Supreme Court Digest June, 2023

Click on Citation to See Full Text of Judgment

Nominal Index

 A. Srinivasulu v. State Rep. by The Inspector Of Police: 2023 STPL(WEB) 9 SC : Criminal – Corruption – Sanction for Prosecution – Acquittal

Aish Mohammad v. State of Haryana: 2023 STPL(WEB) 7 SC : Service Law – Adverse Remark – Compulsory Retirement Valid

Amol Bhaskarrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra: 2023 STPL(WEB) 18 SC: Murder – No specific role attributed to the appellant –  Acquittal

Bank of Baroda and others V Baljit Singh: 2023 STPL(WEB) 36 SC : Service Law – Compassionate appointment

Bar Council of India v. Rabi Sahu: 2023 STPL(WEB) 3 SC : Advocate – Degree not from recognized institute – No enrolment

Birendra Kumar Pandey v. Union Of India: 2023 STPL(WEB) 21 SC : –  Interrogation – Presence of Advocate  allowed

Coal India Limited v. Competition Commission of India: 2023 STPL(WEB) 5 SC : Competition Commission Act applicable on Coal India

Davinder Singh v. State of2023 STPL(WEB) 13 SC : Rape – Prosecutrix testimony will have to satisfy the conscience of the Court

Geeta v. Principal, Ramnagar Bharat Vidyalya, Ramnagar: 2023 STPL(WEB) 16 SC : Service Law – Pension granted

Ghanshyam v. Yogendra Rathi : 2023 STPL(WEB) 1 SC : TPA – Agreement to Sell – Part Performance – Eviction Allowed

Gobind Rai @ Monu V State of Uttar Pradesh: 2023 STPL(WEB) 24 SC : Bail

Government of NCT of Delhi v. Roppen Transportation Services Pvt. Ltd. : 2023 STPL(WEB) 23 SC : Two wheeler taxi – Interim Stay on Govt. order set aside

Greater Malwa Paramedical College v. State of Madhya Pradesh: 2023 STPL(WEB) 25 SC : Transfer of case – From Indore Bench of High Court to Principal Bench at Jabalpur

Hasmukhlal Madhavlal Patel v. Ambika Food Products Pvt. Ltd. : 2023 STPL(WEB) 6 SC : Company – Allotment of share – Increase in authorised capital

Jitendra Nath Mishra v. State of U.P. : 2023 STPL(WEB) 2 SC : Quashing of Summoning – Atrocities – Not quashed

Karandeep Singh v. CBI: 2023 STPL(WEB) 10 SC : Bail – Imposition of onerous condition – Bank Guarantee

Laxman Prasad @ Laxman v. State of Madhya Pradesh: 2023 STPL(WEB) 11 SC : Murder – Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal

M Lucy Rani v. Siddabloina Laxminarayana : 2023 STPL(WEB) 20 SC : Service Law  – 100% reservation – Set aside

Mohd. Muslim v. State of Uttar Pradesh : 2023 STPL(WEB) 8 SC : Murder – Conviction Set aside

NG. Subhachandra Singh v. N. Jasobanta Singh : 2023 STPL(WEB) 22 SC : Transfer of case – Lack of No of Judges for constituting Bench – Allowed

R Varatharajan v. Ramasamy: 2023 STPL(WEB) 17 SC : Dishonour of Cheque – Settlement – Acquittal

Revathi Enterprises v. Goel Industries : 2023 STPL(WEB) 24 SC : Arbitration –  Appointment of fresh arbitrator

Sarla Amritbhai Momaya Deceased v. Vinayak Govind Sandu: 2023 STPL(WEB) 27 SC : Eviction Valid

State of Punjab V Kewal Krishan : 2023 STPL(WEB) 37 SC : Murder – Acquittal valid

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dinesh Kumar Pandey: 2023 STPL(WEB) 15 SC  : Cost set aside

State of West Bengal v. Suvendu Adhikari : 2023 STPL(WEB) 26 SC : Bengal Election – Deployment of Central Forces valid

Station Superintenden v. Surender Bhola : 2023 STPL(WEB) 12 SC : Railway not responsible for theft

Trinity Infraventures Ltd. V. M.S. Murthy : 2023 STPL(WEB) 4 SC : Partition Suit

Union of India v. Devika Kalpeshkumar Chauhan : 2023 STPL(WEB) 14 SC : Delay in filling review – Rightly dismissed

Union of India v. Ghamman Singh: 2023 STPL(WEB) 19 SC : Labour Law – Back wages set aside

Subject Index

Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 11(6) – Arbitration – Appointment of fresh arbitrator – Challenge as to Held that once the Division Bench of the High Court had granted liberty to the parties to approach for appointment of fresh arbitrator, and the Court having exercised its powers under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996, no fault can be found in the same – The appeal liable to be dismissed. Revathi Enterprises v. Goel Industries : 2023 STPL(WEB) 24 SC

Advocate

Advocates Act, 1961, Section 24(1), 24A, Section 49 read with Section 24(3)(d – Advocate – Degree not from recognized institute – Enrolment as an Advocate – Framing of rules by BCI – Requirement of obtaining Degree in law from recognized institution – Respondent No. 1 secured his law degree from a College in the year 2009 which is not recognized/approved by BCI – State Bar Council rejected the application of respondent No. 1 for enrolment as an Advocate – Division Bench of the High Court holding that once a candidate fulfilled the conditions stipulated in Section 24(1) of the s Act, 1961, and did not suffer any disqualification under Section 24A thereof, he would be entitled to enrolment as an Advocate – Further, the Division Bench held that BCI could not frame rules and add any condition for enrolment in addition to what was prescribed under Section 24 of the Act of 1961 and directed BCI to forthwith enrol the writ petitioner as an Advocate -Held that the rule framed by BCI requiring a candidate for enrolment as an Advocate to have completed his law course from a college recognized/ approved by BCI cannot be said to be invalid, as was held in the impugned order – Division Bench was not justified in directing the enrolment of respondent No. 1 as an Advocate, despite the fact that he secured his law degree from a college which was not recognized or approved by BCI – Impugned order dated 21.09.2012 passed by the High Court liable to be set aside. (Para 5 to 9) Bar Council of India v. Rabi Sahu : 2023 STPL(WEB) 3 SC

Bail

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 439 – Bail – Imposition of onerous condition – One of the conditions imposed by the High Court is to the effect that the appellant is required to furnish a Bank Guarantee to the tune of Rs. two crores for being enlarged on bail – Held that a pre-condition of furnishing Bank Guarantee held to be unsustainable – Order passed by High Court modified and directed that the appellant shall not be required to comply with the aforesaid condition contained in the orders of the High Court – Instead of the requirement of furnishing Bank Guarantee, the appellant directed to furnish a bail bond for Rs. Five lakhs in each of the two orders for bail, under appeal – Rest of the conditions contained in the orders impugned shall remain and would have to be complied with by the appellant for being enlarged on bail. (Para 1 and 2) Karandeep Singh v. CBI: 2023 STPL(WEB) 10 SC

Constitution of India, Article 32 –Bail – If Prosecutrix is mangali – While considering the bail application question as to whether the prosecutrix is mangali or not directed to be decided by Head of Department of (Astrology Department) Lucknow University – Operation and effect of this order so far as it gives directions to the Head of the Department (Astrology Department), Lucknow University stayed – Matter will be taken up on merits of the bail application by the High Court on 26th June, 2023 which is the date already fixed in the matter. : Gobind Rai @ Monu V State of Uttar Pradesh : 2023 STPL(WEB) 56 SC

Civil

Competition Act, 2002, Section 28, 54, 60 – Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1973, Section 11, 32 – Constitution of India, Article 31(2) and 39 – Competition Act  –  Applicability on Coal India – Abuse of dominant position Whether the Act, 2002 applies to the appellants Coad India Lt. or not? – Parliament has intended, in order to ensure the proper implementation of the Act, confer power to order division of an enterprise enjoying dominant power – This would include the appellants as well. We must, no doubt, understand the provision to mean that it is not a power to be exercised lightly – It is a special power intended to ensure prevention of abuse of dominant position – The generality of the power is revealed in Section 27 – Though there can be abuse of dominant position by an enterprise and a group, which is sought to be prohibited, Section 28 speaks about the division of an enterprise – Having regard to the discussion find no merit in the case sought to be made for escaping from the net of the Act – Section 54 of the Act gives power to the Central Government to exempt from the application of the Act or any provision and for any period, which is specified in the Notification – The ground for exemption can be security of the State or even public interest – It is not as if the appellants, if there was a genuine case made out for being taken outside the purview of the Act in public interest, the Government would be powerless – Held that there is no merit in the contention of the appellants that the Act will not apply to the appellants for the reason that the appellants are governed by the Nationalisation Act and that Nationalisation Act cannot be reconciled with the Act – This is subject to the appellants having all the rights to defend their actions under the law and as indicated hereinbefore – It will be open to the appellant as the State monopoly to take up all contentions to demonstrate that there is no abuse of the dominant position.  (Para 120 to 126) Coal India Limited v. Competition Commission of India: 2023 STPL(WEB) 5 SC

Constitution of India, Article 136 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 2(1A), 93 – Two wheeler taxi –  Interim order – Challenge as to Challenge to the Public notice which prohibits operation of two-wheelers under the aggregation mechanism for transport of passengers and no prohibition has been imposed on four-wheeler vehicles – Interim order passed by High Court which in effect permit plying of two-wheelers for carrying passengers under a regime operated through aggregators – Main argument on behalf of the appellant has been that two-wheelers are being facilitated by the aggregators, i.e. the writ petitioners without proper licence or permit and plying of such non-transport vehicles for hire or reward is in violation of registration condition – Submitted on behalf of the appellant that the policy of the Delhi Government in respect of the two-wheelers of the Delhi Government in respect of the two-wheelers would be in place and the licencing regime will become operational from 31st July 2023 – Held that under these circumstances interim orders ought not to have been passed staying whole scale operation of a statutory regime till the finalisation of the policy – Solely on consideration of balance of convenience, such interim stay on a public notice ought not to have been granted -Permanent stay on operation of the impugned orders passed by the Delhi High Court passed, which were interim in nature – The parties given liberty to apply before the High Court for early hearing of the Writ Petitions. (Para 21 to 24): Government of NCT of Delhi v. Roppen Transportation Services Pvt. Ltd : 2023 STPL(WEB) 23 SC

Company

Companies Act, 1956, Section 81, 291, 397, 398 – Allotment of share – Increase in authorised capital – Case of mismanagement and oppression by the appellants–Held that in regard to the allotment of shares, the respondents Groups were put on notice and they must be treated as having refused to avail of the offer – There is a concurrent finding by the NCLT and NCLAT that the respondents were aware of the increase in share capital as proposed – That the meetings were held in compliance with the law, is concurrently found – Under Section 81 of the Act, 1956 it is only the company, in its General Body Meeting, which could increase the Authorised Capital-This is not a case where the Board of Directors had resolved to allot the shares otherwise disregarding the mandate of Section 81 of the Act – What is more shares have been offered on a ratio of 1:1 to the existing shareholders – They were given the choice of refusal or to apply for more or lesser number of shares – This is not a case where the Resolution was to allot the further shares to the Directors or Members of their Group alone – There is a concurrent finding that the decision to go in for increase in capital, viz., Authorised Capital, was not vulnerable to attack – The decision was based on the advice given by the Bank – The purpose of the Board of Directors to increase the capital has been admittedly found to be bona fide – An incidental gain, namely the change in the shareholding pattern is entirely the inevitable result of the refusal of the respondent’s groups to apply – Whole idea was to get funds from the Bank for the expansion of the company – The case of the respondents that there were loans due to them also may not advance their case – It would have been different if the respondents had applied and sought adjustment of the consideration by cancelling loans given by them to the company and it was rejected – Held that the appellants cannot be described as having acted in a defective or in an unfair manner, in the matter of allotment of further shares particularly when the contention of the respondents about the bona fides of the decision to increase the authorised capital has been found in favour of the appellants – The appeals are partly allowed – The direction to allot shares in the impugned order liable to be set aside – The order for conducting audit will remain undisturbed. (Para 42, 71, 72 and 73) Hasmukhlal Madhavlal Patel v. Ambika Food Products Pvt. Ltd : 2023 STPL(WEB) 6 SC

Consumer

Consumer Protection Act, 1986, Section 2(1)(g) and 14(1)(d) – Consumer – Railway not responsible for theft – Deficiency in service – Rail travel – Theft of money from belt of the respondent-complaint – Held that fail to understand as to how the theft could be said to be in any way a deficiency in service by the Railways – If the passenger is not able to protect his own belongings, the Railways cannot be held responsible – Orders passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission and the District Consumer Forum awarding Rs.1 lakh to respondent to be paid by the appellant(s) liable to be set aside. (Para 2 to 4) Station Superintenden v. Surender Bhola : 2023 STPL(WEB) 12 SC

Corruption

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 197 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) – Penal Code, 1860, Section 120B read with Sections 420, 468, Section 471 read with Section 468 and Section 193 –Sanction for prosecution Conviction Set aside – FIR actually implicated only four persons, namely PW-16, A-3, A-4 an A-5 – A-1 was not implicated in the FIR – It was only after a confession statement was made by PW-16 in the year 1998 that A-1 was roped in – The allegations against A-1 were that he got into a criminal conspiracy with the others to commit these offences – But the Management of BHEL refused to grant sanction for prosecuting A-3 and A-4, twice, on the ground that the decisions taken were in the realm of commercial wisdom of the Company – If according to the Management of the Company, the very same act of the co-conspirators fell in the realm of commercial wisdom, it is inconceivable that the act of A-1, as part of the criminal conspiracy, fell outside the discharge of his public duty, so as to disentitle him for protection under Section 197(1) of the Code – Contention advanced on behalf of A-1 that the prosecution ought to have taken previous sanction in terms of Section 197(1) of the Code, for prosecuting A-1, for the offences under the IPC upheld – Failure of the prosecution to take previous sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code has vitiated the proceedings against A-1. (Para 42, 53, 80): A. Srinivasulu v. State Rep. by The Inspector Of Police : 2023 STPL(WEB) 9 SC

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 306, 307 – Prevention of corruption Act, 1988, Section 5(1) – Grant of pardon – Approver – There are two types of cases, namely (i) those which come through the committal route; and (ii) those where cognizance is taken directly by the Special Judge under Section 5(1) of the PC Act – In the second category of cases Section 306 of the Code would get by-passed – Therefore, it is clear that when the Special Court chooses to take cognizance, the question of the approver being examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate as required by Section 306 (4)(a) does not arise – Object of examining an approver twice, is to ensure that the accused is made aware of the evidence against him even at the preliminary stage, so as to enable him to effectively cross examine the approver during trial, bring out contradictions and show him to be untrustworthy – The said object stands fulfilled in this case, since the confession statement of the approver before the XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate was enclosed to the Charge Sheet – The approver was examined as PW-16 during trial and he was cross examined on the contents of the confession statement – The Magistrate who recorded the confession was examined as PW 17 and the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate who granted pardon was examined as PW-18 – The proceedings before the XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, the petition under section 306 of the Code and the proceedings on tender of pardon were marked respectively as EXX. P-50, 51 and 52 – All the accused were given opportunity to cross examine these witnesses both on the procedure and on the contents – Held that there was no violation of the procedure prescribed by Section 306(4)(a) of the Code. Thus, we answer the second issue against the appellants.(Para 75, 76, 78 and 79) A. Srinivasulu v. State Rep. by The Inspector Of Police : 2023 STPL(WEB) 9 SC

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) – Penal Code, 1860, Section 120B read with Sections 420, 468, Section 471 read with Section 468 and Section 193 – Evidence Act, 1872, Section 133 – Criminal conspiracy – Deposition of an accomplice/ approver – Appeal against conviction – Appreciation of evidenceAllegations against A-1 (i) that by entering into a criminal conspiracy to cheat BHEL and award the tender to A-5’s firm and by instructing PW-16 to go in for limited tenders without following the procedure of pre-qualification of prospective tenderers and without selecting any one from the approved list of contractors, he committed various offences punishable under the IPC; and (ii) that by abusing his official position and awarding the contract to A-5, he caused a wrongful loss to the tune of Rs.4.32 crores to BHEL- Before accepting the evidence of an approver twin test is that the approver is a reliable witness and the second is that his statement should be corroborated with sufficient evidence – Section 133 of the Act, 1872 declares an accomplice to be a competent witness and that a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice – However, the court is bound to take note of a precautionary provision contained in Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, which provides that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars – Clear from the evidence of PW-16 accomplice-approver, it will be seen that he was trying to shift the burden on A-1, to save his own skin – Admissions made by him during the cross-examination showed that he was unworthy of credit – Only person found by both the Courts to be guilty of the offence under Section 120B was A-1 -Argument advanced that a single person cannot be held guilty of criminal conspiracy was repelled by the Courts on the ground that PW-16 was the second person with whom A-1 had entered into a conspiracy – Held that such a reasoning was a huge climb down from the original charge that A- 1 to A-7 entered into a criminal conspiracy, to cause wrongful loss to BHEL and to confer a wrongful gain to A-5 to A-7 – Once an offence of Section 120B is not made out against A-5 to A-7, the very foundation for the prosecution becomes shaky – Conviction of A-1 for the offences under Section 120B read with Sections 420, 468, Section 471 read with Section 468 and Section 193 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act cannot be sustained. (Para 82 to 103) A. Srinivasulu v. State Rep. by The Inspector Of Police : 2023 STPL(WEB) 9 SC

Cost

 Constitution of India, Article 226 – Costs – Imposition of – Disposal of bunch of writ petitions directing to consider the applications of the writ petitioners for grant of fire arm licences in the light of the observations made therein and to pass appropriate orders within two months – High Court also quantified costs at Rupees One lakh per set of writ petition – Counsel on behalf of appellant unable to apprise us the fate of the applications for fire arm licences – Having regard to the nature of direction made by the High Court as well as the order dated 26.11.2012 of this Court, see no reason to interfere with the judgment and order under challenge – However, cost imposed by the High Court is made easy – Appeals stand dismissed but subject to the above modification of the judgment and order under challenge. (Para 3 to 6) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dinesh Kumar Pandey : 2023 STPL(WEB) 15 SC

Dishonour of Cheque

Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, Section 138 – Dishonour of Cheque – Settlement – After the judgment of the High Court, the parties have entered into a settlement and the balance amount of fine has since been paid to the respondents – Respondents will have no objection in grant of relief to the appellant as the outstanding amount has already been received by them – Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the settlement arrived at between the parties as recorded above, the appeals allowed and the conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Act liable to be set aside – The appellant is in custody in both the cases – He shall be released forthwith if not required in any other case. (Para 4 to 7): R Varatharajan v. Ramasamy : 2023 STPL(WEB) 17 SC

Election

 Constitution of India, Article 136 – Bengal Election – Deployment of Central Forces – Against order passed in Public Interest Litigation directing the State Election Commission to requisition the deployment of Central Forces for all Districts in the State of West Bengal – Held that the State Election Commission had not complied with the earlier directions of the High Court in identifying the sensitive areas thus High Court was left with no option but to direct the State Election Commission to requisition the deployment of Central Para-Military forces for the entire State – Directions issued by the High Court must be viewed from the point of view of the electorate of West Bengal who should be enabled to exercise their franchise in a free and fair manner and not be in fear of the safety of their life and property – Order of the High Court is ultimately to ensure that there is a free and fair election conducted in the State of West Bengal – Moreover, the State is conducting local body election on a single date – High Court has also based its decision after considering the number of seats which are going to the polls and the volume of polling booths that are being set up for holding the said polls – Central forces would act in an appropriate manner bearing in mind the emerging situations and for aiding in a free and fair conduct of election in the State – Endeavour of the Respondents (writ petitioners before the High Court) appears to be to ensure free and fair election to the local bodies in the State of West Bengal – This would strengthen the Panchayati Raj institutions in the State – Therefore, High Court was not in error in issuing the aforestated directions, as the same was done to ensure, not only that the nominations are filed in a peaceful manner, but also that the entire election is conducted fairly and the results are declared peacefully. (Para 14 to 16 and 20): State of West Bengal v. Suvendu Adhikari : 2023 STPL(WEB) 26 SC

Eviction

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, Section 13(1)(l) – Decree of eviction – Challenge as to – Held that no case to interfere with the impugned order dated 16-02-2023 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, is made out – Special Leave Petition liable to be dismissed – Taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, four months’ time from today is granted to the petitioners to vacate the premises, subject to the conditions stated in the order. (Para 6, 7 and 9); Sarla Amritbhai Momaya Deceased v. Vinayak Govind Sandu :2023 STPL(WEB) 27 SC

Family

 Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 21 rule 97-101 – Suit for partition – Issue of fraud – Execution of decree – Scope of inquiry – Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was right in declaring that the preliminary decree dated 28.06.1963 was vitiated by fraud and consequently null and void, especially when there was no pleading and no evidence let in? – What is the scope of the enquiry under Order 21 Rules 97-101, CPC – Held that the judgment and preliminary decree dated 28.06.1963, though may not be vitiated by fraud, are certainly not binding upon third parties like the claim petitioners and the Government who have set up independent claims – In an enquiry under Order 21, Rules 97 to 101, CPC, the Executing Court cannot decide questions of title set up by third parties, who assert independent title in themselves – Marina Beach (in Chennai) or Hussain Sagar (in Hyderabad) or India Gate (in New Delhi) cannot be included as one of the items of properties in the Plaint Schedule, in a suit for partition between the members of a family and questions of title to these properties cannot be allowed to be adjudicated in the claim petitions under Order XXI, Rules 97-101, CPC. (Para 126): Trinity Infraventures Ltd. V. M.S. Murthy : 2023 STPL(WEB) 4 SC

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 21 rule 97-101 – Suit for partition – Nature of property – Whether the concurrent findings of the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court that Khurshid Jah did not leave behind any Mathruka property, goes contrary to the finding recorded in the Judgment and preliminary decree that has attained finality? – Whether the finding recorded in the judgment and preliminary decree that the lands in Hydernagar are Mathruka property is binding upon third parties? – No finding was ever recorded by the Trial Judge in his judgment dated 28.06.1963 that the properties left behind by Khurshid Jah were Mahtruka properties – Therefore, the contention as though there was such a finding and that the finding has attained finality and that the impugned Judgment goes contrary to such a finding, is wholly misconceived – Order of the Nazim Atiyat was not before the Trial Judge – The Trial Judge did not record a finding that it was Inam-al-Tamgha – In any case, it was only a suit for partition. – Even assuming that it was Inam-al-Tamgha, then a question arises as to whether the same stood abolished after the advent of the Hyderabad Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 – This Act defines the word “Inam” under Section 2(1)(c) to mean the land held under a gift or a grant made by the Nizam or by any Jagirdar, holder of a Samsthan or other competent grantor and continued or confirmed by virtue of a Muntakhab or other title deed, with or without the condition of service – Therefore, if at least the order of Nazim Atiyat and the Muntakhab had come into existence before the preliminary decree and they had been produced as exhibits in the suit, the Trial Judge could have had an opportunity to apply his mind to find out the effect of the 1955 Act on Inam-al-Tamgha – Since everyone focused attention only on Hyderabad Jagir Abolition Regulations, 1948 and a contention was raised that the personal properties of the Jagirs were exempt under Section 18, no one ever examined the impact of 1955 Act – Even if the property in question escapes the guillotine under the Jagir Abolition Regulations, it may meet its fate under the 1955 Act – Held that that the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench (in the impugned judgment) were right in holding that the properties were not established to be Mathruka properties – The effect of the order of the Nazim Atiyat was not examined by the Trial Judge – In any case, such an examination had to be done independently and not in a partition suit, keeping in view, the 1955 Act and various subsequent enactments relating to agricultural land reforms and urban land ceiling. (Para 149, 155, 157 to 160) : Trinity Infraventures Ltd. V. M.S. Murthy : 2023 STPL(WEB) 4 SC

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 21 rule 97-101 – Evidence Act, 1872, Section 90 – Suit for partition – Execution of decree –Presumption as to document 30-year-old – Whether the claims of the claim petitioners stood established? – Contention on behalf and the appellants that the claim petitioners (obstructionists to the execution) could not produce a single scrap of paper to show how they derived the title to the portions of land in Survey No.172 of Hydernagar repelled –Findings by learned Single Judge dated 26.10.2004 that these claim petitioners had filed originals or certified copies of the pattas granted in favour of their predecessors-in-title – He also dealt with additional Issue as to whether the claimants have otherwise perfected title by adverse possession – The learned Single Judge recorded that Boddu Veeraswamy and others were granted pattas in the year 1947 and that since these documents were more than 30 years old, no further proof of these documents was necessary in view of Section 90 of the Evidence Act,1872 – The learned Single Judge also recorded that there was ample evidence in the form of sethwar, faisal patti, jamabandi, tax receipts and proceedings before various authorities and recorded that even if the documents relied upon by the claimants are found to be defective, the possession of the claimants have become adverse to the appellants herein –Contention on behalf of the appellants that the presumption under Section 90 will apply only when an original document is produced and only after it is proved that it has come from proper custody – Held that the Explanation under Section 90 makes it clear that no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable – In any case, the learned Judge was not dealing with a title suit – Assuming that the claim petitioners could not produce documents to prove flow of title, they were admittedly in possession and they were sought to be dispossessed through the District Court, Ranga Reddy District – When the entire claim of the appellants that the properties were Mathruka properties inheritable by the legal heirs had failed, the question of executing a decree on the strength of the plea that the property is a Mathruka property does not arise – The moment the claim of the appellants that it was a Mathruka property fails, the appellants lose their claim to property – It is only after they establish successfully their claim to title, that the burden shifts on the claimants. (Para 162 to 168): Trinity Infraventures Ltd. V. M.S. Murthy : 2023 STPL(WEB) 4 SC

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 21 rule 97-101– Suit for partition – Execution of decree – Whether the State of Telangana has any legitimate claim and whether any such claim would still survive after a series of setbacks to the State Government in the Court room? – Finding given by High Court that pattas were granted to cultivating Ryots prior to 1948 and that therefore the land did not vest in the State Government after the Hyderabad Jagir Abolition Regulations – The High Court went on to hold further that the Revenue Department of the subsequent State Government accepted these pattas as genuine and implemented – State was not a party before the Division Bench of the High Court – Therefore, the aforesaid findings are not binding upon the State of Telangana – In fact, the State of Telangana need not have filed any appeals against the impugned judgment, as the declaration in paragraph 414(d) should be understood as a finding with regard to the claim of the claim petitioners qua the appellants – If in a suit for partition, the title to a property cannot be decided in favour of the parties claiming partition qua strangers, the same logic would apply even to the claim petitioners qua the State Government – Finding recorded in paragraph 244 and the conclusion reached in paragraph 414(d) of the impugned judgment, is not binding on the State Government. (Para 172 to 177) : Trinity Infraventures Ltd. V. M.S. Murthy :2023 STPL(WEB) 4 SC

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Section 54, Order 21 35, Rule 97-101; Order 20 Rule 18; Order 26 Rule 13, 14 – Suit for partition – Preliminary decree – Execution of decree Order XX Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, lays down a procedure to be adopted by a Court while passing a decree in a suit for partition. There are two sub-rules to Rule 18 of Order XX. As per the first sub-rule, the Court passing a decree for partition may direct the partition or separation to be made by the Collector or any gazetted subordinate deputed by him, if the decree relates to an estate assessed to the payment of revenue to the Government. This shall be done, after first declaring the rights of several parties interested in the property. Under the second sub-rule, the Court may, if it thinks that the partition and separation cannot be conveniently made without further enquiry, pass a preliminary decree declaring the rights of several parties and giving such further directions as may be required, if the decree relates to any other immovable property not covered by sub-rule (1) – Obviously, the preliminary decree passed on 28-06-1963 in CS No.14 of 1958 did not belong to the category indicated in Order XX Rule 18 (1). It belonged to the category mentioned in Order XX Rule 18 (2) – Question of specific immovable properties or specifically identified portions of immovable properties getting allotted to any person merely holding a preliminary decree with respect to an undivided share does not arise – A preliminary decree in a suit for partition merely declares the shares that the parties are entitled to in any of the properties included in the plaint schedule and liable to partition – On the basis of a mere declaration of the rights that take place under the preliminary decree, the parties cannot trade in, on specific items of properties or specific portions of suit schedule properties – Since there are three stages in a partition suit, namely (i) passing of a preliminary decree in terms of Order XX Rule 18(2); (ii) appointment of a Commissioner and passing of a final decree in terms of Order XXVI Rule 14 (3); and (iii) taking possession in execution of such decree under Order XXI Rule 35, no party to a suit for partition, even by way of compromise, can acquire any title to any specific item of property or any particular portion of a specific property, if such a compromise is struck only with a few parties to the suit. (Para 191 to 195): Trinity Infraventures Ltd. V. M.S. Murthy : 2023 STPL(WEB) 4 SC 

Labour Law

 Labour Law – Back wages – Submission on behalf of the appellant that in view of the policy laid down vide Circular dated 02.06.2012 and the subsequent corrigendum dated 14.08.2012, the only benefit extended to the respondent(s) was of relaxation and promotion with the specific rider that no back-wages would be paid – Benefit of promotion and notional fixation of their salary has also been extended – In case, there is any lacuna in fixation of their salary, the respondents would be free to point out, which will be duly addressed by the appellant(s) as per law – Appeals succeed to the extent that the back-wages awarded by the High Court under the impugned judgment(s) and order(s) is set aside – Rest of the order is maintained. (Para 2 to 6) Union of India v. Ghamman Singh : 2023 STPL(WEB) 19 SC H

Limitation

 Constitution of India, Article 136 – Delay in filling review – Rightly dismissed – SLP was allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to file review petition before High Court – Review petition filed more than one year thereafter – There being no explanation for the long delay in filing the same nor any sufficient cause being shown, the said Review Petition was dismissed on the ground of delay- Held that do not find any infirmity in the order of the High Court. (Para 4): Union of India v. Devika Kalpeshkumar Chauhan : 2023 STPL(WEB) 14 SC

Murder

 Penal Code, 1860, Section 302 – Murder – Conviction Set aside – Appeal against conviction – Appreciation of evidence –Ante timing of FIR – Unnatural behaviour and conduct of the son and nephew of the deceased in not saving the deceased though they were only twenty steps away from him – Non-production of the ‘loi’(blanket) and the cycle (Exh. Ka-10 and Exh. Ka-11) alleged to be that of the accused appellants left behind at the site of the incident – Presence of the son and nephew of the deceased at the site doubted – Held that in the absence of any credible eye witness to the incident and the fact that the presence of the accused appellants at the place of incident is also not well established, constrained to accord benefit of doubt to both the accused appellant – Even if we ignore certain other minor discrepancies in the oral evidence, the delay in conducting the post-mortem, the difference in the name of the weapons of crime, i.e., “tabal” or “palkati” which are more or less similar types of instruments for cutting crops, etc., it is a case where the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the accused appellants have committed the offence beyond any reasonable doubt – Judgment and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the Courts belowliable to be set aside and the accused appellant No.1 is acquitted by giving the benefit of doubt. (Para 11 to 25): Mohd. Muslim v. State of Uttar Pradesh : 2023 STPL(WEB) 8 SC

Penal Code, 1860, Section 302 – Murder – Circumstantial evidence – Appreciation of evidenceMotive – Evidence of last seen – Recovery of weapon of assault –Insofar as the recovery of the weapon of assault and blood-stained clothes were concerned, the High Court in paragraph 18 of the judgment held the same to be invalid and also goes to the extent to say that the recovery which has been made does not indicate that the appellant has committed the offence – Held that do not find such conclusion of the High Court to be strictly in accordance with law inasmuch as in a case of circumstantial evidence, the chain has to be complete in all respects so as to indicate the guilt of the accused and also exclude any other theory of the crime – If the High Court found one of the links to be missing and not proved in view of the settled law on the point, the conviction ought to have been interfered with – Accordingly, appeal allowed and the conviction and sentence of the appellant liable to be set aside. (Para 2 to 5): Laxman Prasad @ Laxman v. State of Madhya Pradesh : 2023 STPL(WEB) 11 SC

Penal Code, 1860, Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 313 – Murder – Conviction set aside – Appeal against conviction – Appreciation of evidence There is no specific role attributed to the appellant – It is a general accusation along with the other persons implicated in the subject-offences – In explaining the circumstances appearing in the evidence against the appellant in terms of the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C, there was no summing-up of any evidence specifically against the appellant by the Trial Court – Held that solely based on a stray reference to the appellant in cross-examination of the PW-1, his conviction was unwarranted – Neither the Trial Court nor the High Court has found any part being played by the appellant in commission of the offences in the respective judgments convicting him and affirming his conviction respectively – Held that guilt of the appellant has not been established in commission of the offences he had been charged with – Judgment of the High Court affirming his conviction and sustaining the order of sentence liable to be set aside – The judgment of the Trial Court shall also stand invalidated as a consequence qua the present appellant, and his conviction and sentence shall stand set aside. (Para 7 to 9): Amol Bhaskarrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra : 2023 STPL(WEB) 18 SC

Penal Code, 1860, Section 302 – Murder – Circumstantial evidence – Appeal against acquittal – Appreciation of evidenceEvidence of last seen  – Deceased allegedly last seen alive in the company of the accused in the evening at around 7 pm of 10.12.1998 – Body of the deceased was found 2 days later, on 12.12.1998 – Autopsy conducted at around 4.15 pm on 12.12.1998, noted occurrence of rigor mortis in the lower limbs, which gives rise to a possibility of death being within 30 hours of the autopsy, meaning thereby that death might have occurred much after 7 pm of 10.12.1998 – Deceased was found dead in his own house, where the accused did not reside -There was no evidence as to when the accused left the house and that no one else could have entered the house in the interregnum, other intervening circumstances including hand of some third person in the crime was not ruled out by the prosecution evidence – High Court was justified in doubting the testimony of PW-2 and finding the last seen circumstance inconclusive in pointing towards the guilt of the accused by excluding other hypotheses consistent with his innocence. (Para 18): State of Punjab V Kewal Krishan: 2023 STPL(WEB) 37 SC

Penal Code, 1860, Section 302 – Murder – Disclosure statement – Recovery of the Khanjar (knife), the same was denied by the accused – There was no serologist report to connect it with the crime – Therefore, it had very little incriminating value to sustain conviction on its own basis – High Court, on strength of the circumstances appearing in the evidence, doubted the date of arrest – Upon consideration of the circumstances, accepted the possibility of the arrest of the accused being much earlier in point of time, as claimed by the accused, than what was set up by the prosecution – Held that the recovery, which was made on 25.12.1998, allegedly on disclosure made by the accused on 25.12.1998, becomes doubtful – The view of the High Court in this regard cannot be termed perverse as to warrant interference by this Court. (Para 18) State of Punjab V Kewal Krishan: 2023 STPL(WEB) 37 SC

Penal Code, 1860, Section 302 – Murder – Extra judicial confession – Extra judicial confession made by the accused, the same was provided by PW-3, a member of the Panchayat wherein the deceased resided – There was no evidence to demonstrate that the accused had any prior relations with PW-3 or that the accused hoped for, or sought, any help from PW-3 and, therefore, made the confession to him – Accused denied making any such confession – High Court discarded the circumstance of the accused making a confession before PW-3 on 25.12.1998 – Otherwise also, an extra judicial confession is a very weak type of evidence and solely on its basis a conviction is not ordinarily to be recorded. (Para 20): State of Punjab V Kewal Krishan: 2023 STPL(WEB) 37 SC

Penal Code, 1860, Section 302 – Evidence Act, 1872, Section 106 – Murder – Evidence of last seen – Non-explanation of incriminating evidence –Held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt – It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the accused – Incriminating circumstances were not proved beyond reasonable doubt and, secondly, they do not form a chain so complete from which it could be inferred with a degree of certainty that it is the accused and no one else who, within all human probability, committed the crime – There was no occasion to place burden on the accused with the aid of section 106 of the Evidence Act to prove his innocence or to disclose that he parted company of the deceased before his murder. (Para 22) : State of Punjab V Kewal Krishan: 2023 STPL(WEB) 37 SC

Circumstantial evidence – Appreciation of evidence – Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the incriminating circumstances on which it proposes to rely – Circumstance(s) relied upon must be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards accused’s guilt and must form a chain so far complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability it is the accused and no one else who had committed the crime – It must exclude all other hypothesis inconsistent with his guilt and consistent with his innocence. (Para 17): State of Punjab V Kewal Krishan: 2023 STPL(WEB) 37 SC Practice and Procedure

 Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Section 25 – Transfer of case – From one High Court to another High Court – Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Manipur at Imphal dismissed a group of petitions along with pending applications vide judgment dated 29.03.2023 – Three intra court appeals were filed before the Division Bench – Division Bench passed an order that these appeals would be listed before another Bench of which one of the Judges of the Division Bench was not a party – High Court of Manipur has a Bench strength of three Judges at present – The order of the Single Judge was by the present Acting Chief Justice, and one of the Members of the Division Bench having recused from hearing the appeal, the difficulty has arisen as the third Judge alone cannot hear the appeal – Held that considering the fact situation and there being no other option for hearing of the appeals at the High Court of Manipur, deem it appropriate to transfer the three appeals from High Court of Manipur at Imphal to the Gauhati High Court at Guwahati for due adjudication – Registry of the Manipur High Court directed to transfer all the records to the Gauhati High Court at Guwahati, within a week from today – Upon receipt of the records, the Registrar, Gauhati High Court will place it before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the High Court for appropriate orders for listing before an appropriate Bench at the earliest. (Para 3 to 9): Subhachandra Singh v. N. Jasobanta Singh : 2023 STPL(WEB) 22 SC

Transfer of case – From Indore Bench of High Court to Principal Bench at Jabalpur – Vacation of interim order as petition not appeared – Grievance of the appellants that they had no opportunity, time or knowledge to participate in the proceedings before the Division Bench at Jabalpur as the matter was fixed for the very next day – No intimation was given to the appellants or their counsels about the transfer of petitions from Indore to Jabalpur – Held that not convinced with the manner the Division Bench has proceeded to vacate the interim orders in the facts and circumstances stated above – Impugned order passed by High Court liable to be set aside leaving it open for the Division Bench to ensure giving appropriate notice and time to the appellants to engage counsels and represent before the Division Bench and thereafter appropriate orders may be passed as the Division Bench may deem fit after hearing learned counsel for the appellant – Till fresh orders are passed by the Division Bench as observed above directed that the interim order passed by the Single Judge on 04.05.2023 will continue. (Para 8 to 13): Greater Malwa Paramedical College v. State of Madhya Pradesh : 2023 STPL(WEB) 25 SC

Quashing

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319 – Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989, Section 3(1)(r) & (s), 14A(1) – Quashing of Summoning – Atrocities – Summoning as an additional accused What is essential for exercise of the power under section 319, Cr. PC is that the evidence on record must show the involvement of a person in the commission of a crime and that the said person, who has not been arraigned as an accused, should face trial together with the accused already arraigned – However, the court holding a trial, if it intends to exercise power conferred by section 319, Cr. PC, must not act mechanically merely on the ground that some evidence has come on record implicating the person sought to be summoned; its satisfaction preceding the order thereunder must be more than prima facie as formed at the stage of a charge being framed and short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if unrebutted, would lead to conviction – FIR disclosed offences having been committed by ‘D’, his brother and an unknown person – Both the complainant and his wife, while testifying before the court, described the manner of assault on the former inflicted by ‘D’ and the appellant and the utterances used by ‘D’ and the appellant, inter alia, touching the caste of the complainant and his wife – At least, on this point, prima facie there appears to be no contradiction at all – Though, the appellant was not named in the FIR; yet, that by itself, cannot be held to be decisive – Once it is conceded that the appellant is a sibling of ‘D’ and he is named as one of the assailants, the material for forming the requisite satisfaction cannot be said to be non-existent – Satisfied that on facts and in the circumstances, the Special Court formed the requisite satisfaction prior to summoning the appellant to face trial with ‘D’ – Points regarding delay in registration of the FIR, material contradiction in the versions of the complainant and his wife, absence of any public witness as well as the circumstances that the complainant and his wife were known to the appellant since 2015 are concerned, the same are left open to be urged by the appellant in course of the proceedings before the Special Court – Appeal liable to be dismissed. (Para 9 to 15): Jitendra Nath Mishra v. State of U.P: 2023 STPL(WEB) 2 SC

Rape

 Penal Code, 1860 Sections 376, 452 and 506 – Rape – Prosecutrix testimony will have to satisfy the conscience of the Court – Appeal against conviction – Appreciation of evidence –Delay in lodging FIR Non examination of material witness – Testimony of prosecutrix – PW6-prosecytrix did not allege that the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC was committed at her uncle’s residence -delay of 28 days in giving the complaint – The reasons assigned cannot be accepted as it defies reason and logic – If the intention of PW4 was to suppress the occurrence, there is no need to give the complaint subsequently – He did give a complaint which was not even registered -Complaint was given by PW4 who was not present on both the occasions – Further, to commit the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC no sane person would take two accomplices, that too after committing a similar offence earlier – The best person to depose would have been the uncle of the prosecutrix – There is no attempt to recover the knife from the appellant as it is a specific case of the prosecution that he committed the offence by threatening to harm the prosecutrix – There is absolutely no reason as to why the son of PW4, who is incidentally the brother of PW6, has not been examined being the sole eye-witness – There is no doubt that the evidence of the prosecutrix will have to be kept at a higher pedestal but then, such a testimony will have to satisfy the conscience of the Court – It has to be seen contextually in the light of the other evidence available -Courts below have not considered the evidence available on record in the proper perspective – They got carried away by the statement made by PW6 – The evidence would also suggest that PW4 was not willing to give his daughter in marriage to the appellant though he was desirous of marrying her – In fact, the First Information Report itself speaks about the aforesaid fact – Held that the conviction and sentence rendered by the Additional Sessions Judge as confirmed in Criminal Appeal No. S.1106 SB of 2003 of the High Court require to be set aside. (Para 8, 10, 12 and 13) : Davinder Singh v. State of Punjab: 2023 STPL(WEB) 13 SC

Service Law

Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1934 Vol-I Part I, Rule 3.26(d) – Punjab Police Rules, 1934 , Rule 8.18 – Punjab Police Rules, 1934 , Vol II, 16.28 – Service Law – Adverse remarks in ACR – Review of order – Compulsory retirement – Challenge as to – Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) found no ground to interfere with the adverse remarks yet granted liberty to the appellant to move for expunction thereof – The learned Civil Court erred in assuming that it had the power to do so, in the absence of any such provision in the Rules, 1934 – There may be cases where a High Court under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India or this Court in exercise of its constitutional powers may specifically direct for fresh consideration of a representation, even in the absence of specific provisions – Held that observation by the learned Civil Court that the appellant could approach the authority, cannot be taken to mean that the appellant was granted carte blanche liberty in law to approach the same authority – What the learned Civil Court lost sight of was that no provision permitted the course of action suggested by it – Even if we were to read the learned Civil Court’s view in the appellant’s favour, at best, he may have had some justification in approaching the Director General of Police, Haryana, being a superior authority, but the same authority could not have been approached again – On this line of reasoning, it becomes clear that even though the appellant had a window to move before the authorities again and dehors the learned Civil Court not interfering, but the same should have been to the superior authority and not the same authority, which had earlier refused expunction – Director General of Police had rightly show-caused the appellant and taken subsequent action thereupon – Considering the chain of events, the consequential action cannot be said to be arbitrary or shocking the conscience of the Court, so as to warrant interference – For a person in uniformed service, like the police, adverse entry relating to his/her integrity and conduct is to be adjudged by the superior authority(ies) who record and approve such entry – Personnel having such remarks being compulsorily retired as per the statutory provisions under the, 1934, in the instant facts, is not an action this Court would like to interdict – Appeal liable to be dismissed. (Para 22 to 29): Aish Mohammad v. State of Haryana: 2023 STPL(WEB) 7 SC

Punjab Police Rules, 1934 , Vol II, 16.28 – Punjab Police Rules – Review – Held that review is a re-look at an order passed by the same authority which passed the original order, be it a Court or an executive officer – The heading to the rule above is a misnomer inasmuch as no power of ‘review’ is created or conferred, as manifest from a reading of (1), (2) and (3) of Rule 16.28 – For completeness, Rule 16.29 is entitled “Right of appeal” and Rule 16.32 is labelled “Revision” – Rules, originally framed in 1934, contemplated the authorities as “The Inspector-General, a Deputy Inspector-General, and a Superintendent of Police” – The “Inspector-General” of that time [when the service was called Imperial/Indian Police] headed the State Police, but is today known as, in most States and Union Territories, barring a handful, in the hierarchy of the State Police, as the Director-General of Police, an officer drawn from the Indian Police Service, who sits at the apex of the state police machinery – In fact, today the Inspector-General of Police is administratively subordinate to the Director-General of Police and the Additional Director-General of Police – The Rules were also framed at a time when the system of Ranges and Commissionerates had not been established – Indubitably, the Rules, for better or for worse (worse, we hazard) have not kept pace with the times – Do not appreciate why the authorities concerned are unable to update/amend the Rules with at least the correct official description of posts to obviate confusion – Copies of this judgment directed to be communicated to the (a) the Chief Secretaries, Governments of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh; (b.1) the Principal Secretary, Department of Home Affairs and Justice, Government of Punjab and (b.2) the Additional Chief Secretary, Home, Government of Haryana, and (c) the Directors General of Police, Punjab and Haryana by the Registry – Steps be taken forthwith in line with the observations recorded at Paragraphs 19 to 21. (Para 19 to 21, 31 and 32): Aish Mohammad v. State of Haryana: 2023 STPL(WEB) 7 SC

Constitution of India, Article 14 and 16 – Service Law – Compassionate appointment –Held that the appointment of a candidate on compassionate basis does not create any vested right and that it is only when a candidate is covered under all clauses of the Scheme applicable at the relevant point of time that he/she could be considered for compassionate appointment – Scheme dated 18.09.1998 which has been issued by way of a Circular is applicable to the case of the respondent – Under the said Scheme, both the educational qualification as well as qualification vis-a-vis the income of the candidate making an application for compassionate appointment have been prescribed and they are to be considered by the employer – One of the condition in the scheme while considering the case for compassionate appointment that if the total income of the family is less than 60% of the total emoluments (which the deceased was drawing at the time of death) less Tax @ 15% (if the income is more than Rs.10,000/- p.m.) the case for compassionate appointment can be considered – Family of the deceased was per month comes to Rs.10,323/- and the net income is Rs.7,618/- per month as wife of the deceased was employed -Total emoluments of the deceased father of the respondent were Rs.3,210/-per month at the time of his death which is lesser than the total net income of the deceased’s family and is not less than 60% of the total emoluments which the deceased was drawing at the time of his death as per the Scheme under consideration – Held that the High Court ought to have taken into consideration the factual details rather than just referring to the judgments in answering the questions of law – Judgment of the High Court liable to be set aside and the suit of the respondent dismissed.(Para 12, 16, 19 to 21): Bank Of Baroda and others Vs.Baljit Singh: 2023 STPL(WEB) 36 SC

Constitution of India, Article 142 – Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981, Rule 8 read with Schedule ‘B’ – Maharashtra Service Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, Section 16 – Service Law – Pension – Appointment – Termination Ground that appellant lacked qualification for the post – Only qualification the appellant lacked was that though she was a graduate but not in first class as was the requirement -Held that since admittedly, the appellant did not have the qualification as required under the law and this was being the consistent finding of the Tribunal, learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court, do not find any reason to interfere with this finding, so far as the qualification is concerned – Held that there is a special equity in favour of the appellant and she continued to work as a Full Time Teacher for 25 long years and has now been superannuated from service – She has devoted her entire working career to her job – The fact also remains that the appellant was not given the actual salary of a full time teacher but the lower salary which was applicable on that post – She deserves to get her pension – Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India determination made that at this stage denial of pension to the appellant would incur a lot of hardship to the appellant, the appellant shall be given pension along with the arrears – Let the entire calculation be made and the arrears be paid within a period of ten weeks from today – Made clear that the pension will be applicable on the pay scale which she has been given to the appellant though with all consequential benefits including the applicable revisions on the said pay scale which has been made from time to time. (Para 5 to 8): Geeta v. Principal, Ramnagar Bharat Vidyalya, Ramnagar : 2023 STPL(WEB) 16 SC

Constitution of India, Article 14 and 16 – Service Law – 100% reservation – Post of teachers in all schools situated in Scheduled Areas – Challenge as to – State of Andhra Pradesh had issued G.O.Ms. No.3 dated 10.01.2000 providing for 100% reservation in favour of local scheduled tribal candidates for the post of teacher in all schools situated in Scheduled Areas – Later on, two further memos were issued on 19.12.2009 and 01.01.2010 respectively whereby it was provided that the State G.O.Ms. No.3 would apply to promotion also giving 100% reservation to the local tribals and further that G.O.Ms.No.3 dated 10.01.2000 will have retrospective effect w.e.f. 05.11.1986 – Held that in view of the fact that the principal G.O.Ms. No.3 dated 10.01.2000 has already been set aside by this Court, all subsequent memos would automatically lapse – Further, since the Constitution Bench had saved the appointments and their promotion to be considered in accordance with appropriate service rules, nothing further survives in this appeal – The same is rendered infructuous as it would stand covered by the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao and others vs. State of A.P. and others. (Para 2 to 6): M Lucy Rani v. Siddabloina Laxminarayana : 2023 STPL(WEB) 20 SC

Transfer of Property

Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 53A, 54 – Agreement to sell – Eviction petition – Mesne profits – An agreement to sell or the power of attorney are not documents of transfer – Right title and interest of an immovable property do not stand transferred by mere execution of the same unless any document as contemplated under Section 54 of the Act, 1882, is executed and is got registered under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 – Legally an agreement to sell may not be regarded as a transaction of sale or a document transferring the proprietary rights in an immovable property but the prospective purchaser having performed his part of the contract and lawfully in possession acquires possessory title which is liable to be protected in view of Section 53A of the Act, 1882 – The said possessory rights of the prospective purchaser cannot be invaded by the transferer or any person claiming under him – Notwithstanding the above as the plaintiff-respondent admittedly was settled with possessory title in part performance of the agreement to sell dated 10.04.2002 – Defendant-appellant has lost his possession over it and had acquired the right of possession under a licence simpliciter, exhausted his right to continue in possession after the licence has been determined – Held that the plaintiff-respondent has rightly been held to be entitled for a decree of eviction with mesne profits – Do not find any error or illegality in such a decree being passed. (Para 15 to 17): Ghanshyam v. Yogendra Rathi  : 2023 STPL(WEB) 1 SC

Criminal

Constitution of India, Article 32 – Customs Act, 1962, Section 108 –  Interrogation – Presence of Advocate – Relief sought for issue of an appropriate writ, order or direction to the Respondents to permit the petitioners’ interrogation and recording of statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 in presence of their advocate at a visible distance, may be beyond audibility’ – Interim order dated 16.04.2012 – A perusal of the said order clearly indicates that the relief sought in the writ petition itself was granted by the interim order – As such nothing further survives in this matter – The writ petition accordingly disposed of. (Para 1 to 3): Birendra Kumar Pandey v. Union Of India : 2023 STPL(WEB) 21 SC

 

 

 

 

 

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Consumer

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Contract: Demurrage not allowed

Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Demurrage – Contractual Liability – Liquidated Damages – Breach of Contract – Adjudication of Claims – The petitioner, engaged in transportation business, participated in a competitive bidding process and was awarded a transportation contract by the Food Corporation of India (FCI). Dispute arose when FCI began deducting demurrage charges from petitioner’s bills for alleged delay in unloading wagons, despite petitioner not being responsible for wagon unloading.

The petitioner contested the deduction, arguing that as per the contract, demurrage cannot be unilaterally imposed by FCI unless liability is determined through due process of law.

The Court examined the relevant contract clause, which allowed FCI to recover costs, damages, etc., due to contractor’s negligence, but found it did not specifically authorize demurrage deduction.

Relying on the Supreme Court precedent in Food Corporation of India vs. Abhijit Paul, the Court held that demurrage could not be levied on the petitioner as the contract did not assign the task of wagon unloading to them.

The absence of a liquidated damages clause in the contract further supported the Court’s decision. The Court directed FCI to refund the deducted demurrage amount and refrain from further deductions, unless liability is determined through lawful adjudication.The order did not prevent FCI from seeking damages through proper legal channels. (Para 12, 15, 18, 22)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 184 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1652 Gauhati]

Hi Speed Logistics Pvt Ltd. Vs. Food Corporation Of India And 5 Ors.

WP(C) 6317 of 2022-Decided on 8-11-2023

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Breach of peace: It must disturb public order, not just personal peace

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 145, 146- Breach of peace – Emergency situation – Possession dispute – Civil litigation – Non-application of mind – Proceeding under Section 145 – Attachment under Section 146 – The application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenges the orders by the Executive Magistrate, concerning a dispute under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and subsequent attachment under Section 146(1) of the same.

The petitioner contests the legality of both orders, asserting that the initiation of the proceeding and the attachment were illegal and an abuse of process. It’s argued that the jurisdiction under Section 145 can only be invoked if there’s a likelihood of a breach of peace, which wasn’t sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

The petitioner highlights that the attachment order was passed ex-parte without affording them an opportunity to respond, which is contrary to the exceptional circumstances required for such an order. Reference is made to legal precedent discouraging parallel criminal proceedings when a civil litigation is pending regarding property possession, emphasizing the binding nature of civil court decrees.

The respondents counter by claiming entitlement to the land based on a partition deed and subsequent court judgments. They argue that emergency circumstances justified the attachment due to the petitioner’s attempt to construct on disputed land.

Legal precedents are cited to emphasize that the existence of an emergency, not just the use of the term “emergency,” warrants attachment under Section 146.

The judgment critically examines the orders and the circumstances leading to them. It observes discrepancies between the assertions made in the complaint and police report, highlighting the absence of clear grounds for apprehension of breach of peace.The judgment reiterates the requirement for a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace under Section 145, emphasizing that it must disturb public order, not just personal peace.

It concludes that the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and jurisdictional error, resulting in injustice to the petitioner. Consequently, both orders are quashed, and the petition is allowed. Important Paragraph Numbers of Judgment: (Para 13, 19, 30, 31)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 183 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1651 Gauhati]

Md. Osman Ali Saikia And Anr. Vs. Chand Mahamod Saikia And 2 Ors.

Crl.Pet. 239 of 2021-Decided on 8-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-183-Gauhati.pdf

 

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Electricity: Outstanding arrears from previous owner

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 – Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 43, 49, 50, 56 – Electricity – Outstanding arrears from previous owner – The petitioner, a partnership firm, sought a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a decision by the Assam Power Distribution Company Limited (APDCL) to deny a new electricity connection to their premises due to outstanding arrears from previous electricity bills.

The court directed interim relief for immediate electricity connection, subject to 50% payment of outstanding dues, with the remaining 50% to be paid upon dismissal of the writ petition.

The petitioner participated in an auction sale of a property and purchased a portion of land with a Business Centre cum Market Complex. They subsequently applied for a new electricity connection, which was denied by APDCL citing outstanding dues.

The court referred to the Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 and the Electricity Act, 2003. It cited a Supreme Court decision (K.C. Ninan vs. Kerala State Electricity Board) regarding the liability of auction purchasers for previous dues in properties sold on ‘as is where is’ basis.

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding the petitioner liable for outstanding electricity dues as per the auction sale agreement. It directed the petitioner to pay the outstanding dues as per the interim order, with APDCL waiving the accrued interest on the principal dues. (Para 15, 16)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1650 Gauhati]

M/S Borah And Companyjiban Phukan Nagar Vs. Assam Power Distribution Company Ltd. And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 989 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

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