Urban Land Ceiling: Possession of Surplus land

By which the writ petition of the first respondent[The original petitioner] was disposed of by declaring that the land in dispute shall continue to be in possession of the original petitioner and would not be treated as surplus land as he is entitled to the benefits of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999[The Repeal Act, 1999]. In addition to the above, a direction was issued to the Competent Authority (Urban Ceiling) Saharanpur[The Competent Authority Facts/Pleadings] to ensure that the name of the original petitioner is restored in the revenue records (Para 1)

In the instant case, the original petitioner had knowledge that 5499.20 square meter of his land was declared surplus by order dated 26.11.1977. Yet, this order was challenged through writ petition not before the year 1986. What happened in between is not disclosed. Even if we assume that the third writ petition was based on a separate cause of action, still there could have been a whisper as to what was the reason for such long delay in filing the first writ petition, particularly when the original petitioner was throughout aware of State’s case that possession had been taken in the year 1979 after publication of the vesting notification. The only explanation, if any, for this delay can be found in paragraph 4 of the writ petition, where it is stated that order dated 26.11.1977 was ex-parte. Even if we accept that order dated 26.11.1977 was ex parte, there is no disclosure in the writ petition as to when it came to the knowledge of the original petitioner. (Para 31)

What is even more interesting is that in the third writ petition there is no specific statement that recital in the order, dated 27.03.1987, with regard to taking of possession is incorrect. Though it is stated in paragraph 9 of the writ petition that under orders dated 26.11.1977 and 27.3.1987 possession was never taken. It be noted that possession was not taken under order dated 27.03.1987. Rather, it is alleged to have been taken pursuant to notification dated 15.1.1979. Thus, by the time third writ petition was filed, a vesting notification had already been published in the official gazette on 15.1.1979. Further, the Competent Authority’s order dated 27.03.1987 categorically stated that State has taken possession of the land. Yet, there is no statement in the writ petition that order dated 27.03.1987 bears an incorrect recital with regard to taking of possession. For all the reasons above, in our view, the High Court ought to have been circumspect about the claim of the original petitioner that possession was not taken right up to the enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999. (Para 32)

As far as documentary material placed by the original petitioner is concerned, we notice that no Khatauni or Khasra extract of the period starting from 1979 up to 1987 was filed. The third writ petition annexes Khatauni or Khasra extracts of the period 1405 to 1417 Fasli, that is of the year 1998 to the year 2010. In addition to those documents, some revenue receipts of the period starting from 1989 have been filed. According to the State, possession of the surplus land was taken in the year 1979. If it were so, even if the petitioner entered into possession anytime thereafter, may be on the strength of the ex parte interim order dated 20.08.1987, the same would not defeat the right of the State in view of decision of this Court in Indore Development Authority (supra) where, in paragraph 258 of the judgment, it was held that once title of the land vests in the State, consequent to acquisition and taking of possession, even if the landholder has retained possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken by the State, he is just a trespasser and his possession, if any, would be on behalf of the owner i.e., the State. (Para 33)

At this stage, we may notice to reject another argument made on behalf of the respondent, which is, that the High Court had granted an interim order, dated 20.08.1987, protecting original petitioner’s possession, therefore, it is to assumed that possession was not taken from him by that time. No doubt, the original petitioner succeeded in obtaining an ex parte interim order but there is no material on record to suggest that this interim order was confirmed after considering State’s objection. Moreover, if possession had been taken prior to the grant of interim order, as is the case of the appellants, and while disposing of the writ petition the question of possession was left open, the interim order would not, in any way, be conclusive to prove continuity of possession. In these circumstances as also that no documentary evidence was filed regarding original petitioner’s possession between the years 1979 and 1987, in our view, the interim order did not carry much evidentiary value to prove that possession was not taken prior to the year 1987. (Para 34)

In view of the discussion above and having regard to the following:

(a) that there was a serious dispute with regard to taking of possession of the surplus land;

(b) that there was a delay of about seven years in filing the first writ petition from the date when possession was allegedly taken by the State, after publication of the vesting notification;

(c) that no documentary evidence such as a Khasra or Khatauni of the period between alleged date of taking possession and filing of the first writ petition was filed by the original petitioner;

(d) that in the earlier two rounds of litigation, the High Court refrained from deciding the issue of possession of the surplus land even though that issue had arisen directly between the parties; and

(e) that infraction of the prescribed statutory procedure for taking possession cannot be the sole basis to discard State’s claim of possession, when it is stated to have been taken long before the date the issue is raised, we are of the considered view that the High Court should have refrained from deciding the issue with regard to taking of actual possession of the surplus land prior to the cut off date specified in the Repeal Act, 1999. Instead, the writ petitioner should have been relegated to a suit. (Para 35)

In view of the above conclusion, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. The first respondent’s writ petition is dismissed without prejudice to his right to institute a suit. (Para 36 )

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

2023 STPL(Web) 340 SC

[2023 INSC 906]

State Of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Ehsan & Anr.

Civil Appeal No. 5721 of 2023 (Arising Out Of Slp (C) No. 20137 of 2023)-Decided on 13-10-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2023-STPLWeb-340-SC.pdf

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Breach of peace: It must disturb public order, not just personal peace

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 145, 146- Breach of peace – Emergency situation – Possession dispute – Civil litigation – Non-application of mind – Proceeding under Section 145 – Attachment under Section 146 – The application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenges the orders by the Executive Magistrate, concerning a dispute under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and subsequent attachment under Section 146(1) of the same.

The petitioner contests the legality of both orders, asserting that the initiation of the proceeding and the attachment were illegal and an abuse of process. It’s argued that the jurisdiction under Section 145 can only be invoked if there’s a likelihood of a breach of peace, which wasn’t sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

The petitioner highlights that the attachment order was passed ex-parte without affording them an opportunity to respond, which is contrary to the exceptional circumstances required for such an order. Reference is made to legal precedent discouraging parallel criminal proceedings when a civil litigation is pending regarding property possession, emphasizing the binding nature of civil court decrees.

The respondents counter by claiming entitlement to the land based on a partition deed and subsequent court judgments. They argue that emergency circumstances justified the attachment due to the petitioner’s attempt to construct on disputed land.

Legal precedents are cited to emphasize that the existence of an emergency, not just the use of the term “emergency,” warrants attachment under Section 146.

The judgment critically examines the orders and the circumstances leading to them. It observes discrepancies between the assertions made in the complaint and police report, highlighting the absence of clear grounds for apprehension of breach of peace.The judgment reiterates the requirement for a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace under Section 145, emphasizing that it must disturb public order, not just personal peace.

It concludes that the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and jurisdictional error, resulting in injustice to the petitioner. Consequently, both orders are quashed, and the petition is allowed. Important Paragraph Numbers of Judgment: (Para 13, 19, 30, 31)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 183 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1651 Gauhati]

Md. Osman Ali Saikia And Anr. Vs. Chand Mahamod Saikia And 2 Ors.

Crl.Pet. 239 of 2021-Decided on 8-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-183-Gauhati.pdf

 

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Electricity: Outstanding arrears from previous owner

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 – Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 43, 49, 50, 56 – Electricity – Outstanding arrears from previous owner – The petitioner, a partnership firm, sought a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a decision by the Assam Power Distribution Company Limited (APDCL) to deny a new electricity connection to their premises due to outstanding arrears from previous electricity bills.

The court directed interim relief for immediate electricity connection, subject to 50% payment of outstanding dues, with the remaining 50% to be paid upon dismissal of the writ petition.

The petitioner participated in an auction sale of a property and purchased a portion of land with a Business Centre cum Market Complex. They subsequently applied for a new electricity connection, which was denied by APDCL citing outstanding dues.

The court referred to the Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 and the Electricity Act, 2003. It cited a Supreme Court decision (K.C. Ninan vs. Kerala State Electricity Board) regarding the liability of auction purchasers for previous dues in properties sold on ‘as is where is’ basis.

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding the petitioner liable for outstanding electricity dues as per the auction sale agreement. It directed the petitioner to pay the outstanding dues as per the interim order, with APDCL waiving the accrued interest on the principal dues. (Para 15, 16)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1650 Gauhati]

M/S Borah And Companyjiban Phukan Nagar Vs. Assam Power Distribution Company Ltd. And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 989 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

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Executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules

Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965 – Rule 7 – Refund of Charges – Administrative Order – Statutory Rules – The present writ petition contested an order issued by the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Excise Department, reintroducing establishment charges under Rule 7 of the Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965, despite their abolition by the Assam Bonded Warehouse (Amendment) Rules, 2005.

The Court held that executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules. Citing the principle established in K. Kuppusamy case, it ruled that until a rule is amended, it remains applicable. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside as ultra vires. Regarding refund, relying on Mafatlal Industries Ltd. case, the Court directed the petitioner to present evidence to the Excise Commissioner, who would determine entitlement to refund within four months, considering whether the petitioner passed on the burden of charges to retailers. (Para 15)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 181 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1649 Gauhati]

M/S Centenary Distilleries P Ltd. Vs. State Of Assam And 2 Ors.

WP(C) 2875 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-181-Gauhati-2.pdf

 

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Land Disputes: Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts

Land Disputes – Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts – The instant writ petition challenged a judgment of the Assam Board of Revenue concerning a land dispute. The dispute pertained to a plot of land associated with the Dargah of Pir Saheb. The Civil Court in Title Suit No.176/1978 had decreed in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, declaring their right, title, and possession over the land. The State of Assam was restrained from interference. Subsequently, the Settlement Officer issued a Khatian in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, and a new Dag was created. However, the Assam Board of Revenue, in its impugned judgment, disregarded the Civil Court’s decree and cancelled the Khatian issued to the Petitioners’ predecessor.

This action was deemed contrary to established principles, as Civil Court decrees are binding on Revenue Courts. Therefore, the High Court set aside the impugned judgment, restoring the Khatian to the Petitioners’ predecessor. (Para 12)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 180 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1648 Gauhati]

Sayed Moinuddin Ahmed Vs. State Of Assam And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 4701 of 2013-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-180-Gauhati.pdf

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