Consumer Law: Applicable on Military Hospital

Challenges an order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi[In Consumer Complaint No. 647 of 2017.] (hereafter, “Commission”). The application by – CPL Ashish Kumar Chauhan (hereafter, “appellant”) for compensation was dismissed by the Commission (Para 1)

He was, therefore, admitted to 171 MH, Samba. On 10.07.2002, whilst undergoing treatment at the aforementioned facility, Lt. Col Devika Bhat, posted as MO (Physician), advised him to undergo a blood transfusion. One unit of blood was therefore, transfused to the appellant, for the management of severe symptomatic anemia. The said military hospital facility did not have a license for a blood bank but has been termed by the Indian Army as an “ad-hoc blood bank”. (Para 3)

The appellant endeavored to trace the source of the virus and realized that the transfusion of virus infected blood at 171 MH Samba in 2002 was the cause of his condition. After the detection of the HIV virus, the first medical board was held on 11.06.2014 and as per the findings of the Medical Board, the infection with HIV was made – “non-attributable to service”. (Para 5)

The case sheet shows that though on 10.07.2002, one unit of blood was transfused to the appellant, but whether Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) test was conducted before infusing the blood in the appellant’s body was conspicuously absent from that medical case sheet. (Para 6)

Thus, Medical Boards were held on 12.12.2014 and 24.06.2015 and in terms of the medical board proceedings, the appellant’s disability was attributable to service owing transfusion of one unit of blood at 171 Military Hospital on 10th July 2002. His disability and the disability qualifying elements for the purpose of disability pension were also assessed by the medical board @ 30% for two years. By letter dated 22.03.2016[Letter No RO/3305/3/Med.], PCDA (P) Allahabad endorsed the findings of the Release Medical Board and agreed with the sanctioned disability pension. (Para 7)

The Appellate Authority by its order[Dated 12.06.2018.] rejected the appeal and observed that best efforts were made by the respondent authorities to trace the appellant’s medical document and even admission and discharge documents were supplied to him whenever available with the respondent. (Para 11)

Meanwhile, proceedings of the Court of Inquiry (CoI) were held on 01.07.2018 to investigate circumstances under which the appellant was transfused blood at the 171 Military Hospital, Samba and the CoI concluded by its findings that blood provided to the appellant was duly screened for the HIV and other markers in vogue at the relevant time and on examination of all the witnesses, no negligence or lapse can be attributed on the part of physician or the support staff at the said military facility. (Para 12)

The Commission dismissed the appellant’s complaint and observed that no expert opinion was adduced or proved before it for establishing medical negligence during the blood transfusion against the respondent/opposite parties. It was also observed that no reason existed for the opposite parties to deny sharing of the appellant’s medical records, and in fact, the discharge certificate, when found was duly supplied to the appellant. (Para 15)

The amici and the appellant argued that it is the onus of the respondents to establish that the two armed forces (Indian Army and IAF) were not negligent, because of the direct acts of their doctors and the hospital. Reference to a letter dated 12.06.2018 was made in which the Respondent No 1 admitted in writing that 171 MH was not authorized to operate any blood bank and therefore, no pathologist was authorized or appointed at the facility. The appellant also referred to an RTI reply[Letter no. 4180/Adm./RTI/2019, dated 3.7.2019.] stating that “there was no transfusion medicine expert (doctor) available and no blood grouping and cross-matching test report is available”. (Para 19)

The amici further argued that the respondents failed to provide any material evidence, such as the ELISA/HIV test and blood compatibility report of the blood unit that was transfused to the appellant in 2002, to demonstrate that they followed their own exhibited ‘Transfusion Medicine Technical Manual and Standard Operating Procedures’ that is to say that before any blood transfusion took place, it was compulsory to conduct an ELISA test of the blood unit to determine whether it was HIV infected or not, ensuring that it is safe for transfusion to HIV negative person. (Para 20)

The amici and the appellant submitted that the respondents failed to secure a written informed consent bearing his signature both before the Commission as well as this court. As a consequence, the HIV negative report dated 5.3.2014 cannot be accepted. (Para 21)

It was further argued that since the respondents have explicitly admitted that the appellant contracted his disability due to the blood transfusion, there is no need for further deliberation on the matter, as per Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; an admitted fact need not be proven. (Para 24)

The first question that the court has to consider is whether the appellant’s case is under the CPA 1986. The respondents contend that the appellant cannot claim to be a consumer, and the medical facilities extended to him, through the IAF and army hospitals, do not fall within the ambit of the CPA 1986, because all armed force personnel are required, as part of their duties, to show fitness, and are subjected to periodic mandatory medical tests. The terms and conditions of engagement of armed forces personnel, and the army/IAF ecosystem are geared to ensure the fitness and sound medical shape of its personnel. Therefore, even the doctors and other personnel within the medical system are subjected to army/IAF discipline and rules and regulations. In these circumstances, Army hospitals and similar facilities cannot be considered as covered by CPA 1986. (Para 43)

Section 1 (4) of CPA 1986, (which was in force when the appellant preferred his complaint) reads as follows:

“1. Short title, extent, commencement and applications:

(4) Save as otherwise expressly provided by the Central Government by notifications, this Act shall apply to all goods and services.” (Para 49)

In India, medical negligence is said to have been established by an aggrieved plaintiff or complainant when it is shown that the doctor or medical professional was in want of, or did not fulfil the standard of care required of her or him, as such professional, reasonably skilled with the science available at the relevant time. In other words, a doctor is not negligent if what he has done would be endorsed by a responsible body of medical opinion in the relevant speciality at the material time. This test is known as the Bolam test[So called, due to the case: Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee 1957(2) All.ER 118.] and has gained widespread acceptance and application in Indian jurisprudence. (Para 67)

When constituted or read together, all these lapses-which may be seen singly as small or minuscule, add up to one thing: lack of adherence to or breach of the relevant standards of care reasonably expected from a medical establishment. Therefore, whilst pinpointed accountability of one or some individuals is not possible, nevertheless the systemic failure in ensuring a safe transfusion of blood to the appellant, is the only irresistible inference. These facts establish medical negligence, and therefore, vicarious liability on the part of the IAF and the Indian Army. The former is the appellant’s immediate employer; the latter was the organization controlling and in charge of 166 MH and 177 MH. (Para 70)

All these facts and circumstances, in the opinion of this court, prove and establish that by reasonable standards of evidence, the appellant has justified the invocation of the principle of res ipsa loquitor. (Para 72)

The above analysis leads this court to the conclusion that the condition in which the appellant found himself, was the direct consequence of the two hospital-establishments and their breach of the standards of care, resulting in the transfusion of the HIV positive infected blood into the appellant, which was the causative factor. The necessary foundational facts, to hold that the application of res ipsa loquitur was warranted, were proved in all detail. The respondents failed to discharge the onus which fell upon them, to establish that due care was in fact exercised and all necessary care standards, applicable at the time, were complied with. As a result, it is held that the respondents are liable to compensate the appellant for the injuries suffered by him, that are to be reckoned in monetary terms. (Para 73)

As a result of the above discussion, it is held that the appellant is entitled to compensation, calculated at Rs. 1,54,73,000/- (Rupees one crore fifty four lakhs seventy three thousand only) towards compensation on account of medical negligence of the respondents, who are held liable, for the injury suffered by the appellant. It is also held that since individual liability cannot be assigned, the respondent organizations (IAF and Indian Army) are held vicariously liable, jointly, and severally, to the above extent. The amount shall be paid to the appellant within six weeks by the IAF, his employer (Para 92)

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

2023 STPL(Web) 298 SC

[2023 INSC 857]

Cpl Ashish Kumar Chauhan (Retd.) Vs. Commanding Officer & Ors.

Civil Appeal No(S). 7175 of 2021-Decided on 26-9-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2023-STPLWeb-298-SC.pdf

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Breach of peace: It must disturb public order, not just personal peace

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 145, 146- Breach of peace – Emergency situation – Possession dispute – Civil litigation – Non-application of mind – Proceeding under Section 145 – Attachment under Section 146 – The application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenges the orders by the Executive Magistrate, concerning a dispute under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and subsequent attachment under Section 146(1) of the same.

The petitioner contests the legality of both orders, asserting that the initiation of the proceeding and the attachment were illegal and an abuse of process. It’s argued that the jurisdiction under Section 145 can only be invoked if there’s a likelihood of a breach of peace, which wasn’t sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

The petitioner highlights that the attachment order was passed ex-parte without affording them an opportunity to respond, which is contrary to the exceptional circumstances required for such an order. Reference is made to legal precedent discouraging parallel criminal proceedings when a civil litigation is pending regarding property possession, emphasizing the binding nature of civil court decrees.

The respondents counter by claiming entitlement to the land based on a partition deed and subsequent court judgments. They argue that emergency circumstances justified the attachment due to the petitioner’s attempt to construct on disputed land.

Legal precedents are cited to emphasize that the existence of an emergency, not just the use of the term “emergency,” warrants attachment under Section 146.

The judgment critically examines the orders and the circumstances leading to them. It observes discrepancies between the assertions made in the complaint and police report, highlighting the absence of clear grounds for apprehension of breach of peace.The judgment reiterates the requirement for a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace under Section 145, emphasizing that it must disturb public order, not just personal peace.

It concludes that the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and jurisdictional error, resulting in injustice to the petitioner. Consequently, both orders are quashed, and the petition is allowed. Important Paragraph Numbers of Judgment: (Para 13, 19, 30, 31)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 183 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1651 Gauhati]

Md. Osman Ali Saikia And Anr. Vs. Chand Mahamod Saikia And 2 Ors.

Crl.Pet. 239 of 2021-Decided on 8-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-183-Gauhati.pdf

 

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Electricity: Outstanding arrears from previous owner

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 – Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 43, 49, 50, 56 – Electricity – Outstanding arrears from previous owner – The petitioner, a partnership firm, sought a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a decision by the Assam Power Distribution Company Limited (APDCL) to deny a new electricity connection to their premises due to outstanding arrears from previous electricity bills.

The court directed interim relief for immediate electricity connection, subject to 50% payment of outstanding dues, with the remaining 50% to be paid upon dismissal of the writ petition.

The petitioner participated in an auction sale of a property and purchased a portion of land with a Business Centre cum Market Complex. They subsequently applied for a new electricity connection, which was denied by APDCL citing outstanding dues.

The court referred to the Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 and the Electricity Act, 2003. It cited a Supreme Court decision (K.C. Ninan vs. Kerala State Electricity Board) regarding the liability of auction purchasers for previous dues in properties sold on ‘as is where is’ basis.

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding the petitioner liable for outstanding electricity dues as per the auction sale agreement. It directed the petitioner to pay the outstanding dues as per the interim order, with APDCL waiving the accrued interest on the principal dues. (Para 15, 16)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1650 Gauhati]

M/S Borah And Companyjiban Phukan Nagar Vs. Assam Power Distribution Company Ltd. And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 989 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

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Executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules

Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965 – Rule 7 – Refund of Charges – Administrative Order – Statutory Rules – The present writ petition contested an order issued by the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Excise Department, reintroducing establishment charges under Rule 7 of the Assam Bonded Warehouse Rules, 1965, despite their abolition by the Assam Bonded Warehouse (Amendment) Rules, 2005.

The Court held that executive instructions cannot nullify statutory rules. Citing the principle established in K. Kuppusamy case, it ruled that until a rule is amended, it remains applicable. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside as ultra vires. Regarding refund, relying on Mafatlal Industries Ltd. case, the Court directed the petitioner to present evidence to the Excise Commissioner, who would determine entitlement to refund within four months, considering whether the petitioner passed on the burden of charges to retailers. (Para 15)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 181 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1649 Gauhati]

M/S Centenary Distilleries P Ltd. Vs. State Of Assam And 2 Ors.

WP(C) 2875 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-181-Gauhati-2.pdf

 

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Land Disputes: Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts

Land Disputes – Binding nature of Civil Court’s decree on Revenue Courts – The instant writ petition challenged a judgment of the Assam Board of Revenue concerning a land dispute. The dispute pertained to a plot of land associated with the Dargah of Pir Saheb. The Civil Court in Title Suit No.176/1978 had decreed in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, declaring their right, title, and possession over the land. The State of Assam was restrained from interference. Subsequently, the Settlement Officer issued a Khatian in favor of the Petitioners’ predecessor, and a new Dag was created. However, the Assam Board of Revenue, in its impugned judgment, disregarded the Civil Court’s decree and cancelled the Khatian issued to the Petitioners’ predecessor.

This action was deemed contrary to established principles, as Civil Court decrees are binding on Revenue Courts. Therefore, the High Court set aside the impugned judgment, restoring the Khatian to the Petitioners’ predecessor. (Para 12)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 180 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1648 Gauhati]

Sayed Moinuddin Ahmed Vs. State Of Assam And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 4701 of 2013-Decided on 7-11-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-STPLWeb-180-Gauhati.pdf

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