Service Law: An expert body has a right to prescribe the minimum qualifications

The High Court, vide the impugned judgment and order, held that the 18 months Diploma in Elementary Education (for short, “D.El.Ed.”) conducted through the Open and Distance Learning (for short, ‘ODL’) mode in elementary education by the National Institute of Open Schooling (hereinafter referred to as ‘NIOS’) is a valid Diploma for applying against the regular posts of Assistant Teachers (Primary) in the State of Uttarakhand. (Para 2)

Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 23583-84 of 2022 are filed by the candidates who are holding the 2 years diploma in elementary education whereas appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 23943 of 2022 is filed by the State of Uttarakhand. (Para 3)

On 27th August 2009, the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as “RTE Act”) was notified. Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the RTE Act provided that any person possessing such minimum qualifications, as laid down by an academic authority, authorized by the Central Government, by notifications, shall be eligible for appointment as a teacher. Sub-section (2) thereof enables the Central Government, if it deems necessary, by notification, to relax the minimum qualifications required for appointment as a teacher, for such period, not exceeding five years. The first proviso to sub-section (2) thereof provided that a teacher who, at the commencement of this Act, does not possess minimum qualifications as laid down under subsection (1), shall acquire such minimum qualifications within a period of five years. The second proviso to sub-section (2) thereof, which was added by Act 24 of 2017, further provided that a teacher appointed or in position as on the 31st March 2015, who does not possess minimum qualifications as laid down under sub-section (1), shall acquire such minimum qualifications within a period of four years from the date of commencement of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (Amendment) Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as “2017 Amendment Act”). (Para 4.1)

The Central Government, through Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of School Education & Literacy (hereinafter referred to as “MHRD”), vide notification dated 31st March 2010 authorized the National Council for Teacher Education (for short, “NCTE”) as the academic authority for laying down the minimum qualifications for a person to be eligible for appointment as a teacher. (Para 4.2)

NCTE, vide notification dated 23rd August 2010, prescribed minimum qualifications for a person to be eligible for appointment as a teacher for Class I to VIII. (Para 4.3)

Vide the impugned judgment and order, the High Court held that 18 months D.El.Ed. Training Diploma conducted through the ODL mode in elementary education by NIOS cannot be said to be a lower or inferior qualification as compared with the 2 years D.El.Ed. programme. It held that, in respect of the in-service teachers, who have undergone the 18 months D.El.Ed. programme conducted by NIOS through ODL mode, the State Government cannot discriminate by debarring them from offering their candidatures for the post of Assistant Teachers (Primary) in the State of Uttarakhand. As such, it quashed and set aside the letter dated 10th February 2021 issued by the Government of Uttarakhand. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals. (Para 4.15)

That the 2014 Regulations clearly provide that the 2 years Diploma in Elementary Education was an essential qualification for appointment of teachers for Class I to VIII. (Para 6)

It is thus clear that all such teachers working in either Government/Government Aided/Unaided Private Schools, were required to acquire the minimum qualifications by 31st March 2019 or they would face dismissal from service. It appears that it was decided by the Central Government to provide a window for all such teachers. A perusal of the said communication would reveal that various directions were issued so that lakhs of teachers, who were untrained, get the requisite qualifications prior to 1st April 2019. The communication addressed by the Director, Elementary Education, Uttarakhand dated 8th September 2017 to the Chief Education Officer and District Education Officer, Uttarakhand would further clarify this position. (Para 23)

We further find that the 2012 Service Rules as framed by the State of Uttarakhand were framed on the basis of notifications issued by NCTE on 23rd August 2010 and 29th July 2011. These 2012 Service Rules were amended from time to time and as existing on the date of advertisement, they specifically provide for a 2 years D.El.Ed. course known as B.T.C. training in the State of Uttarakhand as a minimum qualification. It also provided that a person to be eligible to apply for the said post must have completed 2 years D.El.Ed. course from NIOS and qualified Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) or who has completed 2 years D.El.Ed. course from any other Institute recognized by NCTE and qualified TET. The advertisements issued by various District Education Officers also provided the same qualifications. It can thus be seen that acquiring of 2 years Diploma in Elementary Education was a minimum qualification as prescribed under the statutory Rules. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (supra), wherein this Court has referred to its earlier judgments including that of a Constitution Bench (Para 33)

It can thus be seen that it is a trite law that the Government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point, it can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed. It is a settled proposition of law that an authority cannot issue orders/office memorandum/executive instructions in contravention of the statutory rules. However, instructions can be issued only to supplement the statutory rules but not to supplant it. (Para 34)

We therefore find that the High Court has erred in directing the State Government to consider the candidates who did not qualify as per the 2012 Service Rules and as per the advertisement based on the Service Rules, particularly when the 2012 Service Rules and the advertisements were not under challenge. The High Court, in our view, could not have issued such a mandamus contrary to such Service Rules. (Para 38)

That leaves us with the question as to whether the High Court was justified in holding that the 18 months Diploma conducted by NIOS through ODL mode is said to be equivalent to the 2 years Diploma as required under the notifications of NCTE dated 23rd August 2010 and 29th July 2011. (Para 39)

We find that the High Court erred in holding that 18 months Diploma conducted by NIOS through ODL mode is equivalent to the 2 years regular Diploma, particularly so, when there was no material placed on record to even remotely hold that such a qualification was recommended by the Expert Body NCTE. (Para 41)

There can be no doubt that NCTE, as an expert body, has a right to prescribe the minimum qualifications. In the present case itself, by notifications dated 23rd August 2010 and 29th July 2011, NCTE has done so. (Para 42)

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

2023 STPL(Web) 450 SC

[2023 INSC 1024]

Jaiveer Singh And Others Vs. State Of Uttarakhand And Others

Civil Appeal Nos. 7871-7872 of 2023(Arising Out of Slp(C) Nos. 23583-84 of 2022) With Civil Appeal No. of 2023 [Arising Out of Slp (C) No. 23943 Of 2022]-Decided on 28-11-2023

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Breach of peace: It must disturb public order, not just personal peace

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 145, 146- Breach of peace – Emergency situation – Possession dispute – Civil litigation – Non-application of mind – Proceeding under Section 145 – Attachment under Section 146 – The application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenges the orders by the Executive Magistrate, concerning a dispute under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and subsequent attachment under Section 146(1) of the same.

The petitioner contests the legality of both orders, asserting that the initiation of the proceeding and the attachment were illegal and an abuse of process. It’s argued that the jurisdiction under Section 145 can only be invoked if there’s a likelihood of a breach of peace, which wasn’t sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

The petitioner highlights that the attachment order was passed ex-parte without affording them an opportunity to respond, which is contrary to the exceptional circumstances required for such an order. Reference is made to legal precedent discouraging parallel criminal proceedings when a civil litigation is pending regarding property possession, emphasizing the binding nature of civil court decrees.

The respondents counter by claiming entitlement to the land based on a partition deed and subsequent court judgments. They argue that emergency circumstances justified the attachment due to the petitioner’s attempt to construct on disputed land.

Legal precedents are cited to emphasize that the existence of an emergency, not just the use of the term “emergency,” warrants attachment under Section 146.

The judgment critically examines the orders and the circumstances leading to them. It observes discrepancies between the assertions made in the complaint and police report, highlighting the absence of clear grounds for apprehension of breach of peace.The judgment reiterates the requirement for a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace under Section 145, emphasizing that it must disturb public order, not just personal peace.

It concludes that the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and jurisdictional error, resulting in injustice to the petitioner. Consequently, both orders are quashed, and the petition is allowed. Important Paragraph Numbers of Judgment: (Para 13, 19, 30, 31)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 183 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1651 Gauhati]

Md. Osman Ali Saikia And Anr. Vs. Chand Mahamod Saikia And 2 Ors.

Crl.Pet. 239 of 2021-Decided on 8-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-183-Gauhati.pdf

 

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Electricity: Outstanding arrears from previous owner

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 – Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 43, 49, 50, 56 – Electricity – Outstanding arrears from previous owner – The petitioner, a partnership firm, sought a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a decision by the Assam Power Distribution Company Limited (APDCL) to deny a new electricity connection to their premises due to outstanding arrears from previous electricity bills.

The court directed interim relief for immediate electricity connection, subject to 50% payment of outstanding dues, with the remaining 50% to be paid upon dismissal of the writ petition.

The petitioner participated in an auction sale of a property and purchased a portion of land with a Business Centre cum Market Complex. They subsequently applied for a new electricity connection, which was denied by APDCL citing outstanding dues.

The court referred to the Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 and the Electricity Act, 2003. It cited a Supreme Court decision (K.C. Ninan vs. Kerala State Electricity Board) regarding the liability of auction purchasers for previous dues in properties sold on ‘as is where is’ basis.

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding the petitioner liable for outstanding electricity dues as per the auction sale agreement. It directed the petitioner to pay the outstanding dues as per the interim order, with APDCL waiving the accrued interest on the principal dues. (Para 15, 16)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1650 Gauhati]

M/S Borah And Companyjiban Phukan Nagar Vs. Assam Power Distribution Company Ltd. And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 989 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

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Executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules

Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965 – Rule 7 – Refund of Charges – Administrative Order – Statutory Rules – The present writ petition contested an order issued by the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Excise Department, reintroducing establishment charges under Rule 7 of the Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965, despite their abolition by the Assam Bonded Warehouse (Amendment) Rules, 2005.

The Court held that executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules. Citing the principle established in K. Kuppusamy case, it ruled that until a rule is amended, it remains applicable. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside as ultra vires. Regarding refund, relying on Mafatlal Industries Ltd. case, the Court directed the petitioner to present evidence to the Excise Commissioner, who would determine entitlement to refund within four months, considering whether the petitioner passed on the burden of charges to retailers. (Para 15)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 181 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1649 Gauhati]

M/S Centenary Distilleries P Ltd. Vs. State Of Assam And 2 Ors.

WP(C) 2875 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-181-Gauhati-2.pdf

 

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Land Disputes: Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts

Land Disputes – Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts – The instant writ petition challenged a judgment of the Assam Board of Revenue concerning a land dispute. The dispute pertained to a plot of land associated with the Dargah of Pir Saheb. The Civil Court in Title Suit No.176/1978 had decreed in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, declaring their right, title, and possession over the land. The State of Assam was restrained from interference. Subsequently, the Settlement Officer issued a Khatian in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, and a new Dag was created. However, the Assam Board of Revenue, in its impugned judgment, disregarded the Civil Court’s decree and cancelled the Khatian issued to the Petitioners’ predecessor.

This action was deemed contrary to established principles, as Civil Court decrees are binding on Revenue Courts. Therefore, the High Court set aside the impugned judgment, restoring the Khatian to the Petitioners’ predecessor. (Para 12)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 180 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1648 Gauhati]

Sayed Moinuddin Ahmed Vs. State Of Assam And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 4701 of 2013-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-180-Gauhati.pdf

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