Service Law: Retirement age – Definition of teacher

Wherein it was held that the appellant, who was working as a sports officer/physical training instructor[For short ‘PTI’] in the respondent No. 1 – Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya[For short ‘the University’], falls under the definition of a “teacher” and is entitled to retire at the age of 62 years, at par with teachers serving in the respondent no. 1 – University. (Para 1)

The appellant submitted a representation to the respondents stating that by virtue of the aforesaid decision, the age of teachers was raised by the State Government from 60 years to 62 years with effect from the year 1998 and the said decision also covered the respondent No. 1 – University, thereby entitling teachers serving in the University to superannuate at the age of 62 years instead of 60 years. He urged that since sports officer/PTI working in the respondent No. 1 – University fall under the definition of “teacher”, their age of superannuation should also be treated as 62 years. (Para 2.2)

Thus, it can be seen that the definition “teacher” is inclusive in nature and not just confined to a Professor, Associate Professor or Assistant Professor, as defined in Statute 32. When Section 2(n) of the A.P. Act is read in conjunction with Statute 32, the word “teacher” encompasses one who is enjoined to impart instructions and/or conduct and guide research and/or extension programmes. The definition being inclusive in nature would have to be read expansively and when read in the context of PTI/Sports Officer, it cannot be denied that the appellant while discharging his duties was required to impart instructions relating to the rules and practices adopted for various categories of sports. (Para 8)

In the case at hand, a comparison of the fact situation and the provisions of the relevant Act and Regulations with those analysed in the case of P.S. Ramamohana Rao (supra), would show clear parity. Just as under the A.P. Act where the definition of a “teacher” contained in Section 2(n) was an expansive one and extended not only to those persons who impart instructions, conduct and carry on research work for extension programme, but also those who were declared to be a teacher within the purview of the definition under the Statute framed by the State Government, same is the position under the J.N.K.V.V. Act, the Statute and relevant Regulations. We are therefore of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court fell into an error by placing reliance on the decision in Ramesh Chandra Bajpai (supra), where the issue involved was at variance. (Para 11)

In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is deemed appropriate to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 14th December, 2009 and restore the judgment dated 26th April, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge. It is declared that the appellant, who was discharging the duties of a PTI/Sports Officer, would fall within the definition of a “teacher” and would have been entitled to be continued in service till completion of 62 years of age. (Para 12)

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

2023 STPL(Web) 475 SC

[2023 INSC 1067]

P.C. Modi Vs. Jawaharlal Nehru Vishwa Vidyalaya And Another

Civil Appeal No. 4267 of 2011-Decided on 13-12-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/2023-STPLWeb-475-SC.pdf

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Breach of peace: It must disturb public order, not just personal peace

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 145, 146- Breach of peace – Emergency situation – Possession dispute – Civil litigation – Non-application of mind – Proceeding under Section 145 – Attachment under Section 146 – The application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenges the orders by the Executive Magistrate, concerning a dispute under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and subsequent attachment under Section 146(1) of the same.

The petitioner contests the legality of both orders, asserting that the initiation of the proceeding and the attachment were illegal and an abuse of process. It’s argued that the jurisdiction under Section 145 can only be invoked if there’s a likelihood of a breach of peace, which wasn’t sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

The petitioner highlights that the attachment order was passed ex-parte without affording them an opportunity to respond, which is contrary to the exceptional circumstances required for such an order. Reference is made to legal precedent discouraging parallel criminal proceedings when a civil litigation is pending regarding property possession, emphasizing the binding nature of civil court decrees.

The respondents counter by claiming entitlement to the land based on a partition deed and subsequent court judgments. They argue that emergency circumstances justified the attachment due to the petitioner’s attempt to construct on disputed land.

Legal precedents are cited to emphasize that the existence of an emergency, not just the use of the term “emergency,” warrants attachment under Section 146.

The judgment critically examines the orders and the circumstances leading to them. It observes discrepancies between the assertions made in the complaint and police report, highlighting the absence of clear grounds for apprehension of breach of peace.The judgment reiterates the requirement for a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace under Section 145, emphasizing that it must disturb public order, not just personal peace.

It concludes that the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and jurisdictional error, resulting in injustice to the petitioner. Consequently, both orders are quashed, and the petition is allowed. Important Paragraph Numbers of Judgment: (Para 13, 19, 30, 31)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 183 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1651 Gauhati]

Md. Osman Ali Saikia And Anr. Vs. Chand Mahamod Saikia And 2 Ors.

Crl.Pet. 239 of 2021-Decided on 8-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-183-Gauhati.pdf

 

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Electricity: Outstanding arrears from previous owner

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 – Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 43, 49, 50, 56 – Electricity – Outstanding arrears from previous owner – The petitioner, a partnership firm, sought a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a decision by the Assam Power Distribution Company Limited (APDCL) to deny a new electricity connection to their premises due to outstanding arrears from previous electricity bills.

The court directed interim relief for immediate electricity connection, subject to 50% payment of outstanding dues, with the remaining 50% to be paid upon dismissal of the writ petition.

The petitioner participated in an auction sale of a property and purchased a portion of land with a Business Centre cum Market Complex. They subsequently applied for a new electricity connection, which was denied by APDCL citing outstanding dues.

The court referred to the Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 and the Electricity Act, 2003. It cited a Supreme Court decision (K.C. Ninan vs. Kerala State Electricity Board) regarding the liability of auction purchasers for previous dues in properties sold on ‘as is where is’ basis.

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding the petitioner liable for outstanding electricity dues as per the auction sale agreement. It directed the petitioner to pay the outstanding dues as per the interim order, with APDCL waiving the accrued interest on the principal dues. (Para 15, 16)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1650 Gauhati]

M/S Borah And Companyjiban Phukan Nagar Vs. Assam Power Distribution Company Ltd. And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 989 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

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Executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules

Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965 – Rule 7 – Refund of Charges – Administrative Order – Statutory Rules – The present writ petition contested an order issued by the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Excise Department, reintroducing establishment charges under Rule 7 of the Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965, despite their abolition by the Assam Bonded Warehouse (Amendment) Rules, 2005.

The Court held that executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules. Citing the principle established in K. Kuppusamy case, it ruled that until a rule is amended, it remains applicable. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside as ultra vires. Regarding refund, relying on Mafatlal Industries Ltd. case, the Court directed the petitioner to present evidence to the Excise Commissioner, who would determine entitlement to refund within four months, considering whether the petitioner passed on the burden of charges to retailers. (Para 15)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 181 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1649 Gauhati]

M/S Centenary Distilleries P Ltd. Vs. State Of Assam And 2 Ors.

WP(C) 2875 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-181-Gauhati-2.pdf

 

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Land Disputes: Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts

Land Disputes – Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts – The instant writ petition challenged a judgment of the Assam Board of Revenue concerning a land dispute. The dispute pertained to a plot of land associated with the Dargah of Pir Saheb. The Civil Court in Title Suit No.176/1978 had decreed in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, declaring their right, title, and possession over the land. The State of Assam was restrained from interference. Subsequently, the Settlement Officer issued a Khatian in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, and a new Dag was created. However, the Assam Board of Revenue, in its impugned judgment, disregarded the Civil Court’s decree and cancelled the Khatian issued to the Petitioners’ predecessor.

This action was deemed contrary to established principles, as Civil Court decrees are binding on Revenue Courts. Therefore, the High Court set aside the impugned judgment, restoring the Khatian to the Petitioners’ predecessor. (Para 12)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 180 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1648 Gauhati]

Sayed Moinuddin Ahmed Vs. State Of Assam And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 4701 of 2013-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-180-Gauhati.pdf

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