Service Law: When Supreme Court invoke Article 142 for doing Complete Justice to an Employee

The issue concerns the employment of the appellant, a lecturer, with the second respondent–College which is affiliated to the fourth respondent–Shivaji University, Kolhapur, Maharashtra. (Para 2)

The fourth respondent–University approved the said appointment. (Para 3)

The appellant was appointed to the post of lecturer in English for one academic year on a fulltime basis (Para 4)

The second respondent–College wrote a letter on 28th January 1994 to the fourth respondent–University requesting to grant approval to the appointment of the appellant in the open category as Ms S.D. Patil did not join. The fourth respondent–University, by the letter dated 4th March 1994, did not accept the said request as the appellant was not possessing NET qualification. At that time, both the appellant and the fifth respondent were not possessing NET qualification (Para 5)

The fifth respondent again applied for the post. On 28th October 1996, the second respondent–College terminated the appointment of the fifth respondent from the end of the term. Being aggrieved by the termination, the fifth respondent preferred an appeal before the University and College Tribunal, Pune (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) in which the appellant was not made a party. The Tribunal granted a stay to the order of her termination. During the pendency of the said appeal, the first respondent–College again passed an order of termination dated 20th April 1997 against the fifth respondent on the ground that the Commerce Section in the College was closed down. Therefore, another appeal was preferred by the fifth respondent before the Tribunal. By the order dated 5th February 1998, the Tribunal allowed the appeal and directed reinstatement of the fifth respondent to her original post. The first respondent–College filed a writ petition for challenging the said order, in which the appellant applied for impleadment. However, the High Court rejected the said application. (Para 7)

In the meanwhile, the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court for challenging the order dated 5th February 1998 by which the fifth respondent was ordered to be reinstated. (Para 8)

On 5th September 2014, the High Court in the writ petition filed by the appellant set aside the order dated 5th February 1998 of the Tribunal and remanded the appeal for fresh consideration. In the meanwhile, by the communication dated 29th March 2000, the College informed the appellant that her seniority will be below the seniority of the fifth respondent. The appellant preferred an appeal against the said decision before the Tribunal. The restored appeal along with the appeal preferred by the appellant were heard and by the common judgment and order dated 21st December 2015, the appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed and the appeals preferred by the fifth respondent were allowed. (Para 8)

Appellant is that the appellant was appointed on the basis of the first advertisement. Even on the basis of the second advertisement, the appellant was selected. In both processes, the appellant was selected against the open category post. That is how, on 26th October 1994, the first respondent–College issued the letter of appointment appointing the appellant in open category to which the fifth respondent did not raise any objection. On the contrary, pursuant to the third and fourth advertisements, the fifth respondent applied for the post which was reserved for the Scheduled Caste category. The submission of the learned senior counsel is that after the fifth respondent accepted the appointment of the appellant against open category, it was too late in the day for her to approach the Tribunal and contend that she was above the appellant in the order of merit in the process conducted on the basis of the first advertisement. His submission is that the appellant was a regularly appointed candidate and therefore, her appointment on a fulltime basis cannot be disturbed. (Para 10)

The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the fifth respondent is that pursuant to the first advertisement when the selection process was conducted, the fifth respondent was shown above the appellant in the order of merit. Therefore, the fifth respondent ought to have been appointed against the open category post and the appellant on a temporary basis against the post reserved for the Scheduled Caste category. As far as the first and second respondents are concerned, their stand is that they have abided by the orders of the High Court and the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent justified the action of granting approval to the fifth respondent against the open category post. The submission of the learned Standing Counsel for the State Government is that the additional burden of payment of salary cannot be put on the State Government by directing the appointment of the appellant against the fulltime post. (Para 11)

Thus, the appellant worked against the open category post of lecturer in English from 8th September 1993 till 5th January 1999 and in the meanwhile, the fourth respondent–University approved the regular appointment of the appellant by the letter dated 5th January 1995. This situation has arisen as the fifth respondent never objected to the appointment of the appellant pursuant to the first and second advertisements and she participated in the two further processes conducted on the basis of the third and fourth advertisements. In this process, the appellant has become age barred to get the appointment to the post of lecturer elsewhere. Even assuming that there was an error committed by the College Management by appointing the appellant against the open category of post in the year 1994, the appellant cannot be allowed to suffer, as in the second process, she was the first in the order of merit. This selection was never challenged by the fifth respondent. (Para 14)

Hence, by modifying the impugned order, without disturbing the fifth respondent, we issue the following directions in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India:

  1. The appellant shall be reinstated to the post of lecturer in English in the second respondent-College with effect from 5th January 1995 within a period of one month from today;
  2. However, the appellant will not be entitled to the salary of the post of lecturer from 5th January 1995 till the date of her appointment in terms of this order;
  3. The appellant shall be placed in the seniority list immediately below the fifth respondent and the lecturer appointed on the post reserved for Scheduled Caste;
  4. As clarified earlier, the appellant will not be entitled to salary admissible the post of lecturer from 5th January 1995 till the date of her appointment in terms of this order and this period shall be taken into consideration only for the limited purposes of granting retiral benefits to the appellant;
  5. We direct the State Government to release necessary grant-in-aid for payment of salary to the appellant from the date of her appointment to the post of lecturer in English pursuant to this order, if necessary, by creating a supernumerary post;
  6. We make it clear that notwithstanding this order, the post and status of the fifth respondent shall remain unaffected;
  7. We make it clear that the directions issued under this order are in the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution and the same shall not be treated as precedent; and
  8. The appeals are disposed of on the above terms. (Para 16)

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

2023 STPL(Web) 216 SC

[2023 INSC 775]

Vijaya Bhiku Kadam Vs. Mayani Bhag Shikshan Prasarak Mandal & Ors.

Civil Appeal Nos. 5483-5484 of 2023 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.67646765 of 2018)-Decided on 28-8-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/2023-STPLWeb-216-SC-1.pdf

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Breach of peace: It must disturb public order, not just personal peace

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 145, 146- Breach of peace – Emergency situation – Possession dispute – Civil litigation – Non-application of mind – Proceeding under Section 145 – Attachment under Section 146 – The application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenges the orders by the Executive Magistrate, concerning a dispute under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and subsequent attachment under Section 146(1) of the same.

The petitioner contests the legality of both orders, asserting that the initiation of the proceeding and the attachment were illegal and an abuse of process. It’s argued that the jurisdiction under Section 145 can only be invoked if there’s a likelihood of a breach of peace, which wasn’t sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

The petitioner highlights that the attachment order was passed ex-parte without affording them an opportunity to respond, which is contrary to the exceptional circumstances required for such an order. Reference is made to legal precedent discouraging parallel criminal proceedings when a civil litigation is pending regarding property possession, emphasizing the binding nature of civil court decrees.

The respondents counter by claiming entitlement to the land based on a partition deed and subsequent court judgments. They argue that emergency circumstances justified the attachment due to the petitioner’s attempt to construct on disputed land.

Legal precedents are cited to emphasize that the existence of an emergency, not just the use of the term “emergency,” warrants attachment under Section 146.

The judgment critically examines the orders and the circumstances leading to them. It observes discrepancies between the assertions made in the complaint and police report, highlighting the absence of clear grounds for apprehension of breach of peace.The judgment reiterates the requirement for a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace under Section 145, emphasizing that it must disturb public order, not just personal peace.

It concludes that the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and jurisdictional error, resulting in injustice to the petitioner. Consequently, both orders are quashed, and the petition is allowed. Important Paragraph Numbers of Judgment: (Para 13, 19, 30, 31)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 183 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1651 Gauhati]

Md. Osman Ali Saikia And Anr. Vs. Chand Mahamod Saikia And 2 Ors.

Crl.Pet. 239 of 2021-Decided on 8-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-183-Gauhati.pdf

 

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Electricity: Outstanding arrears from previous owner

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 – Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 43, 49, 50, 56 – Electricity – Outstanding arrears from previous owner – The petitioner, a partnership firm, sought a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a decision by the Assam Power Distribution Company Limited (APDCL) to deny a new electricity connection to their premises due to outstanding arrears from previous electricity bills.

The court directed interim relief for immediate electricity connection, subject to 50% payment of outstanding dues, with the remaining 50% to be paid upon dismissal of the writ petition.

The petitioner participated in an auction sale of a property and purchased a portion of land with a Business Centre cum Market Complex. They subsequently applied for a new electricity connection, which was denied by APDCL citing outstanding dues.

The court referred to the Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 and the Electricity Act, 2003. It cited a Supreme Court decision (K.C. Ninan vs. Kerala State Electricity Board) regarding the liability of auction purchasers for previous dues in properties sold on ‘as is where is’ basis.

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding the petitioner liable for outstanding electricity dues as per the auction sale agreement. It directed the petitioner to pay the outstanding dues as per the interim order, with APDCL waiving the accrued interest on the principal dues. (Para 15, 16)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1650 Gauhati]

M/S Borah And Companyjiban Phukan Nagar Vs. Assam Power Distribution Company Ltd. And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 989 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

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Executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules

Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965 – Rule 7 – Refund of Charges – Administrative Order – Statutory Rules – The present writ petition contested an order issued by the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Excise Department, reintroducing establishment charges under Rule 7 of the Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965, despite their abolition by the Assam Bonded Warehouse (Amendment) Rules, 2005.

The Court held that executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules. Citing the principle established in K. Kuppusamy case, it ruled that until a rule is amended, it remains applicable. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside as ultra vires. Regarding refund, relying on Mafatlal Industries Ltd. case, the Court directed the petitioner to present evidence to the Excise Commissioner, who would determine entitlement to refund within four months, considering whether the petitioner passed on the burden of charges to retailers. (Para 15)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 181 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1649 Gauhati]

M/S Centenary Distilleries P Ltd. Vs. State Of Assam And 2 Ors.

WP(C) 2875 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-181-Gauhati-2.pdf

 

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Land Disputes: Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts

Land Disputes – Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts – The instant writ petition challenged a judgment of the Assam Board of Revenue concerning a land dispute. The dispute pertained to a plot of land associated with the Dargah of Pir Saheb. The Civil Court in Title Suit No.176/1978 had decreed in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, declaring their right, title, and possession over the land. The State of Assam was restrained from interference. Subsequently, the Settlement Officer issued a Khatian in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, and a new Dag was created. However, the Assam Board of Revenue, in its impugned judgment, disregarded the Civil Court’s decree and cancelled the Khatian issued to the Petitioners’ predecessor.

This action was deemed contrary to established principles, as Civil Court decrees are binding on Revenue Courts. Therefore, the High Court set aside the impugned judgment, restoring the Khatian to the Petitioners’ predecessor. (Para 12)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 180 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1648 Gauhati]

Sayed Moinuddin Ahmed Vs. State Of Assam And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 4701 of 2013-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-180-Gauhati.pdf

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