss of income is, thus, held to be 100% and not 50% as held by the High Court. (Para 14) Rahul Ganpatrao Sable V. Laxman Maruti Jadhav : 2023 STPL(WEB) 50 SC 

Motor Vehicles Act, 1973, Section 166, 168 – MACT – Deduction for uncertainties of life – Injury case – High Court deducted 1/3rd towards uncertainties of life – Held this has been disapproved in the case of Leela Gupta as the same is covered while applying the multiplier – Therefore, this deduction by the High Court is held to be incorrect and no deduction should be made for uncertainties in life – We The income is thus held to be Rs.25,000/- per month and not 15,000/- as held by High Court. (Para 15) Rahul Ganpatrao Sable V. Laxman Maruti Jadhav : 2023 STPL(WEB) 50 SC 

Motor Vehicles Act, 1973, Section 166, 168 – MACT – Deduction towards personal expenses – Injury case – High Court deducted 50% of compensation towards personal expenses – Held that the present case being not of death and the claim not being made by the dependents, but the same being by a survivor in the accident with severe injuries resulting into permanent disability, there could not be any justification for deduction of personal expenses – Do not approve the said deduction in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Lalan D. (Para 16) Rahul Ganpatrao Sable V. Laxman Maruti Jadhav : 2023 STPL(WEB) 50 SC 

Motor Vehicles Act, 1973, Section 166, 168 – MACT – Permanent disablement – Injury case – Admitted age of the appellant to be 19 years at the time of the accident – Held that in view of the judgment in the case of Sarla Verma, the multiplier to be applied would be 18 and not 17. (Para 17) Rahul Ganpatrao Sable V. Laxman Maruti Jadhav : 2023 STPL(WEB) 50 SC 

Motor Vehicles Act, 1973, Section 166, 168 – MACT – Attendant expenses – Injury case – Considering the nature of injuries and the permanent disabilities suffered by the appellant, he would require 24 hours help/assistance of an attendant – In view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Chaus Tausif Almiya, which had similar facts regarding disability, a compensation of Rs.10,80,000/- awarded towards this head. Future Medical Expenses. (Para 18) Rahul Ganpatrao Sable V. Laxman Maruti Jadhav : 2023 STPL(WEB) 50 SC 

Motor Vehicles Act, 1973, Section 166, 168 – MACT – Future Medical Expenses – No compensation has been awarded under the said heading – Medical expenses would continue all his life – Regular consultation and daily medication would require expenses – Considering the judgment of this Court in the case of Chaus Tausif Almiya a compensation of Rs.9,72,000/- awarded towards future medical expenses by applying the multiplier of 18. (Para 19) Rahul Ganpatrao Sable V. Laxman Maruti Jadhav : 2023 STPL(WEB) 50 SC 

Motor Vehicles Act, 1973, Section 166, 168 – Compensation – Loss of Marriage prospects – No compensation has been awarded under the above head – Considering the nature of injuries duly approved and certified, the appellant would be entitled to compensation under loss of marriage prospects of Rs.3 lakhs under the said head. (Para 20) Rahul Ganpatrao Sable V. Laxman Maruti Jadhav : 2023 STPL(WEB) 50 SC 

Motor Vehicles Act, 1973, Section 166, 168 – MACT – Pain and suffering – Under the above head, High Court has awarded Rs.1 lakh – Held that the kind of pain, agony and suffering undergone and also for future the amount awarded is less – Considering the amount awarded in other cases namely Master Ayush Vs. The Branch Manager[2022 (7) SCC 738] a sum of Rs.3 lakhs awarded under this head. (Para 21) Rahul Ganpatrao Sable V. Laxman Maruti Jadhav : 2023 STPL(WEB) 50 SC 

Motor Vehicles Act, 1973, Section 166, 168 – MACT – Death case –  Loss of dependency – Future prospects – Deduction towards personal expenses – Loss of consortium – Loss of Estate and Funeral Expenses – Courts below have relied upon the statement of C.W.-1, widow of the deceased and also Ext.52 for determining the monthly salary of the deceased to be Rs.8100/- – Do not find any discussion with regard to the statement of the Accountant which was very specific that at the relevant time, the salary drawn was Rs.12,235/- per month – Do not find any reason not to accept the statement of the Accountant that the salary of the deceased was Rs.12235/- on the date of the accident – Held accordingly – C.W.-1, widow of the deceased, had specifically stated that her husband was earning Rs.25,000/- per year on account of assessment of examination papers, then the entire benefit as claimed should have been extended rather than reducing it for no justifiable reason – Accordingly the additional income taken to be Rs.25,000/- per year – Both the Courts below have not granted any amount towards future prospects – Deceased was between the age of 50- 60 years – There should be an addition of 15% towards future prospects – The courts below have deducted 1/3rd amount towards personal expenses of the deceased – As the dependent family members are at least 4, the deduction should have been 1/4th. – MACT had granted a meagre amount of Rs.5,000/- towards loss of consortium – However, the High Court granted a total amount of Rs.70,000/- as consolidated amount under all conventional heads, which included loss of consortium, loss of estate and funeral expense – Considering the case of Pranay Sethi , an amount of Rs.40,000/- each is awarded to each of the four dependents towards loss of consortium – The Tribunal had awarded Rs.2,500/- towards loss of estate and Rs.2,000/- towards funeral expenses. The High Court had awarded a consolidated amount of Rs.70,000/- under all conventional heads, which liable to be set aside above – Held that the amount awarded for loss of estate and loss of funeral expenses is too less and accordingly increase the same to Rs.15,000/- under both the heads separately. (Para 29 to 34) Rahul Ganpatrao Sable V. Laxman Maruti Jadhav : 2023 STPL(WEB) 50 SC 

 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 166, 168 and 173 – MACT – Loss of earning – Injury case – Claimant was aged 24 years on the date of accident and was a graduate, working as a Marketing Executive in a private company and earning Rs.8,000/p.m. – Tribunal and High Court awarding compensation by taking Rs. 3000/- as his income – On the ground that claimant did not examine his employer it cannot be gain said by the Insurer that claimant was unable to earn or was not earning Rs.8,000/-p.m. – The accident in question had occurred in the year 2007 – Even a mason at that point of time was earning not less than Rs.300/-per day or in other words Rs.9,000/-p.m. during 2007 – Claimant being a graduate and working as Marketing Executive, his plea of salary being Rs.8,000/-p.m. deserves to be accepted, as it is within proximity of truth and same could not have been ignored by the Tribunal and the High Court on hyper technical grounds – The age of the claimant as on the date accident was 24 years and multiplier of 18 as indicated in Sarla Verma and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and others [(2009) 6 SCC 121 ] deserves to be adopted – Thus, under the head ‘Loss of Future Income’ claimant would be entitled to the compensation of Rs.8,000 x 75% x 12 x 18 ÷ 100 = Rs.12,96,000/- (Para 10) Sri Lakshmana Gowda B.N. V. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Co. Ltd.: 2023 STPL(WEB) 54 SC 

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 166, 168 and 173 – Compensation – Pain and suffering – Injury case – For treatment claimant was hospitalized and initially admitted in ICU also – It is in this background Tribunal has awarded compensation Rs. 50,000/- under various heads – Held that in the background of injuries sustained claimant was treated as an in-patient for ten (10) days – Hence, compensation awarded towards ‘pain and suffering’ is on the lower side – Having regard to the fact that claimant remained in hospital for ten days and was also in continuous treatment thereafter an Additional Compensation of Rs.50,000/-under the head ‘pain and suffering’ awarded. (Para 8) Sri Lakshmana Gowda B.N. V. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Co. Ltd.: 2023 STPL(WEB) 54 SC 

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 166, 168 and 173 – Compensation – Loss of marriage prospects – Injury case – On account of the injuries sustained claimant has suffered 75% whole body disability – He has clearly deposed that on account of the injuries sustained and consequential disability suffered his marriage prospects have become bleak – Even in the affidavit filed on 30.09.2022 he has deposed that he has remained unmarried and none has come forward to marry him – In other words, the prospects of appellant getting married would remain a dream and for loss of the same he is awarded compensation in a sum of Rs.50,000/- towards the “loss of marriage prospects. (Para 11) Sri Lakshmana Gowda B.N. V. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Co. Ltd.: 2023 STPL(WEB) 54 SC 

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 166 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 173 – Compensation – Death case – Claim petition – Effect of final report of investigation by Police – While considering petition for quashing of repost of further investigation at the instance of respondent No. 2 findings against deceased son of the appellant-claimant while considering the correctness or otherwise of the final report submitted on a further investigation of the case and thereby quashing the same held to be not a correct and proper approach adopted by the High Court the same liable to be set aside – Held that in a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Act, 1988, the Tribunal has to determine the amount of fair compensation to be granted in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of a driver of a motor vehicle – A holistic view of the evidence has to be taken into consideration by the Tribunal and strict proof of an accident caused by a particular vehicle in a particular manner need not be established by the claimants – The claimants have to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities – The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering the petition seeking compensation on account of death or injury in a road traffic accident – It is for the Appellant herein to establish negligence on the part of the driver of the tanker lorry in the petition filed by him seeking compensation on account of death of his son in the said accident -Thus, the opinion in the final report would not have a bearing on the claim petition for the aforesaid reasons – This is because the Appellant herein is seeking compensation for the death of his son in the accident which occurred on account of the negligence on the part of the driver of the tanker lorry, causing the accident on the said date – In the claim petitions filed by the dependents, in respect of the other passengers in the car who died in the accident, they have to similarly establish the negligence in accordance with law – Impugned order of the High Court liable to be set aside.(Para 9 to 11) Mathew Alexander Vs. Mohammed Shafi and anr. : 2023 STPL(Web) 64 SC 

 Contempt

  Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Section 12 and 19 – Contempt of Court – Conviction set aside  – Appeal against conviction  – Recruitment of land oustees – Judgment dated 17.12.2021, does not bar the appellants from issuing a fresh notification so as to complete the process of recruitment – The said judgment only directed that the process of recruitment be completed within a period of two months and appointment orders be issued to the successful candidates – Whether the recruitment was to be concluded in pursuance of the notification of 2017, or by way of issuing a fresh notification, was not specified in the said judgment – Held that this aspect of the matter was left to the discretion of the appellants – In the absence of as pecific direction to the effect that the recruitment be concluded in pursuance of the notification of 2017 alone, unable to hold that issuance of a fresh recruitment notification would constitute contempt of court – The timeline for completion of recruitment was stipulated by the court, while the manner in which the recruitment was to be completed, was the prerogative of the appellants – Only provisional appointment orders could be issued in view of the fact that the contempt petition initiated by the respondents, was pending – Held that there has been no “deliberate and willful” disobedience of the orders of the High Court – In fact, the appellants had also tendered an unconditional apology on the premise of an alleged violation of the order of the High Court dated 17.12.2021 – Even if the High Court came to a conclusion that there was a deliberate and wilful dis-obedience of the order of the court, it could have considered the said unconditional apology tendered by appellants and concluded the matter – However, the High Court has, instead of considering the unconditional apology tendered by the appellants, sentenced them to suffer simple imprisonment and pay fine – Said punishment imposed held to be not correct having regard to the facts of the case and the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court on 17.12.2021 – It would be appropriate to accept the unconditional apology of the appellants and consequently set aside the sentence imposed on them. (Para 13 to 15) Gurudeep Singh Vs. Regonda Srinivas & ors. : 2023 STPL(Web) 65 SC 

Constitution Law

Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, Section 25(d) (as amended by Act, 2021) – Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, Section 4B(1) (as amended by Act, 2021) – Fundamental Rules, 1922, Rule 56(d) (as amended by Rules, 2021) – Validity of Central Vigilance Commission (Amendment) Act, 2021, the Delhi Special Police Establishment (Amendment) Act, 2021 and the Fundamental (Amendment) Rules, 2021 – Challenge as to – Extension of tenue of appointment of Director of Enforcement or the Director of CBI – Amendments to the CVC Act and the DSPE Act is that the period for which such Director of Enforcement or the Director of CBI holds office on his initial appointment may, in public interest, on the recommendation of the Committee, which under the statutory scheme was required to recommend the appointment of such Director, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, be extended up to one year at a time- The second proviso provides that no such extension shall be granted after the completion of a period of five years in total including the period mentioned in the initial appointment – Held that challenge to the legislative Act would be sustainable only if it is established that the legislature concerned had no legislative competence to enact on the subject it has enacted; that such an enactment is in contravention of any of the fundamental rights stipulated in Part III of the Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution; on the ground of manifest arbitrariness – It is nobody’s case that Parliament did not have power to enact on the subject on which the aforesaid Amendments have been enacted – What has been done is only a power is given to extend their period for a period of one year at a time, subject to a maximum number of three such extensions – However, this has to be done only when the Committee which is constituted to recommend their appointment finds it necessary, in public interest, to grant such extension- It is further required to record the reasons in writing for the said purpose – Unable to accept the arguments that the impugned Amendments grant arbitrary power to the Government to extend the tenure of the Director of ED/CBI and has the effect of wiping out the insulation of these offices from extraneous pressures – Held that the amendment to clause (d) of Section 25 of the CVC Act and to sub-section (1) of Section 4B of the DSPE Act is not unconstitutional – See no reason to hold that the amendment to Fundamental Rules, 1922 is impermissible in law – Challenge to validity of Central Vigilance Commission (Amendment) Act, 2021, the Delhi Special Police Establishment (Amendment) Act, 2021, and the Fundamental (Amendment) Rules, 2021 fails and the writ petitions at the behest of the petitioners to that extent are liable to be rejected. (Para 64,74, 75, 92 to 94, 98 and 121) Dr. Jaya Thakur Vs. Union of India & ors. :2023 STPL(WEB) 60 SC 

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ jurisdiction – Delay and Laches – Effect of delay and laches in availing the remedies against the final publication of record of rights. huge delay on the part of the respondents to avail of their appropriate remedy. Record of rights was finalised in the year 1962. As admitted in the writ petition, objections were filed by the respondents or their predecessors-in-interest before that. Remedy, after publication of final record of rights, was revision under Section 15(b) of the 1958 Act, to be filed within one year. No remedy was availed of. Nearly three decades after finalisation of record of rights, application was filed before the Settlement Officer, which was not maintainable after final record of rights is published. When no relief was granted by the Settlement Officer, the respondents kept quiet for 13 years before filing a civil suit in the year 2003. It was dismissed as withdrawn in the year 2007. The writ petition was filed in the year 2008, which is subject matter of dispute in the present appeal. The aforesaid facts show that the writ petition to claim relief was filed after 46 years of finalisation of record of rights, which was highly belated. Hence, the respondents were no entitled to any relief. (Para 34 and 54) State of orissa & anr. Vs. Laxmi Narayan Das (Dead) Thr. Lrs & ors. : 2023 STPL(Web) 61 SC 

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ jurisdiction –Constructive res judicata – Concealment of material facts –At the time of the filing of the writ petition, it was not mentioned that the writ petitioners had already filed a civil suit claiming the same relief which was dismissed as withdrawn without liberty to file fresh one for the same cause of action – Applying the principles of constructive res judicata, the present writ petition filed by the respondents after withdrawal of the civil suit, was not maintainable and it ought not to have been entertained- In case the respondents still wanted to justify filing of the writ petition, they should have at least disclosed complete facts and then justify filing of the writ petition – The writ petition also ought to be dismissed on the ground of concealment of material facts regarding filing and withdrawal of the civil suit claiming the same relief – Neither in the writ petition nor in the appeal against the order passed in the writ petition, the respondents disclosed the filing of civil suit and withdrawal thereof – It only transpired only that at the time of the hearing of the appeal – Respondents waived off their right to challenge the record of rights which stood finalised way back in the year 1962 and till date there has been no challenge made to the same – Indirectly relief was sought by filing appeal before the Settlement Officer, which was not maintainable; civil suit which was ultimately withdrawn and then filed the writ petition and thereafter writ appeal which is the subject-matter of the present proceedings. (Para 35 to 39, 50 and 54) State of orissa & anr. Vs. Laxmi Narayan Das (Dead) Thr. Lrs & ors. : 2023 STPL(Web) 61 SC 

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ jurisdiction – Whether a party can rely on noting in the Government files without having communication of any order on the basis thereof ? – Held that there was no order passed by the Government and conveyed to the respondents for allotment of any land in their favour – Hence, the respondents are not entitled to any relief solely based on the official notings. (Para 54) State of orissa & anr. Vs. Laxmi Narayan Das (Dead) Thr. Lrs & ors. : 2023 STPL(Web) 61 SC

Service Law – Cancelation of Appointment for Violation of reservation – PIL for seeking to cancel faculty appointments in Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) from 2008 to present for allegedly violating reservation norms. The petitioner admits that the matter regarding implementation of reservation policy in the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) is already pending before the Supreme Court as well the Madras High Court

When none of the appointees is a party respondent, allegation of alleged discriminatory treatment to the candidates belonging to north and Hindi speaking States, in the matter of appointment as faculty members in IITs, is totally vague, evasive and without any supporting material. The petitioner has made sweeping allegations that several IIT students have committed suicide due to harassment caused by the professors in IITs. Such an absurd plea appears to have been taken on the basis of some news reports. Writ petition is wholly misconceived and misdirected. – Dismissed. (Para 4, 5) Dr. Sachchida Nand Pandey Vs. Union Of India & Ors. : 2023 Stpl(Web) 95 SC

Criminal Procedure

 Penal Code, 1860, Section 180 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 161, 162 – Statement to Police – Signing of – Confessional statement – Held that in terms of section 162, Cr. PC, no statement made by a person to a police officer in the course of any investigation under Chapter XII of the Cr. PC, which is reduced to writing, is required to be signed by the person making the statement – Section 180 of the IPC gets attracted only if a statement is refused to be signed which a public servant is legally competent to require the person making the statement to sign – That is not the case here – It does not appear from the order dated 18th July, 2022 of the CJM that any charge has been framed against the petitioner under section 180 of the IPC – However, if any charge thereunder by any separate order has been framed against the petitioner, she will be at liberty to pursue her remedy in accordance with law. (Para 23 and 24) Supriya Jain V. State of Haryana: 2023 STPL(WEB) 38 SC 

 Penal Code, 1860, Section 308, 338 – Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 222(2) – Criminal Procedure – Omission to frame charge u/s 338 IPC – Appellant-accused No. 2 is a conductor of the bus – Allegation against the appellant was that without waiting for the PW1 to board the bus, he rang the bell as a result of which accused No.1 started the bus and PW 1 fell down on the road and came under the left rear wheel of the bus – She sustained serious injuries including fracture of pelvis – In the absence of intention and knowledge as contemplated by Section 299 of IPC, the offence of attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder was not made out – By applying principles incorporated in subsection (2) of Section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the Court can consider whether the appellant has committed any other offence which is a minor offence in comparison to the offence for which he is tried – The appellant knew that at the relevant bus stop, a large number of students were waiting to take the bus to reach their school and therefore, the appellant ought to have verified whether all the passengers had properly boarded the bus before giving the signal to the driver. However, he did not verify whether the passengers had properly boarded the bus – Therefore, he is guilty of negligence as he failed to perform his duty – Due to the negligence on the part of the appellant, human life was endangered – Grievous hurt was caused to PW1 as she suffered fracture of pelvis – Appellant is guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 338 of IPC –No prejudice caused to appellant as he had sufficient notice of allegations of negligence against him during the trial – Hence, omission to frame charge under Section 338 of IPC will not be fatal – Instead of Section 308 of IPC, he is held guilty of an offence punishable under Section 338 of the IPC – The appellant shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months – He is entitled to claim a setoff for the period of incarceration already undergone – The appellant shall pay a total amount of Rs.75,000/ out of which a sum of Rs.50,000/ has already been deposited – Out of the said amount, a sum of Rs.45,000/ shall be paid over to the victim – PW1 as compensation – The remaining amount of Rs.5,000/ will go to the State Government – The appellant is directed to pay an additional amount of Rs.25,000/ by way of deposit in the Trial Court within a period of two months from today – The said amount shall also be paid to PW1 as compensation. (Para 14 to 17) Abdul Ansar V. State of Kerala: 2023 STPL(WEB) 45 SC 

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, Section 8(b) read with Section 15(c), 50, 52A– Evidence Act, 1872, Section 27 – NDPS – Search and seizure – Appeal against conviction – Appreciation of evidence – Seizure of contraband poppy straw from tractor trolley – Disclosure statement – Non production of contraband before Court – Disposal of contraband – P.W2 and P.W6 panch witnesses, both of them turned hostile – Though they admitted their signature it was clearly deposed that they were not present at the scene of occurrence – Search warrant under Exhibit P-4 acknowledge the fact that procedure contemplated under the NDPS Act has not been followed -One of the witnesses to the seizure memo has not been examined while the other turned hostile – Both the witnesses to the arrest memo have not been examined – On the issue of non-production of narcotic substance memorandum under Section 27 of the Act, as witnessed by the two witnesses, P.W3 and P.W4 would be of no value in evidence as there is no discovery of new fact involved – These witnesses also turned hostile – The record would also indicate that an order was passed by the trial Judge permitting the prosecution to keep the seized materials within the police station, to be produced at a later point of time – This itself is a sufficient indication that the mandate of Section 52A has not been followed -No explanation either for non-production of the seized materials or the manner in which they are disposed of – No order passed by the Magistrate allowing the application, if any, filed under Section 52A of the NDPS Act – There is a serious doubt with respect to the seizure – P.W.5 who was a police officer himself had deposed on the existence of the very same seized materials even before the occurrence – This testimony which destroys the very basis of the prosecution case has not even been challenged – Held that both the Courts have mechanically placed reliance on the FSL Report while taking the statement of P.W.11 as the gospel truth – The views expressed by him can at best be taken as opinion at least on certain aspects – There are too many material irregularities which create a serious doubt on the very case of the prosecution – Impugned judgments liable to be set aside and the appellant is to be acquitted by rendering the benefit of doubt. (Para 11 to 15) Mangilal Vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh : 2023 Stpl(Web) 75 SC

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, Section 52A – NDPS – Disposal of contraband – Sub-section (1) of Section 52A of the NDPS Act facilitates the Central Government a mode to be prescribed to dispose of the seized narcotic substance – The idea is to create a clear mechanism for such disposal both for the purpose of dealing with the particular case and to safeguard the contraband being used for any illegal purpose thereafter- Sub-section (2) of Section 52A of the NDPS Act mandates a competent officer to prepare an inventory of such narcotic drugs with adequate particulars – This has to be followed through an appropriate application to the Magistrate concerned for the purpose of certifying the correctness of inventory, taking relevant photographs in his presence and certifying them as true or taking drawl of samples in his presence with due certification – Such an application can be filed for anyone of the aforesaid three purposes – The objective behind this provision is to have an element of supervision by the magistrate over the disposal of seized contraband – Such inventories, photographs and list of samples drawn with certification by Magistrates would constitute as a primary evidence – Therefore, when there is non-compliance of Section 52A of the NDPS Act, where a certification of a magistrate is lacking any inventory, photograph or list of samples would not constitute primary evidence – The obvious reason behind this provision is to inject fair play in the process of investigation – Section 52A of the NDPS Act is a mandatory rule of evidence which requires the physical presence of a Magistrate followed by an order facilitating his approval either for certifying an inventory or for a photograph taken apart from list of samples drawn. (Para 4 to 6) Mangilal Vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh : 2023 Stpl(Web) 75 SC

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, , Section 52A – Evidence Act, 1872, Section 114(g) – NDPS – Negative inference – Disposal of contraband – Before any proposed disposal/destruction mandate of Section 52A of the NPDS Act requires to be duly complied with starting with an application to that effect – A Court should be satisfied with such compliance while deciding the case – The onus is entirely on the prosecution in a given case to satisfy the Court when such an issue arises for consideration – Production of seized material is a factor to establish seizure followed by recovery – One has to remember that the provisions of the NDPS Act are both stringent and rigorous and therefore the burden heavily lies on the prosecution – Non-production of a physical evidence would lead to a negative inference within the meaning of Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. (Para 8) Mangilal Vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh : 2023 Stpl(Web) 75 SC

Penal Code, 1860, Section 302 – Murder – Conviction set aside – Testimony of eye witnesses -Discrepancy in deposition – Initial silence for nearly nine days on the part of alleged eyewitness PW-13 and PW-14, as well as (PW-1), (PW-2) and (PW-11) – Contents of the FIR (Exhibit P-2), cast grave doubt on the court deposition by two sisters (PW-13), (PW-14) and (PW-15) implicating the appellant as the perpetrator who had murdered ‘D’ – The appellant was arrested on 24.01.2010, nine days after the incident in question and registration of the FIR (Exhibit P-2) – This apart, find other discrepancies, as (PW- 11), the grandmother of the two sisters – (PW-13) and (PW-14), has testified that she would not allow her granddaughters to bring wood from the forest, the stated purpose why the two eye-witnesses, along with (PW-15), had proceeded to the forest – Appellant was certainly present in the village on 15.01.2010 – His abscondence is not deposed to by (PW-1) – (PW-2), in his deposition, has claimed that the police had brought a dog with them, and on hearing this, the appellant had fled from there – The dog had sniffed the blood-stained stone and, thereafter, had proceeded to the house of the appellant – Ever since, (PW-2) had not seen the appellant in the village – However, the Investigating Officer -(PW-16), in his deposition, while accepting that the appellant had come with (PW-1) and (PW2) for recording the merg, did not state that the appellant had absconded – The quarrel(s) between the appellant and the deceased were minor in nature and had happened two to three months prior to the incident – Neither the quarrel(s), as deposed, nor the allegation of abscondence, regarding which there is some ambiguity and doubt, would establish the case of murder of ‘D’ against the appellant, if the statements of the alleged eye-witnesses – (PW-13), (PW-14) and (PW-15) is discarded – Conviction of appellant under Section 302 IPC liable to be set aside – The appellant –‘R ‘ will be released immediately, if not required to be detained in jail in any other case. (Para 6 to 8)  Ranjeet Singh Vs. State Of Chhattisgarh : 2023 Stpl(Web) 76 SC

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Section 25 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 406 – Transfer of cases – Matrimonial dispute – Petitioner wife prayed for transfer of divorce petition filed by respondent-husband at Jaisalmer and also for transfer of criminal case pending on the FIR lodged by petitioner wife for the offences punishable under Section 323,341 and 498A IPC from Jaisalmer to Solan – A maintenance petition under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is pending before the Additional District Judge at Solan, Himachal Pradesh – Apart from that, there is a complaint filed by her under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 which is also pending in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate at Solan – There is one more case which is a petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 filed by the wife which is pending in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Kasauli, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh–Held that when there are multiple proceedings between the husband and wife arising out of a matrimonial dispute, in fact, such transfer is in the interests of husband, as all cases between the parties will be heard at the same place – State will hardly be affected, considering the nature of the criminal proceedings – In the facts of the case, do not agree with the submission that the State is a necessary party – The complainant and accused are before the Court – Accordingly, Divorce Petition pending before the Family Court, Jaisalmer, Rajasthan is ordered to be transferred to the District Judge, Family Court, Solan, Himachal Pradesh – Criminal Case pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaisalmer, Rajasthan is ordered to be transferred to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kasauli, district Solan, Himachal Pradesh – The Court to which criminal case mentioned) above is transferred, shall endeavour to fix the same date in the criminal case which is fixed in the other matters pending in the Courts at Solan, Himachal Pradesh – On a formal application being made by the respondent-husband, the transferee Court will grant exemption to the respondent-husband from personal appearance, subject to the condition that whenever the said Court passes an order requiring his personal presence, he shall personally remain present in the Court. (Para 9 to 11) Ankita Bhati Vs. Dev Raj Singh Bhati : 2023 Stpl(Web) 83 SC

Indian Technology Act, 2000 – Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974 – Section 207 – Criminal Procedure – Supply of hard copies of the documents relied on by the Prosecution – Whether mandatory – Plea against High Court order in this regard – Plea by CBI that as per Section 4 of the Indian Technology Act, 2000 and also Section 207of the Code of Criminal Procedure to contend that supplying of documents in digital format is permissible and High Court was in error in upholding the direction issued by the Special Judge ordering for supply of hard copies of the concerned documents to the accused. As the respondent is not represented, Supreme Court order to list matter after four weeks            (Para 2, 3) Central Bureau Of Investigation, Bhopal Vs. Abhishek Sachan @ Abhishek Singh : 2023 Stpl(Web) 92 SC

Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 – Section 19 – Preventive Detention – Non consideration of representation – It is true that in the case at hand there is no real challenge to the initial detention order dated 08.082022. The challenge is clearly to the subsequent orders and the procedural flaws made by the Government in passing the subsequent orders for extension of the period of initial detention. We have already held that there were procedural flaws in the orders, but this makes only the extended period of detention bad, not the initial detention.To that extent, the decision of the Advisory Board and subsequent decision of the State Government extending the period of detention becomes bad as the statutory procedural requirement have not been complied with. Extension of preventive detention quashed. (Para 15, 16) Prakash Chandra Yadav @ Mungeri Yadav Vs. The State Of Jharkhand & Ors. : 2023 Stpl(Web) 94 SC

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974 – Section 378(2) – Appeal Against acquittal – Statutory compliance is necessary and not discretionary – Judgment of High Court of Calcutta modified. (Para 3) Central Bureau Of Investigation Vs. S.R. Ramamani & Ors. : 2023 Stpl(Web) 97 SC

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37 – Bail – Prolonged Incarceration override embargo under NDPS – Petitioner accused in NDPS Case – Already spent more than three and half years in prison – Plea for bail –  In case of prolonged incarceration, conditional liberty will override the statutory embargo under Section 37 of the Act. Prolonged incarceration is against fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21, ie, protection of life and personal liberty. Held: The prolonged incarceration, generally militates against the most precious fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and in such a situation, the conditional liberty must override the statutory embargo created under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. Bail granted. (Para 4) Rabi Prakash Vs. The State Of Odisha : 2023 Stpl(Web) 99 SC

Consumer

 Consumer Protection Act, 1986, Section 2(1)(g) and 14(1)(d) – Consumer – Renewal of health insurance policy – Insurance claim – Repudiation – Ground that appellant’s wife was suffering from rheumatic heart disease and the same was not disclosed in the proposal form – First policy was taken by the appellant for the period from 07.07.2007 to 06.07.2008, which was renewed for another year – The claims even for the period, wherein valid policy was available with the appellant, were repudiated – Renewal of policy beyond 07.07.2009 onwards was refused relying upon the guidelines issued by the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority vide communication dated March 31, 2009 – The claim of the appellant was repudiated on that very ground namely non-disclosure of the disease by which the wife of the appellant (now deceased) suffered at the time of purchase of initial policy – The repudiation of claim by the insurance company was subject matter of consideration before the Fora at different levels under the Act, 1986 – The rejection of the claim on the ground that there was concealment of certain material facts by the appellant at the time of purchase of policy, was not found to be tenable and the insurance company was directed to reimburse the expenses incurred for the period from 07.07.2007 to 06.07.2009 – The aforesaid amount was paid by the insurance company – The order passed by the National Commission was not challenged any further by the Insurance Company – From this, it is established that even the Insurance Company accepted the fact that non-mentioning of the disease from which the deceased wife of the appellant suffered at the time of purchasing the policy was not material, as the death was caused from a different disease all together – Both had no relation with each other – Now, the insurance company cannot be permitted to raise same plea to deny renewal of insurance policy to the appellant for the period from 07.07.2009 onwards – Even though direction was given by the District Forum vide order dated 11.09.2009 to renew the policy further but it was not renewed, till such time interim order was passed by the National Commission on 13.05.2011 – Impugned order was passed by the National Commission on 26.11.2018, whereby direction for renewal of policies was set aside – The amount of premium charged by the insurance company for renewal of policies has not been refunded. Meaning thereby the premium for renewal of the policies for the period in dispute stands paid – Impugned order passed by the National Commission liable to be set aside – The orders passed by the District Forum and State Forum regarding direction to the Insurance Company to renew the policies are restored – Once there is a valid insurance policy available in favour of the appellant, the claim made by him for reimbursement of the expenses incurred is justifiable and deserves to be paid to him – Ordered accordingly. (Para 26 to 29) Om Prakash Ahuja V. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd: 2023 STPL(WEB) 42 SC 

Consumer – Manufacturing Defect in Car – Appeal by Car Manufacturer – Even Engine replacement did not make the car fit – Direction to refund the amount Plus insurance paid – Complainant to handover Car to manufacturer after receipt of amount – Upon payment of the amounts by the appellant, the attachment orders passed by the State Commission shall stand set aside and all the proceedings pending between the parties shall be deemed to have been terminated. (Para 5, 6) Ford India Private Limited Vs. M/S. Medical Eleborate Concept Private Limited & Ors. : 2023 Stpl(Web) 91 SC

 Culpable Homicide

 Penal Code, 1860, Section 308 – Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 222(2) – Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, Rule 89(o) – Attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Not made out – Appellant-accused No. 2 is a conductor of the bus – Allegation against the appellant was that without waiting for the PW1 to board the bus, he rang the bell as a result of which accused No.1 started the bus and PW 1 fell down on the road and came under the left rear wheel of the bus – She sustained serious injuries including fracture of pelvis – Not the prosecution’s case that the appellant had any intention to cause the death of PW1 or intention to cause such bodily injury to her as is likely to cause her death. The question is whether the appellant had knowledge that he, by virtue of the act of ringing the bell, was likely to cause death – It is not possible to say that the appellant while ringing the bell, had knowledge that his act is likely to cause the death of PW1 – The bus was over crowded – The cleaner was standing near the footboard – Therefore, in the absence of intention and knowledge as contemplated by Section 299 of IPC, the offence of attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder was not made out – Under Rule 89, the conduct, duties and functions of conductors have been laid down – Clause (o) of Rule 89 relied upon by prosecution held not applicable to this case. (Para 8 to 12) Abdul Ansar V. State of Kerala: 2023 STPL(WEB) 45 SC 

 Environment Law

 National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, Section 14, 15 and 19(1) – Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – National Green Tribunal – Principle of Natural Justice – Report of the Committee – Reliance upon – Principles of natural justice –NGT though is a special adjudicatory body constituted by an Act of Parliament, nevertheless, the discharge of its function must be in accordance with law which would also include compliance with the principles of natural justice as envisaged in Section 19(1) of the Act – If the NGT intends to rely upon an expert Committee report or any other relevant material that comes to its knowledge, it should disclose in advance to the party so as to give an opportunity for discussion and rebuttal – Thus, factual information which comes to the knowledge of NGT on the basis of the report of the Committee constituted by it, if to be relied upon by the NGT, then, the same must be disclosed to the parties for their responsend a reasonable opportunity must be afforded to present their observations or comments on such a report to the Tribunal – Experts’ opinion is only byway of assistance in arriving at a final conclusion- Appellant(s) who were respondents before the NGT were not given an opportunity to file their objections to the recommendations made by the Committee constituted by the NGT- Held that. Thus, this is a clear case of there being non-compliance with the principles of natural justice – On the said ground alone the impugned order liable to be set aside, the matter is remanded to the NGT for re-consideration from the stage of the recommendations filed by the expert Committee constituted by the NGT – The appellant(s) permitted to file their objections, if they are so advised – The NGT shall consider the objections, if any, filed to the recommendations and thereafter dispose of the applications in accordance with law and after giving a reasonable opportunity to all parties. (Para 16 to 18) : Singrauli Super Thermal Power Station Vs. Ashwani Kumar Dubey & ors : 2023 STPL(Web) 62 SC 

 Evidence

 Penal Code, 1860, Section 302 read with Section 34; Sections 449 and 324 read with Section 34 – Evidence Act, 1872, Section 118 – Oaths Act, 1969, Section 4 – Evidence – Child witness – Testimony of – Appreciation of evidence – Evidentiary value – Under the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 4 of the Act, 1969 in case of a child witness under 12 years of age, unless satisfaction as required by the said proviso is recorded, an oath cannot be administered to the child witness – In the deposition of PW1, it is mentioned that his age was 12 years at the time of the recording of evidence – Therefore, the proviso to Section 4 of the Oaths Act will not apply in this case – In view of the requirement of Section 118 of the Evidence Act, the learned Trial Judge was under a duty to record his opinion that the child is able to understand the questions put to him and that he is able to give rational answers to the questions put to him – The Trial Judge must also record his opinion that the child witness understands the duty of speaking the truth and state why he is of the opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth – Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence – A child witness of tender age is easily susceptible to tutoring – However, that by itself is no ground to reject the evidence of a child witness – The Court must make careful scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness – The Court must apply its mind to the question whether there is a possibility of the child witness being tutored – Therefore, scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness is required to be made by the Court with care and caution – Before recording evidence of a minor, it is the duty of a Judicial Officer to ask preliminary questions to him with a view to ascertain whether the minor can understand the questions put to him and is in a position to give rational answers – The Judge must be satisfied that the minor is able to understand the questions and respond to them and understands the importance of speaking the truth – Therefore, the role of the Judge who records the evidence is very crucial – He has to make a proper preliminary examination of the minor by putting appropriate questions to ascertain whether the minor is capable of understanding the questions put to him and is able to give rational answers – It is advisable to record the preliminary questions and answers so that the Appellate Court can go into the correctness of the opinion of the Trial Court. (Para 7 to 9) Pradeep V. State of Haryana: 2023 STPL(WEB) 48 SC 

Eviction

Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, Section 14(3) –Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001- Eviction petition – Restriction on eviction – Grounds of bona fide necessity – Provision of Section 14(3) is for the protection of a tenant – The objective is that from the date a tenant acquires a right, he must have a right to continue in the premises for a period of five years, subject to his fulfilment of the terms and conditions of the lease–While the suit may have been defectively instituted within five years of the tenancy, more than 38 years have now elapsed since the suit was filed – Held that this passage of time beyond the period of five years would wash away the initial impediment against the suit – Stare at a factual scenario where the vagaries of litigation have prolonged the suit proceedings for a period of 38 years – Plea of the respondent that the appellant should be asked to file a fresh suit repelled – Whether the expression used is ‘shall lie’or ‘be entertained’ would really make no difference -Held that in agreement with the view adopted in B. Banerjee’s[1995 (2) SCC 630.] case that the spirit of protection is fulfilled with the passage of the prescribed time period, and the filing of a fresh suit would lead to unnecessary multiplicity of litigation – Subsequent development has been taken note of that the said Act itself has been abrogated in the year 2001, with a new statute coming into force, i.e. The Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001, which does not create any similar bar – Judgment of the High Court liable to be set aside – A quietus should be put to this prolonged dispute spanning 38 years, on something as simple as tenancy issue and as to when the proceedings commenced in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do absolute justice inter se the parties – Decree of eviction passed by the first appellate court should be affirmed and the respondent be asked to hand over vacant and physical possession of the tenanted premises on or before 30.09.2023. (Para 15 to 22) Ravi Khandelwal Vs. M/S. Taluka Stores : 2023 STPL(WEB) 59 SC 

Labour Law

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 2(oo), 25F – Labour Law – Absorption – Retrenchment – Casual workers –Reinstatement – Absorption in regular service – Management of FCI filed a writ petition challenging the Award passed by the Tribunal but having secured conditional interim relief therein, the management chose to implement the impugned Award though it was under no compulsion to do so -Management did not stop short at just reinstating the workmen in service but went further and absorbed them in regular service – Such absorption in service was not at all required under the interim order dated 05.08.1999 and was, therefore, squarely attributable to the will and volition of the management of FCI itself – In effect, the management of FCI, be it for whatever reason, chose to acquiesce with and accept the Award in its entirety, though it made such compliance subject to the result of the writ petition – Having allowed the workmen to put in regular service to its own benefit for over two decades, the management can no longer claim an indefeasible right to continue with and canvass its challenge to the Award, merely because it made its compliance with the Award conditional long ago – In the light of their absorption in regular service, these workmen, who may have otherwise opted for employment opportunities elsewhere, altered their position and remained with the FCI – Having placed them in that position, it is no longer open to the management of FCI to seek to turn back the clock – Appeal filed by the Executive Staff Union of FCI, on behalf of the workmen, accordingly allowed and the judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court liable to be set aside – In consequence, the order passed by the learned Judge and the Award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal restored – Appeal filed by FCI liable to be dismissed. (Para 16 to 18) Workmen V. Employer In Relation: 2023 STPL(WEB) 28 SC 

 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 2(oo), 10 – Industrial Dispute – Back wages – Held that even if Court passes an order of reinstatement in service, an order of payment of back wages is not automatic – It all depends on the facts and circumstances of the case – In the statement of claim, it is specifically asserted that till August 1997 when the statement of claim was filed, the appellant found it difficult to get employment and in fact he was unemployed – There is a cross-examination of the appellant on this issue by the Advocate for the respondent and in the cross-examination, the appellant denied that he had a sufficient source of income to look after his family – However, considering the conduct of the appellant of withdrawing the affidavit filed earlier and not raising the contention of unemployment in the fresh affidavit, the appellant cannot be granted the benefit of back wages for the entire period from the date of termination till reinstatement – It is not possible to accept that for the entire period of thirteen years, the appellant had no source of income – However, the respondent has not come out with the case that from the date of his removal from service, the appellant had another source of income – Thus, the appellant discharged the burden on him by establishing that he was unemployed at least till August 1997 – Held that it will be appropriate if a sum of Rs.3 lakhs is ordered to be paid to the appellant in lieu of back wages – To that extent, the appeal must succeed. (Para 9 and 10) Ramesh Chand V. Management of Delhi Transport Corporation: 2023 STPL(WEB) 35 SC 

Disputes Act, 1947, Section 2(oo), 10 – Evidence Act, 1872, Section 106 – Industrial Dispute – – Back wages – Gainfully employed – Burden of proof – Whether an employee after dismissal from service was gainfully employed is something which is within his special knowledge – Considering the principle incorporated in Section 106 of the Act, 1872, the initial burden is on the employee to come out with the case that he was not gainfully employed after the order of termination – It is a negative burden – However, in what manner the employee can discharge the said burden will depend upon on peculiar facts and circumstances of each case – It all depends on the pleadings and evidence on record – Since, it is a negative burden, in a given case, an assertion on oath by the employee that he was unemployed, may be sufficient compliance in the absence of any positive material brought on record by the employer. (Para 7) Ramesh Chand V. Management of Delhi Transport Corporation: 2023 STPL(WEB) 35 SC 

Employees Compensation Act, 1923, Section 3–Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 166 – Employee Compensation – Death case – ‘M’ died in a road accident on 17.08.1993 – Immediately thereafter, his legal heirs filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the 1988 Act before the MACT – Same was adjudicated upon by the Tribunal vide Award dated 7.3.2003 awarded compensation of Rs.81,600/- was assessed to be payable to the appellants – The award of the Tribunal attained finality as nothing was pointed out at the time of hearing that it was challenged any further – Thereafter, the appellants filed application before the Commissioner seeking compensation under the provisions of the 1923 Act – Commissioner dismissed the claim petition as the appellants had exercised the option for claiming the compensation under the Act, 1988 and hence they could not claim benefit under the 1923 Act – Aforesaid findings recorded by the Commissioner were set aside by the High Court and the application was held to be maintainable against which no appeal has been filed by the aggrieved party – The Commissioner had dismissed the application on the ground of delay also – Besides this even employer and employee relationship was not proved to claim compensation – High Court upheld the findings of the Commissioner on the delay in filing of claim petition – However, nothing was discussed on the issue of employer and employee relationship – In the evidence led by the appellant no.1, she admitted in her cross-examination that the owner of the vehicle was brother of her husband – It was further admitted that they were having common ration card – They were members of the same Joint Hindu family – Salary certificate of the deceased was produced on record, however the same was not proved – There is nothing to suggest that the so-called employer had admitted the relationship of master and servant – Held that the from conduct of the parties it is evident from the award of the Tribunal where with a view to receive compensation from the offending vehicle, the owner of the vehicle had appeared in the witness box and stated that he was paying salary of Rs. 2,000/- to the deceased and a daily allowance of Rs. 25/- – In case that was so, nothing prevented the owner of the vehicle, who is said to be the employer, to have appeared before the Commissioner and admitted the relationship of employer and employee – In fact, the conduct of the parties now shows that they intended to claim compensation from the offending vehicle – In a calculated move, no claim was made against the owner of the vehicle or the Insurance Company of the vehicle, being driven by the deceased, before the Tribunal – The relationship of employer and employee has not been proved before the Commissioner – The same being the basic requirement to be fulfilled for claiming compensation under the 1923 Act, the appellants may not be entitled to receive any compensation – Even on the ground of delay in filing the application before the Commissioner i.e. 02.08.2004 after 9 years of the accident also, the same deserves to be dismissed. (Para 12 to 16) Shantabai Ananda Jagtap V. Jayram Ganpati Jagtap: 2023 STPL(WEB) 43 SC 

 Land acquisition

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 41 Rule 22 – Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 4(1), 6, 17 – Land acquisition – Cross objections – Non consideration of – Issues raised by the appellants in their cross objections have not been considered by the High Court – No mention of the cross objections filed by the appellants have been found in the said judgment – Held that the High Court was under an obligation to consider the cross objections filed by the Appellants herein – Since such an obligation was not discharged while passing the judgment in appeal, the matter remanded to the High Court for fresh adjudication on the grounds raised in the cross objections. (Para 18 and 22) Dheeraj Singh V. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority: 2023 STPL(WEB) 33 SC 

 National Highways Authority Act, 1956, Section 3A, 3G, 3H – Land acquisition – Apportionment of compensation – Determination of amount payable as compensation – Held that if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, then, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated – The competent authority possesses certain powers of the Civil Court, but in the event of a dispute of the above nature, the summary power, vesting in the competent authority of rendering an opinion in terms of subsection (3) of Section 3H, will not serve the purpose – The dispute being of the nature triable by the Civil Court that the law steps in to provide for that to be referred to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction – The dispute regarding apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, would then have to be decided by that Court – Order passed by the District Magistrate liable to be quashed and set aside – The writ application stands allowed – In view of the dispute between the parties as regards apportionment of the amount of compensation, the Special Land Acquisition Officer shall now refer the dispute to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in accordance with sub-clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956. (Para 34 and 35) Vinod Kumar v. District Magistrate Mau: 2023 STPL(WEB) 53 SC 

Constitution of India, Article 136 – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, Section 24(2) – Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 4, 6(1) – Land acquisition – Lapse of proceedings –Special Leave Petition – Condonation of delay –Costs – Compensation – When the Writ Petition was filed invoking sub-Section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the acquired land was already put to use for an important public purpose of the metro depot – Held that the use of the land for public purposes for the last several years is certainly a relevant factor for adopting a liberal approach while considering the prayer for condoning the delay -Petition invoking sub-Section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act was filed by the appellant nearly seventeen months after the 2013 Act came into force – In a case where the land was not put to use for a public purpose, the approach of this Court while deciding the application for condonation of a long delay in such a case would have been different – Application for condonation of delay has been drafted rather casually – However, considering the peculiar facts of the case, , by adopting a justice oriented and liberal approach, the delay will have to be condoned (Para 11 to 16) Delhi Development Authority Vs. Jagan Singh & ors. : 2023 STPL(Web) 63 SC 

Constitution of India, Article 136 – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, Section 24(2) – Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 4, 6(1) – Land acquisition – Compensation – High Court has issued a direction to pay compensation to the first respondent in terms of the 2013 Act – Held that the said direction was issued in the context of the fact that the Court was declaring the acquisition as lapsed notwithstanding the fact that the acquired land was already used for an important public purpose – Once it is held that the acquisition under the 1894 Act continues to be valid, the first respondent is disentitled to claim compensation payable in terms of the 2013 Act which was not applicable to the acquisition – However, the appellant is entitled to receive compensation already determined under the award made under the 1894 Act – Impugned order liable to be quashed and set aside and the writ petition filed by respondent liable to be dismissed – Appellant to pay costs quantified at Rs. 50,000/to the first respondent within a period of one month. (Para 17and 20) Delhi Development Authority Vs. Jagan Singh & ors. : 2023 STPL(Web) 63 SC 

 Land Scam

 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 438 – Anticipatory bail – Land Scam – Challenge to grant of – Offence punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC – Sale of land belonging to appellants an elderly NRI couple by GPA alleged to have been executed by appellants – FIR by appellant stating that they never executed any Power of Attorney alleged to be of the year 1996 – Original Power of Attorney of the year 1996 yet to see the light of the day – Held that the alleged offences of forging documents for transferring ownership of land worth crores of rupees are grave in nature – Hence, while it is extremely important to protect the personal liberty of a person, it is equally incumbent upon us to analyze the seriousness of the offence and determine if there is a need for custodial interrogation – It is immaterial that the genuineness of the 1996 GPA is already subjudice before the Civil Court in the civil suits pending between the parties – The appellants, owing to their age and residential status, cannot be expected to await indefinitely for the outcome of these civil proceedings – Regardless, the pendency of these cases does not estop the issues of forgery and fabrication being considered in the course of criminal investigation – The facts of the case speak for themselves and an element of criminality cannot be ruled out at this stage – Custodial interrogation of not only Respondent No. 2 but all other suspects is, therefore, imperative to unearth the truth – Joining the investigation with a protective umbrella provided by prearrest bail will render the exercise of eliciting the truth ineffective in such like case – Impugned order passed by the High Court granting prearrest bail to Respondent No. 2 set aside. (Para 18 to 20) Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana: 2023 STPL(WEB) 55 SC 

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 438 – Land Scam – SIT Constituted – Offence punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC – Sale of land belonging to appellants an elderly NRI couple by GPA alleged to have been executed by appellants – FIR by appellant stating that they never executed any Power of Attorney alleged to be of the year 1996 – Original Power of Attorney of the year 1996 yet to see the light of the day – Subject Land is situated in Gurugram District, the GPA in relation to the property was registered in Kalkaji, New Delhi – It raises some suspicion regarding the genuineness of the – Also skeptical, suspicious and incredulous about the verification process of the 1996 GPA carried out by the Sub–Registrar, Kalkaji, New Delhi – Hence, the conduct of the officials of Sub-Registrar Office, Kalkaji, New Delhi is also required to be examined to take the investigation to its logical conclusion – Scope of inquiry in these proceedings expanded and directed the Commissioner of Police, Gurugram to constitute a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to be headed by an officer not below the rank of Dy. Superintendent of Police along with two Inspectors as its members – The SIT shall take over the investigation forthwith – The SIT shall have the liberty to subject Respondent No. 2, the vendee(s), the Sub Registrar/officials, or other suspects to custodial interrogation to arrive at a definite conclusion, strictly in accordance with law – In case the vendees, the officers/officials of the Registering Authority have secured anticipatory bail from Sessions Court/High Court, the SIT shall be at liberty to seek suitable modifications to such orders so that no impediment is caused in carrying out a fair and free investigation – No interlocutory/interim order passed by the Civil Court shall obstruct the ongoing investigation – The Civil Court shall not, from this point forth, pass any such order in pending civil suits which may hamper the ongoing investigation. (Para 23, 31 to 33) Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana: 2023 STPL(WEB) 55 SC 

Murder

 Penal Code, 1860, Section 302 read with Section 34; Sections 449 and 324 read with Section 34 – Evidence Act, 1872, Section 118 – Oaths Act, 1969, Section 4 – Murder – Conviction set aside – Appeal against conviction – Appreciation of evidence – Child witness – Testimony of – Appreciation of evidence – Evidentiary value – Non-examination of crucial witness – Adverse inference – Preliminary examination of the minor is very sketchy – Only three questions were put to the minor on the basis of which the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the witness was capable of giving answers to each and every question – Held that the learned Sessions Judge has not done his duty – After closely scrutinising the evidence of PW1-child witness the possibility of the witness being tutored cannot be ruled out – No support or corroboration to the testimony of PW1 Ajay, apart from other deficiencies in the prosecution case – In the facts of the case, it will not be safe to base the conviction only on the testimony of PW1 which does not inspire confidence – Crucial person milkman who he first narrated the incident who came to deliver milk not examined by prosecution – Inference will have to be drawn against the prosecution for non-examination of the milkman – According to the prosecution, there were foot marks of the shoes/footwear of the accused near the house where the incident took place – The prosecution took the moulds of the foot marks, as deposed by PW6 – The footwear/shoes of both the accused were taken into custody in the presence of PW6 – But, the shoes of the present appellant did not match the moulds of the imprint of the shoe taken by the prosecution – . Apart from the non-examination of the milkman, PW11, Investigation Officer, did not make investigation by recording the statements of the elder brothers of Ajay for verifying whether they were away from the house on the date of the incident – Impugned judgments of the High Court and the impugned judgment of the Trial Court liable to be set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the offences alleged against him. (Para 10 to 17) Pradeep V. State of Haryana: 2023 STPL(WEB) 48 SC 

 Penal Code, 1860, Section 302 read with Section 34 – Murder – Circumstantial evidence – Evidence of last seen – Extra judicial confession – Appreciation of evidence -There appears to be no reason as to why the accused persons would go 100 kms. away and confess to PW2 – Deceased was found on 4th September 1998, the statement of (PW-2) to whom the alleged extra-judicial confession was made, was recorded on 9th September 1998 – SI (PW-11) has admitted in his examination that (PW-2) was known to him – He has further stated that he did not know in how many cases of his Police Station PW2 was cited as witness – PW-11has also admitted in his evidence that though the father of deceased Ravinder Singh was alive in those days, he did not record his statement by visiting his village – PW-11 further admitted that he also did not visit the house of the deceased Ravinder Singh to collect any evidence of motive or him leaving his house before the occurrence – Held that the conviction on the basis of such evidence cannot be sustained. Apart from that, even according to PW-11, the gun which was recovered from the car had two empty cartridges (Ex. P10 and P11) – From evidence of Dr. PW-5), who had conducted the post-mortem of the deceased, would show that there was no external exit wound, and wad and pellets were preserved and sealed -Apart from not collecting any evidence as to whether the said gun belonged to the appellant ‘M’, even the Ballistic Expert has not been examined to show that the wad and pellets were fired from the empty cartridges (Ex. P10 and P11) – Held that serious doubt with regard to the credibility of the witnesses on the issue of extra-judicial confession and last seen theory – Failure to examine Ballistic Expert – It would be a glaring defect in the prosecution case – Prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and, as such, the accused are entitled to benefit of doubt. – Impugned judgment and order of the High Court and the judgment of the Trial Court liable to be quashed and set aside. (Para 20 to26) Pritinder Singh @ Lovely Vs. State of Punjab: 2023 STPL(WEB) 58 SC 

Muncipality

Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, Sections 2(21), 2(29), 2(38), 2(60), 234, 234A, 235, 238 , 271, 272, 275(1)(c), 610 – Municipality – Domestic Water Connection used for other purpose – Notice addressed to the appellant describing it as owner or occupier of premises stated that appellant had contravened Section 238 of the Act by using water supplied for domestic purpose, for purposes other than domestic; that there was no permission under Section 271 of the Act for using water supplied for domestic purposes for any other purpose; that such unauthorised use is a punishable offence under Section 610 of the Act making the appellant liable for prosecution – Admittedly, there is no supply of unfiltered water in the locality/area where building in question is situated – As such, the filtered water or the wholesome water could be used for purposes other than domestic by the owner/occupier of the building in question – Thus, it cannot be said that there was any violation of Section 238 or 271 of the Act – Noater n-obstante clause in Section 272(4) of the Act clearly mentions that notwithstanding anything contained in hereinbefore in this chapter which covers Section 271 as also Section 238 of the Act as the entire scheme of water supply is covered under Chapter XVII of Part-V beginning from Section 233 right up to Section 276 of the Act. Section 272(4) of the Act would thus have overriding effect with respect to all the provisions of that chapter namely Chapter XVII of Part V of the Act – Trade license was issued for use of the premises by the licensees for purposes other than non-residential and necessary levy for fee under various heads including water charges was also made – Held that in such fact situation, it could not be alleged by the KMC that there was any violation of Section 271 or 238 of the Act where specific license has been issued for use of the premise for other than residential purpose and moreover where there was no supply of unfiltered water in the area/locality. The occupiers would, therefore, be well within their rights to use water supply for domestic purpose for any other purpose in view of Section 272(4) of the Act. (Para 21 to 24) Trust Estate Khimji Keshawji & Anr. Vs. Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Ors. : 2023 Stpl(Web) 78 SC

Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, Sections 2(21), 2(29), 2(38), 2(60), 234, 234A, 235, 238 , 271, 272, 275(1)(c), 610 – Municipality – Using water supplied for domestic purposes for purposes other than domestic – Notice addressed to the appellant describing it as owner or occupier of premises stated that appellant had contravened Section 238 of the Act by using water supplied for domestic purpose, for purposes other than domestic; that there was no permission under Section 271 of the Act for using water supplied for domestic purposes for any other purpose – KMC was fully conscious and aware of the occupiers of all the seven floors of the building in question i.e. the ground floor plus six floors – They were also aware that the appellant, who is the owner of the building was occupying the ground floor and the 6th Floor – KMC had issued trade licenses to all the occupiers of the 1st to 5th Floor – The statute primarily lays down the liability on the occupier of the building to pay water charges – Held that it was therefore mandatory for the Corporation to first give notice to the occupiers and make an attempt to recover the charges from them – It is only upon failure to recover dues, if any, from the occupiers that the demand could be raised against the owner – In the present case, KMC having failed to initiate any proceedings against the occupiers committed serious error in initiating the proceedings only against the owner. (Para 25) Trust Estate Khimji Keshawji & Anr. Vs. Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Ors. : 2023 Stpl(Web) 78 SC

Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, Sections 2(21), 2(29), 2(38), 2(60), 234, 234A, 235, 238 , 271, 272, 275(1)(c), 610 – Municipality – Using water supplied for domestic purposes for purposes other than domestic – Notice addressed to the appellant describing it as owner or occupier of premises – Held that notice to the occupier was essential – The notice mentioned that in case water supply for domestic purpose was being used for any other purpose other than domestic, under Section 275(1)(c) of the Act, the water supply could be cut off or turned off – Section 275(1)(c) of the Act clearly refers to occupier of the premises contravening Section 238 of the Act – Therefore, notice ought to have been addressed to the occupier in the first place before cutting off the connection or turning off the supply – KMC admits that there is no supply of unfiltered water in the area – Once that is the fact situation coupled with demand of charges on water for purposes other than domestic as per the trade license, the impugned notice cannot be sustained – High Court committed error by not relying upon the non-obstante clause in sub-Section 4 of Section 272 of the Act as it would have overriding effect over anything contained in that chapter i.e. Chapter XVII – Section 272(4) of the Act, therefore, would have overriding effect over and above Sections 238 and 271 of the Act, once, it is admitted position that there was no supply of unfiltered water – The use of wholesome water for purposes other than domestic cannot be held to be violative of any of the provisions and all the more when the trade license permitted use of the same. (Para 21 to 28) Trust Estate Khimji Keshawji & Anr. Vs. Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Ors. : 2023 Stpl(Web) 78 SC

 POCSO

 Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Section 4, 5, 6, 3(a), 5(m) – PenalCode,1860, Section 377, 506 – POCSO – Aggravated penetrative sexual assault – Case of the prosecution that appellant came to complainant’s house and took his son aged about 10 years in the temple – There appellant gave Rs.20 to complainant’s son i.e. victim and said to suck his penis – Appellant put his pen is into the mouth of the victim – Section 2(a) of the POCSO Act provides that ‘aggravated penetrative sexual assault’ has the same meaning as assigned to it in Section 5 – Held that respondent has committed an offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault as he has committed penetrative sexual assault on a child below twelve years – Clause (m) of Section 5 is attracted in this case – On the date of the commission of the offence, rigorous imprisonment for ten years was the minimum sentence prescribed for the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault – High Court has observed that Section 5 was not applicable, and the offence committed by the respondent falls under the category of a lesser offence of penetrative sexual assault, which is punishable under Section 4 of the POCSO Act – Held that the High Court committed an obvious error by holding that the act committed by the respondent was not an aggravated penetrative sexual assault – In fact, the Special Court was right in punishing the respondent under Section 6 and sentencing him to under go rigorous imprisonment for ten years with a fine of Rs.5,000 – The impact of the obnoxious act on the mind of the victim child will be lifelong – The impact is bound to adversely affect the healthy growth of the victim – Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court liable to be quashed and set-aside – judgment and order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Special Judge POCSO Act restored – The respondent shall under go rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and shall pay a fine of Rs.5,000/. (Para 8 to 13) State of U.P. V. Sonu Kushwaha: 2023 STPL(WEB) 47 SC 

Practice and Procedure

Constitution of India, Article 137 – Supreme Court Rules, 2013, Order 47 Rule 1 – Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Section 114; Order 47 Rule 1 – Review  – Error on the face of record – Held that a power to review cannot be exercised as an appellate power and has to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC – An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions – As many as 18 grounds have been raised in there view petitions – A close perusal of the judgment dated 10.08.2021 reflects that all the grounds taken in the review have been discussed in detail and findings returned not accepting the claim of the Review Petitioner – What is sought to be argued is basically that the view taken is erroneous and therefore, impugned judgment deserves to be reviewed – Arguments advanced if accepted would result in expressing a different opinion on the points raised and decided, which do not fall within the settled contours of Order 47 Rule 1CPC relating to error apparent on the face of record – The other grounds of invoking the review power are neither existing nor have been raised in the present petitions – Held that do not find any good ground to allow the review petitions – They are, accordingly, dismissed. (Para 15 to 27) Arun Dev Upadhyaya V. Ntegrated Sales Service Ltd.: 2023 STPL(WEB) 49 SC 

SARFAESI

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002; Section 14 – SARFAESI  – Quashing of order u/s 482 Cr PC – Quashing of Magistrate order under section 14 of SARFAESI-  Not Permissible – as any remedy against such order can be availed only under the SARFAESI ACT’, 2002. (Para 2) M/S. Phoenix Arc Private Limited Vs. V. Ganesh Murthy & Anr. : 2023 Stpl(Web) 93 SC

 Special Leave Petition

 Constitution of India, Article 136 – Central Excise Act, 1944, Section 11A (1) –Special Leave Petition – New plea – Contention on behalf of the Revenue that the Tribunal’s order in the case of IFGL Refractories could not have constituted a valid basis for the belief entertained by the assesse in view of the fact that the relevant valuation provisions had undergone amendments in the year 2000 repelled – This contention too has not been urged in the Civil Appeal filed by the Revenue and has been urged only during the course of the hearing before this Court – On this count alone the contention deserves to be ignored – Secondly, also find this contention to be diametrically opposite to what the Revenue itself has been contending on merits right from the Show cause notice till the appeal filed before this Court. On merits, the Revenue’s case throughout had been that the issue of valuation is covered against the assessee by the judgement of this Court in the case of IL Refractories – Even in the order of the CESTAT under challenge the Tribunal has proceeded on the basis that the principle of valuation laid down by this Court in the case of IFGL Refractories holds good and remains valid even under the amended valuation provisions for the period post July 2000 – Cannot allow the Revenue to blow hot and cold in the same breath by relying upon IL’s case on merits while at the same time arguing that the same had no relevance for the purposes of examining the plea for a bonafide belief. (Para 22) Commissioner, Central Excise and Customs V. Reliance Industries Ltd: 2023 STPL(WEB) 32 SC 

Constitution of India, Article 136 – Special Leave Petition – Maintainability of – Against order passed in review by High Court – Preliminary objection – Issue of maintainability of SLP – Contention of the respondents that an appeal by way of Special leave against an order passed in review, the provisions of Order XLVII rule 7 make it amply clear that the same is not permissible, that is to say, no appeal by way of Special Leave Petition against an order passed in review is maintainable – Further, that this Court, while dismissing the original Special Leave Petition filed by the petitioner(s) therein, while it granted liberty to the petitioners to approach the High Court in review, did not give the petitioners specific permission to file a subsequent Special Leave Petition before this Court and that such lack of explicit permission, as per the respondent, places a bar on the petitioners to approach this Court again – Held that to put a quietus to such an issue, it is necessary for the same to be adjudicated and deliberated upon by a larger bench of this Court – Further, since only after such a preliminary objection is decided, can the merits of the present case be entered into, the same is to be placed before an appropriate bench after the question of law is decided by the larger bench – Papers of the case directed to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger bench. (Para 26, 27, 41 and 42) S. Narahari V. S.R. Kumar: 2023 STPL(WEB) 46 SC 

 Sentence

Penal Code, 1860, Section 302, 304 Part II – Sentence – Quantum of sentence –Reduction in n – Appeal by complainant – All the accused were found concurrently guilty under Section 148 IPC – They were armed with different kinds of implements and weapons, that were capable of inflicting deadly injuries – The postmortem report of deceased revealed at least six serious head injuries, including fracture and haemorrhage in different places – Held that the sentencing in this case, to put it mildly, is inexplicable (if not downright bizarre) – On the one hand, ‘K’ underwent sentence for 9 years 4 months- at the other end of the spectrum, ‘S’ underwent only 11 months – No rationale appears from the reasoning of the High Court for this wide disparity – It is not as though the court took note of the role ascribed to the accused (such a course was not possible, given the nature of the evidence) – If it were assumed that the age of the accused played a role, then ‘K’, at 61 years- who served 9 years and ‘B’, who had served in the army, and was detained for over 8 years got the stiffest sentence – On the other end of the scale, younger persons were left relatively unscathed, having served between 3 years and 11 months – Impugned judgment fell into error in not considering the gravity of the offence – Having held all the accused criminally liable, under Section 304 Part II read with Section 149 IPC and also not having found any distinguishing feature in the form of separate roles played by each of them, the imposition of the “sentence undergone” criteria, amounted to an aberration, and the sentencing is for that reason, flawed – Given the totality of circumstances (which includes the fact that the accused have been at large for the past four years), the appropriate sentence would be five years rigorous imprisonment – However, at the same time, the court is cognizant of the fact ‘K’ and ‘B’ served more than that period – Therefore, the impugned judgment, as far as they are concerned, is left undisturbed – Consequently, the sentence of ‘R’, ‘P’, ‘S’, and other three accused modified – They are sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for five years – They shall surrender and serve the rest of their sentences within six weeks from today. (Para 13 to 16) Uggarsain V. State of Haryana: 2023 STPL(WEB) 31 SC 

Service Law

 Constitution of India, Article 137 – Service Law – Equivalence of qualification – Recruitment – Post of Art & Craft Teachers – Qualification – Equivalence of qualification – Eligibility criteria prescribed therefor included, inter alia,a 2-year Diploma in Art & Craft conducted by the Haryana Industrial Training Department or an equivalent qualification, recognized by the Haryana Education Department – Controversy arose vis-à-vis this eligibility condition as the Director, School Education, Haryana, issued letter dated 12.12.2006 intimating that the Diploma in Art & Craft conducted by the Director, Industrial Training and Vocational Education, Haryana, was the only recognized course in the State of Haryana and that the Diploma in Art & Craft from Kurukshetra University and other Universities was not recognized for the purpose of appointment to the post of Art & Craft Teacher in the State of Haryana – This Court held that equivalence of qualifications is a matter for the State, as the recruiting authority, to determine – This observation was made in the context of the High Court’s finding that the Diploma in Art & Craft of Kurukshetra University was equivalent to the Diploma in Art & Craft of Haryana Industrial Training Department – Candidates with Diploma from Industrial Training and Vocational Education were appointed and those having Diploma from Kurukshetra were not appointed – A Standing Committee was constituted by Kurukshetra University to examine the matter of equivalence and, pursuant to its deliberations in the meeting held on 08.12.2021 – The Committee recommended that both the courses be treated as equivalent for all purposes – This recommendation was made after comparing the syllabus and finding that both courses were of equal standard in terms of content, credit requirements and attainment level – It was approved by the Vice-Chancellor of the Kurukshetra University and the same was, accordingly, informed to the Director, Elementary Education, Haryana – Government of Haryana is now ready to accommodate and appoint candidates with Diplomas in Art & Craft from Kurukshetra University, who were found meritorious and were included in the selection list dated 14.11.2021, without adversely affecting the 178 candidates who were conditionally appointed pursuant to the directions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court – As it is no longer in issue that the Diplomas in Art & Craft secured from Kurukshetra University by the 667 candidates in the selection list dated 14.11.2021 stand on par with the Diploma in Art & Craft from Haryana Industrial Training Department, there would be no hindrance to their being considered for appointment and this Court is not required to venture into the equivalence of these qualifications. – However, such appointments would now have to be made against the 663 notified vacant posts that would be available, as the 178 appointees are being treated as distinct and separate -The review petitions disposed of accordingly. (Para 10 to 12) Neeraj Kumar V. State of Haryana: 2023 STPL(WEB) 29 SC 

Constitution of India, Article 16, 142 – Disabilities (Equal Opportunity, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, Section 32, 33–Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 , Section 34 – Person with disability – Reservation in Promotion – Whether the RBI by failing to consider Mr. Nair for promotion, a right guaranteed by Article 16 of the Constitution, on application of relaxed standards committed an illegality? – Mr. Nair-first respondent a person having ‘Post-Polio Paralysis of Limbs’ with 50% disability – He joined on a vacancy reserved for a person with disability –He participated in the All India Merit Test for the Panel Year 2003, conducted in year 2004 by the RBI for securing his promotion to a Class–I post – The standards fixed for qualifying in the examination were the same for general candidates as well as persons with disabilities – Apart from fulfilling other conditions, Mr. Nair was required to obtain 95 (ninety-five) marks to qualify for promotion – Having obtained 92 (ninety-two) marks, he fell short of the qualifying marks by only 3 (three) marks – Notwithstanding fulfilment of other eligibility criteria for promotion, Mr. Nair was not considered for promotion owing to such shortfall – Since circulars issued by the GoI contemplated condonation of short fall to the extent of 5 (five) marks for SC/ST candidates, Mr. Nair submitted a representation dated 18th December, 2004 seeking grant of benefit of relaxation as available to him “on par with SC/ST category candidates” but the same was declined – When Mr. Nair had participated in the Panel Year 2003 examination, no decision had been rendered by this Court that reservation in promotion is permissible in respect of Group ‘A’ posts – This Court while interpreting sections 32 and 33 of the PwD Act, 1995 did not declare the law laid down by it to have prospective application – Held that Mr. Nair did have a statutorily conferred right all through to claim that reservation in promotional appointment in Group ‘A’ posts is ingrained in the PwD Act, 1995 – To reach out to persons with disabilities and grant them the facilities and benefits that the PwD Act, 1995 envisaged, it was rather harsh to apply standards which are applicable to general candidates to Mr. Nair while he competed with such general candidates for securing his promotion – RBI, as a model employer, ought to have taken an informed decision in this regard commensurate with the aspirations of persons with disabilities. – Omission or failure of the RBI in condoning the shortfall in marks coupled with the neglect to identify a Group ‘A’ post suitable for reservation to accommodate Mr. Nair on promotion appears to be indefensible–By invoking Article 142 of the Constitution “for doing complete justice” in the cause RBI directed to grant notional promotion to Mr. Nair on the post of Assistant Manager Grade – ‘A’, to be effective from the date of presentation of the writ petition before the High Court, i.e., 27th September, 2006 and actual promotion from 15th September, 2014, i.e., the last date for compliance of the order of the High Court – This exercise must be completed within a period of 2 (two) months from date – The monetary benefits accruing to Mr. Nair with effect from 15th September, 2014 shall be computed and released by 4 (four) months from date. (Para 46 to 56) Reserve Bank of India & ors. Vs. A. K. Nair & ors. : 2023 STPL(WEB) 57 SC 

Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, Section 25(d) (as amended by Act, 2021) – Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, Section 4B(1) (as amended by Act, 2021) – Fundamental Rules, 1922, Rule 56(d) (as amended by Rules, 2021) – Extension of tenure of appointment of Director of Enforcement – Challenge as to – Breach of mandamus – Held that this Court has specifically issued a mandamus that no further extension shall be granted to the second respondent – The Union of India and the respondent No.2 were both parties in the proceedings before this Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1374 of 2020 [Common Cause (2021)] – The mandamus issued to be parties was binding on them – Respondent No.1 could not have issued orders dated 17th November 2021 and 17th November 2022 in breach of the mandamus issued by this Court vide its judgment dated 8th September 2021 in Common Cause (2021) – Impugned orders dated 17th November 2021 and 17th November 2022 granting extensions to the tenure of the respondent No.2 for a period of one year each are held to be illegal – Taking into consideration the concern expressed by the Union of India with regard to FATF review and that the process of appointing the Director of Enforcement is likely to take some time and that in order to ensure the transition to be smooth in the larger public interest, it will be appropriate to permit respondent No.2 to continue to be in office till 31st of July 2023. (Para 116, 119 and 121) Dr. Jaya Thakur Vs. Union of India & ors. :2023 STPL(WEB) 60 SC 

Service Law – Discrimination – Not regularizing all entitled employees – When the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax has himself found that 65 persons were entitled to be regularized, the act of regularizing the services of only 35 employees and not regularizing the services of other employees, including the appellants, is patently discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. . The services of the appellants are directed to be regularized from the date on which the services of other 35 employees were regularized and the backwages and other consequential benefits etc., to which the appellants would be entitled to (Para 10 & 13) Raman Kumar & Ors. Vs. Union Of India & Ors. : 2023 Stpl(Web) 90 SC

Service Law – Cancelation of Appointment for Violation of reservation – PIL for seeking to cancel faculty appointments in Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) from 2008 to present for allegedly violating reservation norms. The petitioner admits that the matter regarding implementation of reservation policy in the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) is already pending before the Supreme Court as well the Madras High Court

When none of the appointees is a party respondent, allegation of alleged discriminatory treatment to the candidates belonging to north and Hindi speaking States, in the matter of appointment as faculty members in IITs, is totally vague, evasive and without any supporting material. The petitioner has made sweeping allegations that several IIT students have committed suicide due to harassment caused by the professors in IITs. Such an absurd plea appears to have been taken on the basis of some news reports. Writ petition is wholly misconceived and misdirected. – Dismissed. (Para 4, 5) Dr. Sachchida Nand Pandey Vs. Union Of India & Ors. : 2023 Stpl(Web) 95 SC

Service Law – Revaluation of answer Script – Delhi Higher Judicial Main Examination – Appeal against High Court order to reevaluate answer sheet -The core contention of the appellant is that Clause XII, Rule 7C of the Appendix to the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970 prohibits re-evaluation of answer sheets – No material error find by Supreme Court in evolution of answer sheet – that it is not a case where the respondent is seeking correction of a patent error in the matter of totaling of the marks, or an omission in evaluating an answer warranting an evaluation – Held: We are of the considered view in the light of the specific prohibition in Clause XII of Rule 7 of the DHJS Rules for reevaluation as also in view of our conclusion that there is no ‘material error’ in the evaluation warranting an interfering with the decision of the petitioner herein. High Court order set aside. (Para 5, 6) Registrar General, High Court Of Delhi Vs. Ravinder Singh : 2023 Stpl(Web) 98 SC

Taxation

 Central Excise Act, 1944, Section 11A (1) – Central Excise – Suppression of facts – In the absence of any specific column or note similar to note 4, requiring separate disclosure of the value of deemed export clearances, do find any merit in the findings of the adjudicating authority that there was suppression of facts as a consequence of assessee’s failure to separately disclose the value of deemed export clearances – An accusation of non-disclosure can only be made if there is in the first instance a requirement to disclose – Note 4 to Form ER-1 requires separate details of clearances to be mentioned for exports under Bond – There is no reference in the said notes to deemed exports or supplies made to holders of advance licenses – Submissions of the counsel for the assessee agreed to that the assesse was never required to separately furnish details of clearances made to holders of advance 12 licenses – Neither the show cause notice nor the civil appeal filed by the Revenue before this Court contain any reference to the wrongful clubbing of deemed export clearances under the details meant for domestic clearances – Also the order of the Tribunal does not contain any reference to this particular aspect which was the main thrust of the oral arguments made by the Ld. Counsel for the Revenue before this Court – Held that the Revenue cannot be permitted to argue its matters by going beyond the written pleadings filed by it before this Court. (Para 20 and 21) Commissioner, Central Excise and Customs V. Reliance Industries Ltd:2023 STPL(WEB) 32 SC 

 Central Excise Act, 1944, Section 11A (1) –Extended period of limitation – Bona fide belief –  – Held that in full agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that during the period in dispute it was holding a bonafide belief that it was correctly discharging its duty liability – The mere fact that the belief was ultimately found to be wrong by the judgment of this Court does not render such belief of the assessee a malafide belief particularly when such a belief was emanating from the view taken by a division bench of Tribunal – The issue of valuation involved in this particular matter is indeed one were two plausible views could co-exist – In such cases of cases of disputes of interpretation of legal provisions, it would be totally unjustified to invoke the extended period of limitation by considering the assessee’s view to be lacking bonafides – In any scheme of self-assessment it becomes the responsibility of the assessee to determine his liability of duty correctly – This determination is required to be made on the basis of his own judgment and in a bonafide manner. (Para 23) Commissioner, Central Excise and Customs V. Reliance Industries Ltd:2023 STPL(WEB) 32 SC 

Central Excise Act, 1944, Section 11A (1) – Self assessment of liability under Central Excise – Bona fide belief – Malafide – The extent of disclosure that an assessee makes is also linked to his belief as to the requirements of la – In the present case the assessee who was required to self-assess his liability determined the assessable value on the basis of an interpretation given by CESTAT in its order dated 28.7.2000 – It could not have foreseen that the view taken by CESTAT would be upset and overturned by the Supreme Court as it happened on 9.8.2005 – The assessee’s conduct during the material period i.e. between 2000 to 2005 cannot be considered to be malafide when it merely followed the view taken by the Tribunal in IFGL’s case – On the question of disclosure of facts, the assessee had disclosed to the department its pricing policy by giving separate letters – It is also not disputed that the returns which were required to be filed were indeed filed – In these returns, there was no separate column for disclosing details of the deemed export clearances – Separate disclosures were required to be made only for exports under bond and not for deemed exports, which are a class of domestic clearances, entitled to certain benefits available otherwise on exports – Held that there was nothing wrong with the assessee’s action of including the value of deemed exports within the value of domestic clearances. (Para 24) Commissioner, Central Excise and Customs V. Reliance Industries Ltd:2023 STPL(WEB) 32 SC 

Central Excise Act, 1944, Section 11A (1) – Self assessment of liability under Central Excise – Suppression of documents – In the show cause notice itself it has been accepted by the revenue that the self-assesment procedure did not require an assessee to submit copies of all contracts, agreements and invoices – This being the admitted position in the notice we not find any basis for agreeing with the findings of the Commissioner that certain relevant documents had not been filed and thereby suppressed from the scrutiny of the revenue officers – An assessee can be accused for suppressing only such facts which it was otherwise required to be disclosed under the law – The counsel for the Revenue has, while pleading that facts was suppressed been unable to show us the provision or rule which required the assessee in this case to make additional disclosures of documents or facts – The assertion that there was suppression of facts is therefore clearly not tenable. (Para 25) Commissioner, Central Excise and Customs V. Reliance Industries Ltd:2023 STPL(WEB) 32 SC 

 Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, Section 3(2), 28A – Sales Tax – Exemption notification – Classification ‘Maize starch’ – There were two entries in the field at or about the period of the relevant assessment year, i.e., “sago and starch of any kind” in Schedule I, referred by us as Taxation Entry No.61, and “products of millets (rice, flour, brokens and brans of cholam, cumbu, ragi, thinai, varagu, samai, kudiraivali, milo and maize)” in Schedule III which we are referring to as Exemption Entry No.8- Maize is the raw product, whereas maize starch is a processed product – Held that maize is entitled to exemption in terms of Exemption Entry No.8 as it stood prior to the relevant assessment year, maize starch being a product of maize derived through mechanical process, it cannot be read as “like maize”, the “like” having been excluded by Act No. 32 of 1994 – Maize starch being a kind of starch, it is covered by Taxation Entry No. 61 as introduced by Act No.37 of 1996 which is to the effect “… starch of any kind” – Held that ‘any kind’ in the context the same has been used in the taxation entry clearly indicates that it has been used in a wide sense extending from one to all and admits of no exception – In Taxation Entry No.61 ‘starch of any kind’ is preceded by ‘sago’ does not make any material difference – Sago is a starch extracted from the pith, or spongy core tissue of various tropical palm stems – Therefore, what is taxable under Taxation Entry No.61 is ‘sago’, which itself is a starch, as well as starch of any kind which would obviously include maize starch – Taxation Entry No.61 is relatable to ‘starch’ of any kind whereas Exemption Entry No.8 relates to products of ‘millet’ – Looking at the specific (Taxation Entry No.61) in contradistinction with the general (Exemption Entry No.8), there can be no manner of doubt that maize starch would be covered by the taxation entry and not by the exemption entry – Impugned judgment upheld albeit for reasons not assigned by the High Court. (Para 16 to 30) Santhosh Maize & Industries Limited V. State of Tamil Nadu : 2023 STPL(WEB) 39 SC 

Reward to informer – Tax evasion – Plea for enhancement of reward as reward granted not as per policy – Supreme Court observed that there is no application of mind in allowing reward – Direction to committee to give opportunity of being heard to the appellant and then decide whether the appellant is entitled to any amount over and above already paid to him. Needless to add that if the committee finds that appellant is entitled to additional amount, the Committee will recommend payment of reasonable interest to the appellant. Appropriate decision shall be taken by the Committee within a period of six months from today and shall be communicated to the appellant. (Para 7, 8) Ketan Kantilal Modi Vs. Union Of India & Ors. : 2023 Stpl(Web) 118 SC

 Terrorist

Penal Code, 1860, Section 302, 307, 436, 411 and 120B; Explosive Substances Act, Section 4 r/w Section 5 – Terrorist – Circumstantial evidence – Appeal against conviction – Appreciation of evidence – Following circumstances are held to be proved against A3:

Arrest of A3 on 14.06.1996 (Circumstance no.9)

Stay of A3 at Gupta Hotel, Gorakhpur (Circumstance No. 13)

Recovery from the house of A3 (Circumstance No. 10)

Recovery of front and rear number plates (Circumstance No. 25)

Recovery of duplicate key from Nizamuddin (Circumstance No. 26)

Pointing out of shop from where Duplicate Key was prepared (Circumstance No. 31)

Pointing out of shop where fake number plates were prepared (Circumstance No. 18)

Pointing out of place where Maruti Car was parked for days before the blast (Circumstance No. 22)

Pointing out of Dulhan Dupatta shop where the car was parked on 19.05.1996 (Circumstance No.23)

Pointing out residence of A8 from where stepney of stolen Maruti car was recovered (Circumstance No. 15)

Pointing out of shop from where soldering iron and solder was purchased (Circumstance No. 32)

Pointing out of shop from where gas cylinder was purchased (Circumstance No.30)

Pointing out of shop from where wire was purchased (Circumstance No.20)

Pointing out of shop from where drill machine was procured (Circumstance No.21)

The cumulative effect of these circumstances so established, brings out the endeavour and active role of A3 in carrying out the blast at Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi – RDX came to be recovered from his residence – No explanation furnished – Various articles came to be procured by him with the purpose of carrying out the blast at New Delhi to destabilise the nation – Held that the conviction of A3 by the High Court is upheld. (Para 151 to 153) Naushad V. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi): 2023 STPL(WEB) 52 SC 

Penal Code, 1860, Section 302, 307, 436, 411 and 120B – Terrorist  – Circumstantial evidence – Appreciation of evidence – Held that in addition to the circumstances which are already proved against A3 are also alleged against A5 and therefore, the same reasoning would apply and be proved against A5 – Such circumstances are listed below:

1. Recovery of front and rear number plates (Circumstance No. 25)
2. Recovery of duplicate key from Nizamuddin (Circumstance No. 26)
3. Pointing out of shop from where Duplicate Key was prepared (Circumstance No. 31)
4. Pointing out of shop where fake number plates were prepared (Circumstance No. 18)
5. Pointing out of place where Maruti Car was parked for days before the blast (Circumstance No. 22)
6. Pointing out of Dulhan Dupatta shop where the car was parked on 19.05.1996 (Circumstance No.23)
7. Recovery of stepney from the house of A8 at the behest of A3, A5 and A6 (Circumstance No. 15)
8. Pointing out of shop where soldering iron and solder were purchased (Circumstance No. 32)
9. Pointing out of shop where Gas Cylinder was purchased (Circumstance No. 30)
10. Pointing out of shop from where wire was purchased (Circumstance No. 20)

In total 15 circumstances stand proved as against A5 – Being a part of the larger conspiracy to destabilise the nation, participated in the planning and carrying out of the bomb blast at Lajpat Nagar – His role in the conspiracy is also highlighted by the proven confession of A9, wherein he categorically stated that A15, had sent A5 to Delhi to prepare for the same – No explanation furnished by him as to the knowledge of shops from where different incriminating material is purchased; recovery of the stepney of the vehicle used in the blast; having knowledge of the failed bomb blast attempt, which pertinently the police could not have known, if the accused persons did not point out the same – Question framed stands answered in the negative and the acquittal of A5 set aside. (Para 187 to 189) Naushad V. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi): 2023 STPL(WEB) 52 SC 

Penal Code, 1860, Section 302, 307, 436 and 120B – Terrorist – Circumstantial evidence – Appeal against conviction – Appreciation of evidence – Held that in terms of A3 and A5, the following proved circumstances have been alleged against A6 on an equal footing and, therefore, the same reasoning would apply and be proved against A6:

1. Recovery of front and rear number plates (Circumstance No. 25)
2. Recovery of duplicate key from Nizamuddin (Circumstance No.26);
3. Pointing out of shop from where Duplicate Key was prepared (Circumstance No.31
4. Pointing out of shop where fake number plates were prepared (Circumstance No.18);
5. Pointing out of place where Maruti Car was parked for days before the blast (Circumstance No.22)
6. Pointing out of Dulhan Dupatta shop where the car was parked on 19.05.1996 (Circumstance No.23)
7. Pointing out of shop ‘Dulhan Dupatta’ where the stolen car was parked on 19.05.1996 (Circumstance No.23)
8. Recovery of stepney from the house of A8 at the behest of A3, A5 and A6 (Circumstance No.15) The circumstances proved only against A5 & A6 are enumerated below
9. Pointing out shop, where 9V battery used in the blast was purchased (Circumstance No.27
10. Pointing out shop on 19.06.1996, where soldering of battery terminals is done (Circumstance No.28).
11. Pointing out shop on 19.06.1996, where Jayco wall clock is purchased (Circumstance No.29).

circumstances mentioned above being proved, the active role played by A6 is as one of the conspirators – Though not proved by direct evidence, his role is quite evident through the various circumstances which show that he has been the part of a conspiracy – His role can be seen from the preparation of the bomb till its execution – Find his involvement from the stage of planning yet the circumstances that stood proved showed his greater role in all the events that took place after 19.05.1996, i.e., the day of the failed attempt of the bomb – Cannot ignore that it is his contribution in rectifying the defects along with other co-accused persons as is proved through the confessional statement of A9 that actually culminated in a ghastly occurrence where people lost their lives – Further evident from the confession of A9, that A6 was moving along him and other accused, namely A15 and A13, throughout for the planning and execution of the bomb blast – Question framed by us, stands answered in the negative and the acquittal of A6 liable to be set aside. (Para 191 to 197) Naushad V. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi): 2023 STPL(WEB) 52 SC 

Penal Code, 1860, Section 411 – Terrorist – Circumstantial evidence – Appeal against conviction – Appreciation of evidence – Whether A3, A5 and A6 are liable to be convicted under Section 411 IPC for stealing the Maruti car for use in the blast. – The fact that a bomb blast took place in the car is not disputed and is believed by both the courts below – On a conjoint reading of the testimonies of PW8 (owner of the vehicle) and PW76 (cleaner of the vehicle) have established that a Maruti car bearing No.DL-2CF-5854 belonging to PW8 was stolen on the intervening night of 17/18.05.1996 and its report vide FIR No. 286/1996 was lodged by PW8 on 18.05.1996 – The circumstance of A3, A5 and A6 stealing the said vehicle has been held to be proved by the Trial Court – The involvement of A3, A5 and A6 comes to be proved through the following circumstances:

(a) The original number plates bearing No.DL 2CF 5854 came to be recovered at the instance of the accused persons and the said circumstance has been held to be proved (circumstance No.25);

(b) The stepney of the Maruti car belonging to PW8 came to be recovered by the accused persons from the residence of A8 and has been held to be proved, the same being identified by PW8 (circumstance No.15); and

(c) The accused persons have pointed out the shop where they got the duplicate key prepared for stealing the vehicle and duplicate number plates for the same which have been held to be proved (circumstance Nos.18 and 31).

Held that the accused persons stole the car through the duplicate key, it was in their possession and was finally used in the commission of the crime – The acts of the accused persons A3, A5 and A6, as proved by the above-mentioned circumstances, warrant conviction under Section 411 IPC, as held by the Trial Court. (Para 198 to 201) Naushad V. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi): 2023 STPL(WEB) 52 SC 

Penal Code, 1860, Section 120B – Terrorist – Criminal conspiracy – Appeal against conviction – Circumstantial evidence – Appreciation of evidence – Whether A3, A5, A6 and A9 these were part of a conspiracy as under Section 120B IPC? – Question to be answered in the affirmative – The blast was planned at the behest of other accused persons, namely, A15, who was working under the instructions of A11 to A1, who never faced trial – From an evaluation of the evidence on record including the judicial confession of A9, it is evident that all these accused persons were known to each other and were participating with the common objective to carry out the blast in Delhi in furtherance of an international conspiracy to cause disruptive activities in India – All the proven circumstances taken together form a chain of events that implicates the accused persons – A9 specifically names A5 and A6 – A5 in furtherance of this object arrived in Delhi on 10.05.1996 from Kathmandu, which stands proved – A9 carrying the RDX to Delhi and A6’s arrival has already been proved – A3, A5 and A6 proceeded to prepare the bomb in Delhi for which they procured various articles including battery, gas cylinder, duplicate key, fake number plates etc.; stole a car and made two attempts for the blast, out of which the second one came to be successful – This preparation has come to the knowledge of the police through pointing out proceedings carried out at the instance of these accused persons – Material which came to be recovered from the residence of A3 in the form of RDX is the same explosive material used in the Lajpat Nagar bomb blast, as has come through the CFSL Reports, Ex.PW101/C and Ex.PW101/G – Factum of the failed attempt is only brought about by the joint pointing out proceedings by these accused persons – Held that A3, A5, A6 and A9 were part of a criminal conspiracy to cause the blast in the capital city, New Delhi. (Para 202 to 205) Naushad V. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi): 2023 STPL(WEB) 52 SC 

Penal Code, 1860, Section 302, 307, 436, 411 and 120B; Explosive Substances Act, Section 4 r/w Section 5 – Terrorist – Sentence – Trial Court had imposed Death Sentence on A3, A5 and A6 and the High Court acquitted A5 and A6, while the death sentence awarded to A3 was commuted to life imprisonment – A9 has been awarded life imprisonment concurrently by the High Court and the Trial Court – Held that in terms of rule of prudence and from the point of view of principle, a Court may choose to give primacy to life imprisonment over death penalty in cases which are solely based on circumstantial evidence or where the High Court has given a life imprisonment or acquittal – Bomb blast caused at the behest of the accused persons resulted in the death of 13 persons and 38 persons suffered injuries – There was further damage caused to the livelihood of the shopkeepers, whose shops were burnt down due to the said bomb blast – In view of the recovery from the residence of A3 and the confessional statement of A9, it is evident that these accused persons were part of the plan for future blasts in the nation as well – The incident took place on 21.05.1996, i.e., approximately 27 years ago; the Trial Court awarded the sentence of death on 22.04.2010, i.e., more than 13 years ago; and the present accused acting at the behest of the principal conspirators; are all mitigating circumstances in not awarding the sentence of death even though it falls within the category of rarest of rare cases – In view of the conspiracy and the facts at hand, including mitigating circumstances as against the punishment of death penalty, consider it a fit case to award life imprisonment without remission, extending to natural life of A3, A5, A6 and A9 – All these accused persons are sentenced to imprisonment for life, without remission, extending to natural life – Accused, if on bail, are directed to immediately surrender before the Court concerned and their bail bonds stand cancelled – A5 and A6 are directed to surrender forthwith. (Para 207 to 213) Naushad V. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi): 2023 STPL(WEB) 52 SC 

Quashing

 Criminal Procedure Code, 1860, Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Petition for – Offence punishable uer sections 420, 406, 506, 379, 120B and 180 of the IPC – Charge-sheet that came to be submitted before the criminal court does not also specify with clarity the role of the petitioner in either cheating or defrauding the second respondent but refers to her, at best, as a conspirator – What is also highlighted in the charge-sheet is that after securing anticipatory bail, the petitioner had joined the investigation on 30th July, 2021 and in course thereof she had made a confessional statement – Charges framed against the petitioner – In the course of hearing of this appeal, the petitioner sought for and was granted permission to file additional documents – Held that it is not one of those rare cases where the uncontroverted allegations appearing from the materials on record notwithstanding, it can successfully be contended that even no prima facie opinion can be formed pointing to commission of any offence by the petitioner – Conspiracy to commit an offence is by itself distinct from the offence to do which the conspiracy is entered into and that such an offence, if actually committed, would be the subject-matter of a separate charge – The allegations that the petitioner was found counting the cash received by the principal accused from the second respondent in the presence of a listed witness and that she conspired with her sister, the principal accused, to cheat and defraud the second respondent, persuade to record that involvement of the petitioner, howsoever limited, cannot be ruled out at this stage and, therefore, the trial ought to be permitted to proceed and she obliged to stand trial – Impugned judgment and order of the High Court dismissing the petition under section 482, Cr. PC upheld. The trial court may proceed with the trial uninfluenced by any observation made in this judgment and order which is for the purpose of a decision on the appeal. (Para 11 to 19) Supriya Jain V. State of Haryana: 2023 STPL(WEB) 38 SC 

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 173(8) and 482 – Further investigation report – Quashing of report – High Court, in the impugned order has made observations which are in the nature of findings while considering the correctness or otherwise of the final report – Held that opinions expressed which are in the nature of findings while considering the correctness or otherwise of the final report submitted on a further investigation of the case and thereby quashing the same is not a correct and proper approach adopted by the High Court – Impugned order of the High Court liable to be set aside on this short ground alone. (Para 8) Mathew Alexander Vs. Mohammed Shafi and anr. : 2023 STPL(Web) 64 SC