Civil: Classification of Advocates is Valid

The petitioners, practicing Advocates, have filed the present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for a declaration that the designation of Advocates as Senior Advocates under Sections 16 and 23(5) of the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’) as well as under Rule 2 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, creating a special class of Advocates with special rights, privileges and status not available to ordinary Advocates is unconstitutional being violative of the mandate of equality under Artilce14 and Right to Practice any Profession under Article 19 as well as Right to Life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (Para 1)

There is no doubt that petitioner No.1 has had more than one brush with the law, though he claims to have become an advocate in the pursuit of his own case. Petitioner No.1 obviously crossed boundaries where the Court was compelled to take action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and debar petitioner No.1 from practicing in this Court. (Para 12)

We find the pleadings completely devoid of merit and justification, making allegations against all and sundry. This is more so in the conspectus of the large growth in the legal profession where a large number of first-generation lawyers have made their mark. These lawyers, some of them young ones, have come from National Law Schools and other prominent Law Schools. Instead of appreciating their contribution, petitioner No.1 has used his usual style of making allegations against all and sundry. (Para 13)

The classification of advocates as senior advocates and other advocates under Section 16 of the said Act is a classification made by the legislature. The legislature has a broad discretion to make such classifications, and while there must be a reason for classification, the reason need not be a good one. The Court can only review the classification if it is palpably discriminatory and arbitrary. (Para 15)

The classification of advocates under Section 16 of the said Act is a tangible difference established by the practice advocates have over decades, and the Court has devised a discernible and transparent mechanism to adjudicate the seniority of advocates in the profession. In order to be able to file any matter in the Supreme Court, an extensive and strict examination for an Advocates-on-Record has been provided. Not any advocate can walk in to file a matter. The objective is the efficiency of the system and proper assistance to the Bench as also to be in a better position to propagate the case of the client. Expertise and merit are the criterion. A lot of advocates prefer to remain as an Advocate-on-Record or advocates in the High Court and District Courts as the designation as Senior Advocate carries many inhibitions in the role that they can perform, i.e., they have to appear with an instructing counsel, not draft and file pleadings, and not deal with the litigants, etc. Thus, a special entitlement to address the Court is coupled with restrictions on many acts which they could otherwise perform as advocates. The designation as a Senior Advocate is a recognition of merit by the Court, and the two judgments passed in Indira Jaising[supra] cases referred to aforesaid have endeavoured to make the process more transparent. (Para 17)

The challenge that the aforesaid classification is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution is untenable since Article 14 permits the reasonable classification of people by the legislature. The seniority of advocates is premised on a standardised metric of merit aimed at forwarding the standards of the profession. Thus, the classification of advocates and the mechanism to grant seniority to advocates is not based on any arbitrary, artificial or evasive grounds. Such a classification is a creation of the legislature, and there is a general presumption of constitutionality, and the burden is on the petitioners to show that there is a clear transgression of the constitutional principles – something which they have miserably failed to discharge. This rule is based on the assumption, judicially recognized and accepted, that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of the people. (Para 18)

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

2023 STPL(Web) 348 SC

[2023 INSC 918]

Mathews J. Nedumpara & Ors Vs. Union Of India & Ors

Writ Petition (C) No.320 Of 2023-Decided on 16-10-2023.

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2023-STPLWeb-348-SC.pdf

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Breach of peace: It must disturb public order, not just personal peace

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 145, 146- Breach of peace – Emergency situation – Possession dispute – Civil litigation – Non-application of mind – Proceeding under Section 145 – Attachment under Section 146 – The application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenges the orders by the Executive Magistrate, concerning a dispute under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and subsequent attachment under Section 146(1) of the same.

The petitioner contests the legality of both orders, asserting that the initiation of the proceeding and the attachment were illegal and an abuse of process. It’s argued that the jurisdiction under Section 145 can only be invoked if there’s a likelihood of a breach of peace, which wasn’t sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

The petitioner highlights that the attachment order was passed ex-parte without affording them an opportunity to respond, which is contrary to the exceptional circumstances required for such an order. Reference is made to legal precedent discouraging parallel criminal proceedings when a civil litigation is pending regarding property possession, emphasizing the binding nature of civil court decrees.

The respondents counter by claiming entitlement to the land based on a partition deed and subsequent court judgments. They argue that emergency circumstances justified the attachment due to the petitioner’s attempt to construct on disputed land.

Legal precedents are cited to emphasize that the existence of an emergency, not just the use of the term “emergency,” warrants attachment under Section 146.

The judgment critically examines the orders and the circumstances leading to them. It observes discrepancies between the assertions made in the complaint and police report, highlighting the absence of clear grounds for apprehension of breach of peace.The judgment reiterates the requirement for a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace under Section 145, emphasizing that it must disturb public order, not just personal peace.

It concludes that the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and jurisdictional error, resulting in injustice to the petitioner. Consequently, both orders are quashed, and the petition is allowed. Important Paragraph Numbers of Judgment: (Para 13, 19, 30, 31)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 183 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1651 Gauhati]

Md. Osman Ali Saikia And Anr. Vs. Chand Mahamod Saikia And 2 Ors.

Crl.Pet. 239 of 2021-Decided on 8-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-183-Gauhati.pdf

 

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Electricity: Outstanding arrears from previous owner

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 – Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 43, 49, 50, 56 – Electricity – Outstanding arrears from previous owner – The petitioner, a partnership firm, sought a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a decision by the Assam Power Distribution Company Limited (APDCL) to deny a new electricity connection to their premises due to outstanding arrears from previous electricity bills.

The court directed interim relief for immediate electricity connection, subject to 50% payment of outstanding dues, with the remaining 50% to be paid upon dismissal of the writ petition.

The petitioner participated in an auction sale of a property and purchased a portion of land with a Business Centre cum Market Complex. They subsequently applied for a new electricity connection, which was denied by APDCL citing outstanding dues.

The court referred to the Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 and the Electricity Act, 2003. It cited a Supreme Court decision (K.C. Ninan vs. Kerala State Electricity Board) regarding the liability of auction purchasers for previous dues in properties sold on ‘as is where is’ basis.

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding the petitioner liable for outstanding electricity dues as per the auction sale agreement. It directed the petitioner to pay the outstanding dues as per the interim order, with APDCL waiving the accrued interest on the principal dues. (Para 15, 16)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1650 Gauhati]

M/S Borah And Companyjiban Phukan Nagar Vs. Assam Power Distribution Company Ltd. And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 989 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

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Executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules

Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965 – Rule 7 – Refund of Charges – Administrative Order – Statutory Rules – The present writ petition contested an order issued by the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Excise Department, reintroducing establishment charges under Rule 7 of the Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965, despite their abolition by the Assam Bonded Warehouse (Amendment) Rules, 2005.

The Court held that executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules. Citing the principle established in K. Kuppusamy case, it ruled that until a rule is amended, it remains applicable. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside as ultra vires. Regarding refund, relying on Mafatlal Industries Ltd. case, the Court directed the petitioner to present evidence to the Excise Commissioner, who would determine entitlement to refund within four months, considering whether the petitioner passed on the burden of charges to retailers. (Para 15)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 181 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1649 Gauhati]

M/S Centenary Distilleries P Ltd. Vs. State Of Assam And 2 Ors.

WP(C) 2875 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-181-Gauhati-2.pdf

 

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Land Disputes: Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts

Land Disputes – Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts – The instant writ petition challenged a judgment of the Assam Board of Revenue concerning a land dispute. The dispute pertained to a plot of land associated with the Dargah of Pir Saheb. The Civil Court in Title Suit No.176/1978 had decreed in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, declaring their right, title, and possession over the land. The State of Assam was restrained from interference. Subsequently, the Settlement Officer issued a Khatian in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, and a new Dag was created. However, the Assam Board of Revenue, in its impugned judgment, disregarded the Civil Court’s decree and cancelled the Khatian issued to the Petitioners’ predecessor.

This action was deemed contrary to established principles, as Civil Court decrees are binding on Revenue Courts. Therefore, the High Court set aside the impugned judgment, restoring the Khatian to the Petitioners’ predecessor. (Para 12)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 180 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1648 Gauhati]

Sayed Moinuddin Ahmed Vs. State Of Assam And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 4701 of 2013-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-180-Gauhati.pdf

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