Rape: Testimony of the prosecutrix do not inspire confidence

Has been convicted under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) and has been sentenced for seven years of R.I. and Rs.1000/-as fine, with default stipulations. (Para 1)

The school register which was produced in the court shows the date of birth of PW-5 is 04.04.1987, which would make the age of the prosecutrix at the time of the incident to be only 13½ years. However, as per her medical examination and in the doctor’s report, the prosecutrix is sixteen years of age. Moreover, the version of dated 03rd February, 2013. the mother of the prosecutrix herself is that the prosecutrix was sixteen years of age. (Para 4)

Does the testimony of the prosecutrix in the present case inspire confidence? We are afraid it does not. Let us appreciate the facts once again. Although, the first incident of rape is alleged to be of 12.09.2000, the prosecutrix does not disclose this to anyone immediately. She then alleges rape again on two or three different occasions later, though no date and time are disclosed. She only discloses it to her mother after one and half months. It has then come in the evidence led by none other but the prosecution (in the school register submitted in the court by PW-2 i.e., Ram Sahay), that the prosecutrix had attended her classes in the school on 12.09.2000 at Dabwali, where she resides with her parents. We must note that she has alleged rape on the same day at village Sanwat Khera, where she was staying at the relevant time with her sister in her matrimonial house. This seems improbable, if not impossible. The other aspect is the admitted position of the prosecution itself that the FIR was ultimately filed as the initial proposal of marriage was then turned down. All these facts do cast a doubt on the story of the prosecution. (Para 6)

The evidence, as to the age or even rape has not been examined properly by the Trial Court as well as the High Court. Courts must examine each evidence with open mind dispassionately as an accused is to be presumed innocent till proved guilty. In our adversarial system of criminal jurisprudence, the guiding principle shall always be the Blackstone ratio which holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than one innocent be punished. (Para 7)

There are two aspects which ought to have been considered by the Trial Court and the High Court in greater detail than what has been done. The first is the age of the prosecutrix. The age of the prosecutrix has an extremely crucial bearing in the case. (Para 8)

The fact that the prosecution has a case that initially the proposal of the marriage of prosecutrix with the appellant was accepted by the family of the appellant and only when the appellant refused the offer of marriage that the FIR was finally lodged. All these factors point out towards the fact that what was alleged as rape was not rape but could be a consensual act. The only factor which could have made the consensual aspect immaterial and made it a case of ‘rape’ was the age of the prosecutrix. The medical evidence, however, points out that she is more than 16 years of age. The only evidence placed by the prosecution for establishing the DOB as 04.04.1987 i.e., the school register has not been conclusively proved. (Para 10)

Secondly, as to the factum of rape itself, we are not convinced that an offence of rape is made out in this case as it does not meet the ingredients of Rape as defined under Section 375 of the IPC, as we do not find any evidence which may suggest that the appellant, even though had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, it was against her will or without her consent. (Para 11)

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

2023 STPL(Web) 394 SC

[2023 INSC 959]

Manak Chand @ Mani Vs. The State Of Haryana

Criminal Appeal No.2276 of 2014-Decided on 30-10-2023

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Breach of peace: It must disturb public order, not just personal peace

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 145, 146- Breach of peace – Emergency situation – Possession dispute – Civil litigation – Non-application of mind – Proceeding under Section 145 – Attachment under Section 146 – The application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenges the orders by the Executive Magistrate, concerning a dispute under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and subsequent attachment under Section 146(1) of the same.

The petitioner contests the legality of both orders, asserting that the initiation of the proceeding and the attachment were illegal and an abuse of process. It’s argued that the jurisdiction under Section 145 can only be invoked if there’s a likelihood of a breach of peace, which wasn’t sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

The petitioner highlights that the attachment order was passed ex-parte without affording them an opportunity to respond, which is contrary to the exceptional circumstances required for such an order. Reference is made to legal precedent discouraging parallel criminal proceedings when a civil litigation is pending regarding property possession, emphasizing the binding nature of civil court decrees.

The respondents counter by claiming entitlement to the land based on a partition deed and subsequent court judgments. They argue that emergency circumstances justified the attachment due to the petitioner’s attempt to construct on disputed land.

Legal precedents are cited to emphasize that the existence of an emergency, not just the use of the term “emergency,” warrants attachment under Section 146.

The judgment critically examines the orders and the circumstances leading to them. It observes discrepancies between the assertions made in the complaint and police report, highlighting the absence of clear grounds for apprehension of breach of peace.The judgment reiterates the requirement for a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace under Section 145, emphasizing that it must disturb public order, not just personal peace.

It concludes that the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and jurisdictional error, resulting in injustice to the petitioner. Consequently, both orders are quashed, and the petition is allowed. Important Paragraph Numbers of Judgment: (Para 13, 19, 30, 31)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 183 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1651 Gauhati]

Md. Osman Ali Saikia And Anr. Vs. Chand Mahamod Saikia And 2 Ors.

Crl.Pet. 239 of 2021-Decided on 8-11-2023

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Electricity: Outstanding arrears from previous owner

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 – Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 43, 49, 50, 56 – Electricity – Outstanding arrears from previous owner – The petitioner, a partnership firm, sought a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a decision by the Assam Power Distribution Company Limited (APDCL) to deny a new electricity connection to their premises due to outstanding arrears from previous electricity bills.

The court directed interim relief for immediate electricity connection, subject to 50% payment of outstanding dues, with the remaining 50% to be paid upon dismissal of the writ petition.

The petitioner participated in an auction sale of a property and purchased a portion of land with a Business Centre cum Market Complex. They subsequently applied for a new electricity connection, which was denied by APDCL citing outstanding dues.

The court referred to the Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 and the Electricity Act, 2003. It cited a Supreme Court decision (K.C. Ninan vs. Kerala State Electricity Board) regarding the liability of auction purchasers for previous dues in properties sold on ‘as is where is’ basis.

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding the petitioner liable for outstanding electricity dues as per the auction sale agreement. It directed the petitioner to pay the outstanding dues as per the interim order, with APDCL waiving the accrued interest on the principal dues. (Para 15, 16)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1650 Gauhati]

M/S Borah And Companyjiban Phukan Nagar Vs. Assam Power Distribution Company Ltd. And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 989 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

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Executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules

Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965 – Rule 7 – Refund of Charges – Administrative Order – Statutory Rules – The present writ petition contested an order issued by the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Excise Department, reintroducing establishment charges under Rule 7 of the Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965, despite their abolition by the Assam Bonded Warehouse (Amendment) Rules, 2005.

The Court held that executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules. Citing the principle established in K. Kuppusamy case, it ruled that until a rule is amended, it remains applicable. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside as ultra vires. Regarding refund, relying on Mafatlal Industries Ltd. case, the Court directed the petitioner to present evidence to the Excise Commissioner, who would determine entitlement to refund within four months, considering whether the petitioner passed on the burden of charges to retailers. (Para 15)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 181 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1649 Gauhati]

M/S Centenary Distilleries P Ltd. Vs. State Of Assam And 2 Ors.

WP(C) 2875 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

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Land Disputes: Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts

Land Disputes – Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts – The instant writ petition challenged a judgment of the Assam Board of Revenue concerning a land dispute. The dispute pertained to a plot of land associated with the Dargah of Pir Saheb. The Civil Court in Title Suit No.176/1978 had decreed in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, declaring their right, title, and possession over the land. The State of Assam was restrained from interference. Subsequently, the Settlement Officer issued a Khatian in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, and a new Dag was created. However, the Assam Board of Revenue, in its impugned judgment, disregarded the Civil Court’s decree and cancelled the Khatian issued to the Petitioners’ predecessor.

This action was deemed contrary to established principles, as Civil Court decrees are binding on Revenue Courts. Therefore, the High Court set aside the impugned judgment, restoring the Khatian to the Petitioners’ predecessor. (Para 12)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 180 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1648 Gauhati]

Sayed Moinuddin Ahmed Vs. State Of Assam And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 4701 of 2013-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-180-Gauhati.pdf

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