Central Excise: Classification of Tobacco Products

We deem it necessary to briefly state the history of classification of these two competing entries which have been the pivotal issue in all these groups of appeals before this Court, i.e., CET SH 2403 9910 (‘chewing tobacco’) and CET SH 2403 9930 (‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’) (Para 10)

At the outset, it may be noticed that the expressions ‘chewing tobacco’ and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ are nowhere defined under the CE ACT or CETA. CETA initially covered ‘tobacco’ in item No.9 to the schedule. Entry 9(II) was country tobacco and sub-clause (2) thereof read “if intended for sale as chewing tobacco, whether manufactured or merely cured.” In 1983, ‘tobacco’ was covered under Item 4 of the Schedule of the CE Act. (Para 11)

Thus, it is clear that the stand of the assessee has been consistent to the effect that product manufactured by it is to be classified as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ and at the insistence of the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner the assessee was classifying the goods under CET SH 2403 9910 i.e., ‘chewing tobacco’, for which there was also an order of determination passed under Rule 6(2) of CTPM rules. Whereas in the other matters, namely Urmin and Flakes-n-Flavourz, the facts were entirely different. In Urmin Products the assessee had declared the product as ‘chewing tobacco’ and then changed the classification to ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ and again came back to the original position of declaring it or classifying it as ‘chewing tobacco’. These classifications in Urmin Products were at the behest of the assessee himself. In Flakes-n-Flavourz, the assessee was alleged to be manufacturing ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ and clearing it as ‘chewing tobacco’, and on facts it was found that there were additives added to the tobacco. In the said case this Court on facts held that there was no wilful suppression attributable to the assesssee and the Revenue had failed to establish the product as ‘zarda scented tobaccot’. (Para 138)

In the instant case the assessee had clearly declared his product as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ falling under sub-heading 2403 9930 in Form 1 filed and based on the said declaration, capacity determination order dated 04.03.2015 under rule 6(2) had been passed re-classifying the product as ‘chewing tobacco’. Accordingly, for the period April 2015 in Form-1 the assessee had described the product as ‘Jayanti Zarda Scented- 2403 9910’. However, in the capacity determination order dated 05.05.2015, the Deputy Commissioner classified the goods as ‘chewing tobacco’. As such, there was no misstatement or suppression of facts, collusion, or fraud in the instant case and hence on facts, the principles enunciated in Urmin’s case is distinguishable. (Para 139)

In the facts of the present case, there has been no penalty levied under Rule 26 on the ground that there has been no intent to evade duty. In fact, the commissioner in his order dated 27.09.2017 concludes at para 48.2 to the following effect: “..in view of the above there is no fraud or collusion or any wilful misstatement or separation of facts with intent to evade payment of duty to invoke the provisions of Section 11A (4) of Central Excise Act, 1944 in the present case. (Para 140)

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

2023 STPL(Web) 381 SC

[2023 INSC 951]

Commr. Of Cen. Exc. Ahmedabad Vs. M/S Urmin Products P. Ltd. And Others

Civil Appeal No.10159-10161 of 2010 With Civil Appeal No.6519 Of 2023 (@ Diary No.6888 Of 2020) With Civil Appeal No.2469 Of 2020 With Civil Appeal No.6521 Of 2023 (@ Diary No.3492 Of 2020) With Civil Appeal No.6522 Of 2023 (@ Diary No.3487 Of 2020) With Civil Appeal Nos.6523-24 Of 2023 (@ Diary No.2810 Of 2020) With Civil Appeal No.959 Of 2019 With Civil Appeal Nos.6538-42 Of 2023 (@ Diary No.14581 Of 2019) With Civil Appeal No.6531-37 Of 2023 (@ Diary No.44912 Of 2019) With Civil Appeal No.6525 Of 2023 (@ Diary No.3484 Of 2020) With Civil Appeal No.6526 Of 2023 (@ Diary No.3513 Of 2020) With Civil Appeal No.6527 Of 2023 (@ Diary No.3536 Of 2020) With Civil Appeal No.6528 Of 2023 (@ Diary No.3544 Of 2020) With Civil Appeal No.6529 Of 2023 (@ Diary No.3545 Of 2020) With Civil Appeal No.6530 Of 2023 (@ Diary No.3547 Of 2020) With Civil Appeal No. 5146 Of 2015 With Civil Appeal No.3596 Of 2023-Decided on 20-10-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2023-STPLWeb-381-SC.pdf

Next Story

Consumer

Next Story

Contract: Demurrage not allowed

Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Demurrage – Contractual Liability – Liquidated Damages – Breach of Contract – Adjudication of Claims – The petitioner, engaged in transportation business, participated in a competitive bidding process and was awarded a transportation contract by the Food Corporation of India (FCI). Dispute arose when FCI began deducting demurrage charges from petitioner’s bills for alleged delay in unloading wagons, despite petitioner not being responsible for wagon unloading.

The petitioner contested the deduction, arguing that as per the contract, demurrage cannot be unilaterally imposed by FCI unless liability is determined through due process of law.

The Court examined the relevant contract clause, which allowed FCI to recover costs, damages, etc., due to contractor’s negligence, but found it did not specifically authorize demurrage deduction.

Relying on the Supreme Court precedent in Food Corporation of India vs. Abhijit Paul, the Court held that demurrage could not be levied on the petitioner as the contract did not assign the task of wagon unloading to them.

The absence of a liquidated damages clause in the contract further supported the Court’s decision. The Court directed FCI to refund the deducted demurrage amount and refrain from further deductions, unless liability is determined through lawful adjudication.The order did not prevent FCI from seeking damages through proper legal channels. (Para 12, 15, 18, 22)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 184 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1652 Gauhati]

Hi Speed Logistics Pvt Ltd. Vs. Food Corporation Of India And 5 Ors.

WP(C) 6317 of 2022-Decided on 8-11-2023

Next Story

Breach of peace: It must disturb public order, not just personal peace

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 145, 146- Breach of peace – Emergency situation – Possession dispute – Civil litigation – Non-application of mind – Proceeding under Section 145 – Attachment under Section 146 – The application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenges the orders by the Executive Magistrate, concerning a dispute under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and subsequent attachment under Section 146(1) of the same.

The petitioner contests the legality of both orders, asserting that the initiation of the proceeding and the attachment were illegal and an abuse of process. It’s argued that the jurisdiction under Section 145 can only be invoked if there’s a likelihood of a breach of peace, which wasn’t sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

The petitioner highlights that the attachment order was passed ex-parte without affording them an opportunity to respond, which is contrary to the exceptional circumstances required for such an order. Reference is made to legal precedent discouraging parallel criminal proceedings when a civil litigation is pending regarding property possession, emphasizing the binding nature of civil court decrees.

The respondents counter by claiming entitlement to the land based on a partition deed and subsequent court judgments. They argue that emergency circumstances justified the attachment due to the petitioner’s attempt to construct on disputed land.

Legal precedents are cited to emphasize that the existence of an emergency, not just the use of the term “emergency,” warrants attachment under Section 146.

The judgment critically examines the orders and the circumstances leading to them. It observes discrepancies between the assertions made in the complaint and police report, highlighting the absence of clear grounds for apprehension of breach of peace.The judgment reiterates the requirement for a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace under Section 145, emphasizing that it must disturb public order, not just personal peace.

It concludes that the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and jurisdictional error, resulting in injustice to the petitioner. Consequently, both orders are quashed, and the petition is allowed. Important Paragraph Numbers of Judgment: (Para 13, 19, 30, 31)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 183 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1651 Gauhati]

Md. Osman Ali Saikia And Anr. Vs. Chand Mahamod Saikia And 2 Ors.

Crl.Pet. 239 of 2021-Decided on 8-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-183-Gauhati.pdf

 

Next Story

Electricity: Outstanding arrears from previous owner

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 – Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 43, 49, 50, 56 – Electricity – Outstanding arrears from previous owner – The petitioner, a partnership firm, sought a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a decision by the Assam Power Distribution Company Limited (APDCL) to deny a new electricity connection to their premises due to outstanding arrears from previous electricity bills.

The court directed interim relief for immediate electricity connection, subject to 50% payment of outstanding dues, with the remaining 50% to be paid upon dismissal of the writ petition.

The petitioner participated in an auction sale of a property and purchased a portion of land with a Business Centre cum Market Complex. They subsequently applied for a new electricity connection, which was denied by APDCL citing outstanding dues.

The court referred to the Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 and the Electricity Act, 2003. It cited a Supreme Court decision (K.C. Ninan vs. Kerala State Electricity Board) regarding the liability of auction purchasers for previous dues in properties sold on ‘as is where is’ basis.

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding the petitioner liable for outstanding electricity dues as per the auction sale agreement. It directed the petitioner to pay the outstanding dues as per the interim order, with APDCL waiving the accrued interest on the principal dues. (Para 15, 16)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1650 Gauhati]

M/S Borah And Companyjiban Phukan Nagar Vs. Assam Power Distribution Company Ltd. And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 989 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

Recent Articles