Juvenile Justice: Right to appeal

(A) Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015  Section 14(3, 15 – Juvenile Justice – Preliminary assessment time limit – Mandatory or Directory This case examines whether the three-month time limit for completing a preliminary assessment under Section 14(3) of the JJ Act is mandatory or directory.

The Court considers the scheme of the Act, the consequences of non-compliance in other sections, and relevant case law on interpreting time limits in statutes. The Court concludes that the time limit in Section 14(3) is directory, not mandatory. However, the Court emphasizes the importance of completing preliminary assessments expeditiously and provides guidance for extending the time limit.(Para 9.5-9.20) 

(B)Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 –  High Court Revisional Power – Maintainability – Remedy of Appeal – This case deals with the maintainability of a revision petition filed before the High Court under the JJ Act. The issue arose when the Board continued proceedings against a Child in Conflict with Law (CCL) despite a final order by the Principal Magistrate directing trial by the Children’s Court.

The Court clarifies that even though a remedy of appeal was available against the Board’s order, the High Court’s revisional power under Section 102 of the JJ Act can be invoked due to the illegality and impropriety of the Board’s actions. The Court highlights the absence of a time limit for filing revisions under Section 102 and its broad scope for ensuring the legality and propriety of orders passed by the Board or Children’s Court.(Para 10.2, 10.3, 10.4)

(C) Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Section 10, 102 – “Children’s Court” vs. “Court of Sessions” –  Anomaly – Appeal – Time Limit – Second Appeal –  The Supreme Court identifies inconsistencies in the JJ Act regarding the terms “Children’s Court” and “Court of Sessions” when referring to appellate authorities.

The Supreme Court clarifies that “Children’s Court” and “Court of Sessions” should be read interchangeably when determining the appropriate appellate forum, with Children’s Court taking precedence if available. The Court recognizes the omission of a time limit for appeals under Section 101(2) and sets a 30-day limit with provisions for condonation of delay based on Section 101(1). The Court acknowledges potential anomalies regarding second appeals under Section 101(4) and Section 102 but leaves a detailed examination for a future case. (Para 11to 14)

(D) Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Section 7 – Juvenile Justice Board Order – Dissent – Principal Magistrate – Majority Opinion – The Supreme Court clarifies the procedure for final orders by the Board under Section 7 of the JJ Act.

  1. A majority opinion is required for final disposal or orders under Section 18(3). In the absence of a majority, the Principal Magistrate’s opinion prevails.
  2. A dissenting opinion without detailed reasons by another member does not invalidate the Principal Magistrate’s order signed on behalf of the Board.
  3. Once a final order is passed by the Principal Magistrate, further proceedings by the Board become void. Para 15.4, 15.5, 15.6 )

(E) Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Section 15 – Juvenile Justice Board Order – Right to appeal – Non consideration of arguments while issuing order – Appelants had right to appeal The Child in Conflict with Law can exercise his right of appeal against order passed by the Board within 10 days and appeal, if any filed, shall be decided by the appellate authority within two months thereafter. (Para 16.1, 16.2)

(F) Practice and Procedure – Quasi-Judicial Proceedings – Failure to mention name of officer signing order – A prevalent issue in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings nationwide. Often, the Presiding Officers, Board Members, or Tribunal officials fail to mention their names when issuing orders. This omission poses challenges in identifying the responsible authority later on, especially if multiple officers share the same name.

While judicial officers have unique identification numbers, this practice is not universal. Therefore, we advocate for a standardized approach. In all orders, including interim ones, issued by Courts, Tribunals, Boards, and quasi-judicial authorities, it is imperative to explicitly mention the names of the Presiding Officers or Members when signed. Additionally, where applicable, their identification numbers should also be included to facilitate clarity and accountability. (Para 17.1, 17.2)

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

2024 STPL(Web) 336 SC

[2024 INSC 387]

Child In Conflict With Law Through His Mother Vs. State Of Karnataka And Another

Criminal Appeal No. of 2024 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3033 of 2024)-Decided on

07-05-2024

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2024-STPLWeb-336-SC-1.pdf

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Breach of peace: It must disturb public order, not just personal peace

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 145, 146- Breach of peace – Emergency situation – Possession dispute – Civil litigation – Non-application of mind – Proceeding under Section 145 – Attachment under Section 146 – The application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenges the orders by the Executive Magistrate, concerning a dispute under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and subsequent attachment under Section 146(1) of the same.

The petitioner contests the legality of both orders, asserting that the initiation of the proceeding and the attachment were illegal and an abuse of process. It’s argued that the jurisdiction under Section 145 can only be invoked if there’s a likelihood of a breach of peace, which wasn’t sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

The petitioner highlights that the attachment order was passed ex-parte without affording them an opportunity to respond, which is contrary to the exceptional circumstances required for such an order. Reference is made to legal precedent discouraging parallel criminal proceedings when a civil litigation is pending regarding property possession, emphasizing the binding nature of civil court decrees.

The respondents counter by claiming entitlement to the land based on a partition deed and subsequent court judgments. They argue that emergency circumstances justified the attachment due to the petitioner’s attempt to construct on disputed land.

Legal precedents are cited to emphasize that the existence of an emergency, not just the use of the term “emergency,” warrants attachment under Section 146.

The judgment critically examines the orders and the circumstances leading to them. It observes discrepancies between the assertions made in the complaint and police report, highlighting the absence of clear grounds for apprehension of breach of peace.The judgment reiterates the requirement for a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace under Section 145, emphasizing that it must disturb public order, not just personal peace.

It concludes that the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and jurisdictional error, resulting in injustice to the petitioner. Consequently, both orders are quashed, and the petition is allowed. Important Paragraph Numbers of Judgment: (Para 13, 19, 30, 31)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 183 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1651 Gauhati]

Md. Osman Ali Saikia And Anr. Vs. Chand Mahamod Saikia And 2 Ors.

Crl.Pet. 239 of 2021-Decided on 8-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-183-Gauhati.pdf

 

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Electricity: Outstanding arrears from previous owner

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 – Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 43, 49, 50, 56 – Electricity – Outstanding arrears from previous owner – The petitioner, a partnership firm, sought a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a decision by the Assam Power Distribution Company Limited (APDCL) to deny a new electricity connection to their premises due to outstanding arrears from previous electricity bills.

The court directed interim relief for immediate electricity connection, subject to 50% payment of outstanding dues, with the remaining 50% to be paid upon dismissal of the writ petition.

The petitioner participated in an auction sale of a property and purchased a portion of land with a Business Centre cum Market Complex. They subsequently applied for a new electricity connection, which was denied by APDCL citing outstanding dues.

The court referred to the Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 and the Electricity Act, 2003. It cited a Supreme Court decision (K.C. Ninan vs. Kerala State Electricity Board) regarding the liability of auction purchasers for previous dues in properties sold on ‘as is where is’ basis.

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding the petitioner liable for outstanding electricity dues as per the auction sale agreement. It directed the petitioner to pay the outstanding dues as per the interim order, with APDCL waiving the accrued interest on the principal dues. (Para 15, 16)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1650 Gauhati]

M/S Borah And Companyjiban Phukan Nagar Vs. Assam Power Distribution Company Ltd. And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 989 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

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Executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules

Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965 – Rule 7 – Refund of Charges – Administrative Order – Statutory Rules – The present writ petition contested an order issued by the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Excise Department, reintroducing establishment charges under Rule 7 of the Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965, despite their abolition by the Assam Bonded Warehouse (Amendment) Rules, 2005.

The Court held that executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules. Citing the principle established in K. Kuppusamy case, it ruled that until a rule is amended, it remains applicable. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside as ultra vires. Regarding refund, relying on Mafatlal Industries Ltd. case, the Court directed the petitioner to present evidence to the Excise Commissioner, who would determine entitlement to refund within four months, considering whether the petitioner passed on the burden of charges to retailers. (Para 15)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 181 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1649 Gauhati]

M/S Centenary Distilleries P Ltd. Vs. State Of Assam And 2 Ors.

WP(C) 2875 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-181-Gauhati-2.pdf

 

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Land Disputes: Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts

Land Disputes – Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts – The instant writ petition challenged a judgment of the Assam Board of Revenue concerning a land dispute. The dispute pertained to a plot of land associated with the Dargah of Pir Saheb. The Civil Court in Title Suit No.176/1978 had decreed in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, declaring their right, title, and possession over the land. The State of Assam was restrained from interference. Subsequently, the Settlement Officer issued a Khatian in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, and a new Dag was created. However, the Assam Board of Revenue, in its impugned judgment, disregarded the Civil Court’s decree and cancelled the Khatian issued to the Petitioners’ predecessor.

This action was deemed contrary to established principles, as Civil Court decrees are binding on Revenue Courts. Therefore, the High Court set aside the impugned judgment, restoring the Khatian to the Petitioners’ predecessor. (Para 12)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 180 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1648 Gauhati]

Sayed Moinuddin Ahmed Vs. State Of Assam And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 4701 of 2013-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-180-Gauhati.pdf

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