Industrial Dispute: Standing order have statutory force –override any contract

Relying upon Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 it was held that there is no retrenchment since the nonrenewal of fixed term contract did not amount it to be so as provided under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the said Act. Thus, there was no question of re-employment of the concerned workmen. (Para 2)

Which is the Appropriate Authority empowered to issue the Standing Order(s) under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as ‘The Act’)? – Whether private agreement/settlement between the parties would override the Standing Order? (Para 3)

Insofar as the Respondent Company is concerned, the appropriate Government is clearly not the Central, but the State Government since the Respondent is not, within the meaning of Section 2(b), under the control of the Central Government. The present case falls under the latter part of the section; thus, the appropriate Government means the State Government. The Bombay Model Standing Order would be applicable to the parties. (Para 5)

On various occasions, this Court has observed that the certified standing orders have a statutory force. The Standing Order implies a contract between the employer and the workman. Therefore, the employer and workman cannot enter into a contract overriding the statutory contract embodied in the certified Standing Orders. (Para 7)

The High Court, while upholding the order of the CGIT, held that the mere completion of 240 days would not entitle the members to claim permanency under the Model Standing Order given the settlement and, more specifically, Clause 18 thereof. It further observed that the Model Standing Order is not a statutory provision but, at best, a statutorily imposed condition of service that a settlement or award can alter. (Para 13)

On all counts, we respectfully disagree with the findings of the Tribunal and the High Court. (Para 14)

A cumulative reading of aforesaid clauses reveals that a workman who has worked for 240 days in an establishment would be entitled to be made permanent, and no contract/settlement which abridges such a right can be agreed upon, let alone be binding. The Act being the beneficial legislation provides that any agreement/contract/settlement wherein the rights of the employees are waived off would not override the Standing Orders. (Para 16)

Learned counsel for the Respondent has appraised this Court of the insolvency proceedings initiated against the Respondent Company under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. However, we refrain from commenting thereupon, for it does not bear any consequence to the present lis and neither was it a subject matter of adjudication before the courts/authorities below. (Para 17)

Given the above discussions, we allow the appeal holding the Appellant-Union entitled to all benefits per the Bombay Model Standing Order. The award dated 30.03.2017 passed by CGIT in Reference No. CGIT-2/56 of 2013 and the judgment dated 10.01.2018 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 2657 of 2017 affirming the same are quashed and set aside. (Para 18)

SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT

Citation: 2023 STPL(Web) 86 SC

Bharatiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh Vs. M/S. Jet Airways Ltd.

Civil Appeal No. 4404 of 2023 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 14886 of 2023)-Decided on 25-7-2023

https://stpllaw.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/2023-STPLWeb-86-SC.pdf

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Contract: Demurrage not allowed

Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Demurrage – Contractual Liability – Liquidated Damages – Breach of Contract – Adjudication of Claims – The petitioner, engaged in transportation business, participated in a competitive bidding process and was awarded a transportation contract by the Food Corporation of India (FCI). Dispute arose when FCI began deducting demurrage charges from petitioner’s bills for alleged delay in unloading wagons, despite petitioner not being responsible for wagon unloading.

The petitioner contested the deduction, arguing that as per the contract, demurrage cannot be unilaterally imposed by FCI unless liability is determined through due process of law.

The Court examined the relevant contract clause, which allowed FCI to recover costs, damages, etc., due to contractor’s negligence, but found it did not specifically authorize demurrage deduction.

Relying on the Supreme Court precedent in Food Corporation of India vs. Abhijit Paul, the Court held that demurrage could not be levied on the petitioner as the contract did not assign the task of wagon unloading to them.

The absence of a liquidated damages clause in the contract further supported the Court’s decision. The Court directed FCI to refund the deducted demurrage amount and refrain from further deductions, unless liability is determined through lawful adjudication.The order did not prevent FCI from seeking damages through proper legal channels. (Para 12, 15, 18, 22)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 184 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1652 Gauhati]

Hi Speed Logistics Pvt Ltd. Vs. Food Corporation Of India And 5 Ors.

WP(C) 6317 of 2022-Decided on 8-11-2023

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Breach of peace: It must disturb public order, not just personal peace

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 145, 146- Breach of peace – Emergency situation – Possession dispute – Civil litigation – Non-application of mind – Proceeding under Section 145 – Attachment under Section 146 – The application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenges the orders by the Executive Magistrate, concerning a dispute under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and subsequent attachment under Section 146(1) of the same.

The petitioner contests the legality of both orders, asserting that the initiation of the proceeding and the attachment were illegal and an abuse of process. It’s argued that the jurisdiction under Section 145 can only be invoked if there’s a likelihood of a breach of peace, which wasn’t sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

The petitioner highlights that the attachment order was passed ex-parte without affording them an opportunity to respond, which is contrary to the exceptional circumstances required for such an order. Reference is made to legal precedent discouraging parallel criminal proceedings when a civil litigation is pending regarding property possession, emphasizing the binding nature of civil court decrees.

The respondents counter by claiming entitlement to the land based on a partition deed and subsequent court judgments. They argue that emergency circumstances justified the attachment due to the petitioner’s attempt to construct on disputed land.

Legal precedents are cited to emphasize that the existence of an emergency, not just the use of the term “emergency,” warrants attachment under Section 146.

The judgment critically examines the orders and the circumstances leading to them. It observes discrepancies between the assertions made in the complaint and police report, highlighting the absence of clear grounds for apprehension of breach of peace.The judgment reiterates the requirement for a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace under Section 145, emphasizing that it must disturb public order, not just personal peace.

It concludes that the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and jurisdictional error, resulting in injustice to the petitioner. Consequently, both orders are quashed, and the petition is allowed. Important Paragraph Numbers of Judgment: (Para 13, 19, 30, 31)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 183 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1651 Gauhati]

Md. Osman Ali Saikia And Anr. Vs. Chand Mahamod Saikia And 2 Ors.

Crl.Pet. 239 of 2021-Decided on 8-11-2023

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Electricity: Outstanding arrears from previous owner

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 – Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 43, 49, 50, 56 – Electricity – Outstanding arrears from previous owner – The petitioner, a partnership firm, sought a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a decision by the Assam Power Distribution Company Limited (APDCL) to deny a new electricity connection to their premises due to outstanding arrears from previous electricity bills.

The court directed interim relief for immediate electricity connection, subject to 50% payment of outstanding dues, with the remaining 50% to be paid upon dismissal of the writ petition.

The petitioner participated in an auction sale of a property and purchased a portion of land with a Business Centre cum Market Complex. They subsequently applied for a new electricity connection, which was denied by APDCL citing outstanding dues.

The court referred to the Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission [Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters] Regulations, 2004 and the Electricity Act, 2003. It cited a Supreme Court decision (K.C. Ninan vs. Kerala State Electricity Board) regarding the liability of auction purchasers for previous dues in properties sold on ‘as is where is’ basis.

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding the petitioner liable for outstanding electricity dues as per the auction sale agreement. It directed the petitioner to pay the outstanding dues as per the interim order, with APDCL waiving the accrued interest on the principal dues. (Para 15, 16)

GAUHATI HIGH COURT

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

[2024 STPL 1650 Gauhati]

M/S Borah And Companyjiban Phukan Nagar Vs. Assam Power Distribution Company Ltd. And 3 Ors.

WP(C) 989 of 2014-Decided on 7-11-2023

2023 STPL(Web) 182 Gauhati

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