Criminal : Quashing of FIR: Quashed as prima facie no offence made out

(A) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 239 – Criminal Procedure – Discharge application – Whether the actions of the Appellants prima facie constitute the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC? – Crux of Respondent No. 2’s allegations is that the Appellants purportedly forged his signature on the passport application submitted to obtain the minor child’s passport – Motivations prompting either of the Appellants to procure a passport for the minor child were not rooted in deceit – Furthermore, the grant of passport to the minor child did not confer any benefit upon the Appellant wife, nor did it result in any loss or damage to Respondent No. 2 -, Appellant No. 2, being the father of the Appellant – wife and assisting in securing the passport for the chid, derived no direct or indirect benefit from this action – Aforesaid act does not entail inducement leading to the parting of any property by Respondent No. 2. – The nature of the property which can be claimed to have been relinquished or the tangible loss, damage, or injury, if any, suffered by Respondent No. 2 are not visible at all – Respondent No. 2-compalinant, the biological father and natural guardian of the minor child, is positioned as such in relation to the grant of a passport to his son – This grant can be best characterised as the minor child’s acquisition of property – Since the gain by the minor child is not at the cost of any loss, damage or injury to Respondent No. 2, both the fundamental elements of ‘deceit’ and ‘damage or injury’, requisite for constituting the offence of cheating are conspicuously absent in this factual scenario -insinuations made by Respondent No. 2, even if they possess an iota of truth, have miserably failed to prima facie establish the elements of ‘cheating’ and thus, the accusation made against the Appellants under Section 420 IPC must fall flat. (Para 16 to 20)

 

(B) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 239 – Criminal Procedure – Discharge application – Whether there has been a prima facie case made out for forgery under Sections 468 and 471 IPC? –Held that the offences of ‘forgery’ and ‘cheating’ intersect and converge, as the act of forgery is committed with the intent to deceive or cheat an individual -It stands established that no dishonest intent can be made out against the Appellants – The determination of whether the Appellants prepared a false document, by forging Respondent No. 2’s signature, however, cannot be even prima facie ascertained at this juncture – Considering the primary ingredient of dishonest intention itself could not be established against the Appellants, the offence of forgery too, has no legs to stand -Proceedings as against the concerned Passport Officer, who was implicated as Accused No. 4, already stand quashed -There are glaring procedural irregularities that have been overlooked by the Trial Magistrate – Investigating agency initially found insufficient evidence to support charges under Sections 468 and 471 IPC – Accordingly, no chargesheet was filed under these provisions – However, in compliance with the Trial Magistrate’s order dated 24.06.2015, a supplementary chargesheet was submitted under Sections 468, 471 and 201 IPC and Section 12(b) of the Passports Act, 1967 – It is a matter of record that in the course of ‘further investigation’, no new material was unearthed by the investigating agency – Instead, the supplementary chargesheet relies upon the Truth Lab report dated 15.07.2013, obtained by Respondent No. 2, which was already available when the original chargesheet was filed – Elementary ingredients of ‘cheating’ and ‘forgery’ are conspicuously missing – Held that the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the Appellants is nothing but an abuse of the process of law – Trial Magistrate and the High Court unfortunately failed to appreciate that the genesis of the present controversy lies in a marital dispute- Recognising that the allegations do not pertain to offences against property or documents related to property marks Trial Magistrate should have exercised prudence, making at least a cursory effort to discern the actual ‘victim’ or ‘victimiser’ – Elementary ingredients of ‘cheating’ and ‘forgery’ are conspicuously missing – Continuation of the criminal proceedings against the Appellants is nothing but an abuse of the process of law. (Para 14 to 24, 31 and 34 )

 

(C) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 173(8) – Criminal Procedure – The term ‘further investigation’- Held that the term ‘further investigation’ stipulated in Section 173(8) CrPC obligates the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station to ‘obtain further evidence, oral or documentary’, and only then forward a supplementary report regarding such evidence, in the prescribed form – The provision for submitting a supplementary report infers that fresh oral or documentary evidence should be obtained rather than reevaluating or reassessing the material already collected and considered by the investigating agency while submitting the initial police report, known as the chargesheet under Section 173(2) CrPC – In the absence of any new evidence found to substantiate the conclusions drawn by the investigating officer in the supplementary report, a Judicial Magistrate is not compelled to take cognizance, as such a report lacks investigative rigour and fails to satisfy the requisites of Section 173(8) CrPC. (Para 26 and 27)

 

(D) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 239 – Criminal Procedure – Discharge application – Whether there has been a violation of Section 12(b) of the Passports Act, 1967? –Held that what must be established is that the accused knowingly furnished false information or suppressed material information with the intent of obtaining a passport or travel document – State FSL report explicitly stated that the alleged forgery of Respondent No. 2’s signatures on the passport application was inconclusive – Moreover, the cognizance of such like offence can be taken only at the instance of the Prescribed Authority – No complaint to that effect has been disclosed against the Appellants – This Court, therefore, will exercise caution before invoking such severe offences and penalties solely on the basis of conjectures and surmises – Impugned judgment of the High Court, and that of the Trial Magistrate liable to be set aside – FIR under Sections 420, 468, 471 read with Section 34 IPC, lodged by Respondent No. 2 against the Appellants and all the proceedings arising therefrom liable to be quashed – Appellants were unnecessarily implicated and dragged into criminal proceedings, thereby causing undue hardship to them – These instances shed light on Respondent No. 2’s conduct preceding the initiation of the present proceedings and provide insight into his motivations for instigating the same. Respondent No. 2 is liable to pay the cost of Rs. 1,00,000/to Appellant No. 1. (Para 37 to 40)

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

2024 STPL(Web) 49 SC

[2024 INSC 49]

Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. Vs. State By Adugodi Police Station & Anr.

Criminal Appeal No. 335 of 2024 (Arising out of Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 2877 of 2021)-Decided on 22-1-2024

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/2024-STPLWeb-49-SC.pdf

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Contract: Demurrage not allowed

Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Demurrage – Contractual Liability – Liquidated Damages – Breach of Contract – Adjudication of Claims – The petitioner, engaged in transportation business, participated in a competitive bidding process and was awarded a transportation contract by the Food Corporation of India (FCI). Dispute arose when FCI began deducting demurrage charges from petitioner’s bills for alleged delay in unloading wagons, despite petitioner not being responsible for wagon unloading.

The petitioner contested the deduction, arguing that as per the contract, demurrage cannot be unilaterally imposed by FCI unless liability is determined through due process of law.

The Court examined the relevant contract clause, which allowed FCI to recover costs, damages, etc., due to contractor’s negligence, but found it did not specifically authorize demurrage deduction.

Relying on the Supreme Court precedent in Food Corporation of India vs. Abhijit Paul, the Court held that demurrage could not be levied on the petitioner as the contract did not assign the task of wagon unloading to them.

The absence of a liquidated damages clause in the contract further supported the Court’s decision. The Court directed FCI to refund the deducted demurrage amount and refrain from further deductions, unless liability is determined through lawful adjudication.The order did not prevent FCI from seeking damages through proper legal channels. (Para 12, 15, 18, 22)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 184 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1652 Gauhati]

Hi Speed Logistics Pvt Ltd. Vs. Food Corporation Of India And 5 Ors.

WP(C) 6317 of 2022-Decided on 8-11-2023

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Breach of peace: It must disturb public order, not just personal peace

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 145, 146- Breach of peace – Emergency situation – Possession dispute – Civil litigation – Non-application of mind – Proceeding under Section 145 – Attachment under Section 146 – The application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenges the orders by the Executive Magistrate, concerning a dispute under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and subsequent attachment under Section 146(1) of the same.

The petitioner contests the legality of both orders, asserting that the initiation of the proceeding and the attachment were illegal and an abuse of process. It’s argued that the jurisdiction under Section 145 can only be invoked if there’s a likelihood of a breach of peace, which wasn’t sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

The petitioner highlights that the attachment order was passed ex-parte without affording them an opportunity to respond, which is contrary to the exceptional circumstances required for such an order. Reference is made to legal precedent discouraging parallel criminal proceedings when a civil litigation is pending regarding property possession, emphasizing the binding nature of civil court decrees.

The respondents counter by claiming entitlement to the land based on a partition deed and subsequent court judgments. They argue that emergency circumstances justified the attachment due to the petitioner’s attempt to construct on disputed land.

Legal precedents are cited to emphasize that the existence of an emergency, not just the use of the term “emergency,” warrants attachment under Section 146.

The judgment critically examines the orders and the circumstances leading to them. It observes discrepancies between the assertions made in the complaint and police report, highlighting the absence of clear grounds for apprehension of breach of peace.The judgment reiterates the requirement for a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace under Section 145, emphasizing that it must disturb public order, not just personal peace.

It concludes that the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and jurisdictional error, resulting in injustice to the petitioner. Consequently, both orders are quashed, and the petition is allowed. Important Paragraph Numbers of Judgment: (Para 13, 19, 30, 31)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 183 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1651 Gauhati]

Md. Osman Ali Saikia And Anr. Vs. Chand Mahamod Saikia And 2 Ors.

Crl.Pet. 239 of 2021-Decided on 8-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-183-Gauhati.pdf

 

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Electricity: Outstanding arrears from previous owner

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 – Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 43, 49, 50, 56 – Electricity – Outstanding arrears from previous owner – The petitioner, a partnership firm, sought a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a decision by the Assam Power Distribution Company Limited (APDCL) to deny a new electricity connection to their premises due to outstanding arrears from previous electricity bills.

The court directed interim relief for immediate electricity connection, subject to 50% payment of outstanding dues, with the remaining 50% to be paid upon dismissal of the writ petition.

The petitioner participated in an auction sale of a property and purchased a portion of land with a Business Centre cum Market Complex. They subsequently applied for a new electricity connection, which was denied by APDCL citing outstanding dues.

The court referred to the Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 and the Electricity Act, 2003. It cited a Supreme Court decision (K.C. Ninan vs. Kerala State Electricity Board) regarding the liability of auction purchasers for previous dues in properties sold on ‘as is where is’ basis.

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding the petitioner liable for outstanding electricity dues as per the auction sale agreement. It directed the petitioner to pay the outstanding dues as per the interim order, with APDCL waiving the accrued interest on the principal dues. (Para 15, 16)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1650 Gauhati]

M/S Borah And Companyjiban Phukan Nagar Vs. Assam Power Distribution Company Ltd. And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 989 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

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