Upholding Arbitral Autonomy and Restricting Judicial Interference

In this case, the Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. (RVUNL) filed a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution to challenge a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court rendered under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The High Court had reversed a Commercial Court order that had set aside an Arbitral Tribunal’s award and additional award in favor of Parsa Kente Collieries Limited (PKCL). The underlying dispute arose from claims regarding coal mining and delivery operations under a Coal Mining and Delivery Agreement (CMDA) following the cancellation and reallocation of the PEKB coal block. The Supreme Court examined the limited parameters of judicial review under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act as well as the discretionary scope under Article 136. The Court held that the Commercial Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by reappraising evidence and substituting its own plausible views for those of the Arbitral Tribunal, and that the High Court had correctly restored the arbitral awards. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, reinforcing the principle of minimal judicial intervention in arbitral matters.

  • Background and Arbitral Proceedings: PKCL initiated arbitration against RVUNL concerning nine distinct claims arising from the operation and reallocation of the PEKB coal block. The Sole Arbitrator passed an Award on January 15, 2021, allowing several claims in full or part, and subsequently passed an Additional Award on July 5, 2021, allowing a claim for land acquisition costs.
  • Commercial Court’s Interference: Under Section 34 of the Act, the Commercial Court upheld findings on certain claims but set aside findings on multiple other claims (including stamp duty, legal fees, project-affected families, and the vocational training centre), and set aside the Additional Award on limitation grounds. Finding it lacked modification powers, it set aside both awards in their entirety.
  • High Court’s Appellate Ruling: On appeal under Section 37, the Rajasthan High Court held that the Commercial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by treating the proceedings like a regular appeal and reappraising evidence, thereby restoring both the main Award and the Additional Award.
  • Scope of Judicial Review under Sections 34 and 37: The Supreme Court reiterated that courts exercising powers under Sections 34 and 37 must not act as regular appellate courts. An arbitral award cannot be set aside merely because an alternative view is possible or because of an erroneous application of law, unless it suffers from patent illegality or perversity.
  • Evaluation of Claims: The Supreme Court conducted a claim-by-claim scrutiny and found that the Arbitral Tribunal’s interpretations of the CMDA and Supplementary Agreement were plausible, well-reasoned, and free from patent illegality. It held that the Commercial Court erred in interfering with the tribunal’s findings, and that the High Court’s restoration of the awards was legally sound.
  • Final Order: The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, emphasizing respect for the autonomy, finality, and minimal judicial interference intended under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

2026 INSC 1234

Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. v. Parsa Kente Collieries Limited (D.O.J. 16.11.2026)

Loading Viewer...

Next Story

Limits on Section 37 Court Modifying Arbitral Awards

The Supreme Court of India held that a Division Bench exercising narrow jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, could not modify an arbitral award to 50% and reduce interest to 6% merely because additional work claims exceeded 70% of the original contract value and “shocked the conscience” of the Court. Setting aside the impugned Section 37 judgment, the Court restored the arbitral award dated 03.11.2003 in full.

Background and Procedural History

  • The contractor was entrusted with dredging/evacuation work for the approach channel and basin of a shore-based pilot station at Sagar Island, completed by 17.04.2001 when inaugurated by the Chairman of the Port Trust of Calcutta, despite delay due to force majeure conditions.
  • Additional dredging work became necessary due to force majeure weather, soil-data mismatch, siltation, and lack of protective walls, reflected in the Port Trust’s letter dated 19.07.2000.
  • An arbitral award was passed on 03.11.2003 regarding the additional work, which was affirmed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by a Single Judge.
  • On the awarder’s appeal under Section 37, a Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta recorded that the award was not based on “no evidence” or “insufficient evidence,” nor perverse, patently illegal, or contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, yet modified it to 50% of the quantified amount with 6% interest from 08.02.2002 because additional work claims exceeded 70% of the original contract value.
  • Cross-appeals were filed before the Supreme Court by the contractor (seeking restoration of the award) and the Port Trust (seeking complete setting aside or, alternatively, upholding the modified award).

Key Issues

  • Whether the High Court Division Bench acted within its Section 37 jurisdiction in modifying the arbitral award based on the quantum of additional work exceeding 70% of the original contract and “shocking the conscience” of the Court.
  • Whether the absence of a formal completion certificate or the public/government status of the awarder justified interference or partial severance.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • Narrow Scope Under Section 37: Relying on Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI and Somdatt Builders-NCC-NEC (JV) v. NHAI, the Court held that “shocking the conscience” or conflict with basic notions of morality or justice requires substantive, blatant grounds—not mere invocation of phrases because additional work exceeded 70% of the original contract or re-adjudication of evidence/merits.
  • Evidentiary Basis and Non-Issuance of Completion Certificate: The Arbitrator relied on measurements and invoices for additional re-dredging work, and non-issuance of a completion certificate by the Port Trust did not bar recovery for work actually executed. Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. v. HPCL was distinguished as concerning damages rather than valid invoices for additional work.
  • No Special Treatment for State Entities & Inseparability: Under Pam Developments Private Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, parties in arbitration must be treated equally without special leniency merely because the award debtor is a government/statutory entity. Under Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, the invoices and measurements for additional dredging formed a single integrated character and could not be arbitrarily halved.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court set aside the impugned Section 37 judgment, allowed the contractor’s appeal, restored the arbitral award, disposed of the Port Trust’s appeal, and disposed of pending applications.

2026 INSC 1238

M/s Marino Dredgeco Limited v. The Board of Trustees of the Port of Kolkata (D.O.J 18.11.2026)

Loading Viewer...

Next Story

Transmission Tariff Liability for LILO Lines Before DTL

The Supreme Court of India held that Power Grid Corporation of India Limited (PGCIL) was entitled to recover transmission tariff on a non-PoC basis for two Line-In Line-Out (LILO) assets commissioned in January 2015 up to 27.10.2016, when the generating company commissioned its Dedicated Transmission Line (DTL). Setting aside the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) orders, the Court restored the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) order and ruled that delay in upstream lines to Salem and Madhugiri did not negate actual evacuation and use of the LILOs while the generator delayed its DTL.

Background and Procedural History

  • The dispute involved PGCIL’s tariff claim for two LILOs on both circuits of the Tuticorin JV–Madurai 400 kV D/C (Quad) transmission line at the Tuticorin Pooling Station, commissioned on 04.01.2015 and 08.01.2015, for the period up to 27.10.2016 when the generating company (Moxie Power Generation Ltd., formerly Coastal Energen Pvt. Ltd.) commissioned its DTL directly to the Tuticorin Pooling Station.
  • Under the 24.02.2010 Bulk Power Transmission Agreement (BPTA) (amended 08.09.2011) and Standing Committee on Power System Planning in Southern Region (SCPSPSR) meetings, the generator was to build its DTL to the Tuticorin Pooling Station, while PGCIL was to establish the Tuticorin Pooling Station and LILOs of both circuits of the Tuticorin JV–Madurai line (Part-A) and upstream lines toward Salem and Madhugiri (Part-B).
  • Power generation commenced on 23.12.2014 and was evacuated through a temporary LILO on the Tuticorin JV–Madurai line and supplied to distribution licensee TANGEDCO.
  • By order dated 29.07.2016, the CERC accepted the Commercial Operation Dates (CODs) of 04.01.2015 and 08.01.2015 and directed liability for the LILO transmission charges on the generating companies (including Coastal Energen) until their DTL became commercially operational, while declining to condone time over-run at that stage subject to truing-up.
  • APTEL overturned the CERC’s view on usage and COD (and on review remanded the COD issue), holding that the LILOs had no “beneficial use” before the upstream Salem–Madhugiri lines were operationalized and that Regulation 4(3)(ii) of the CERC Tariff Regulations, 2014 required redetermination/review of COD. PGCIL appealed to the Supreme Court.

Key Issues

  • Whether PGCIL was entitled to transmission tariff (on a non-PoC basis) for the two LILOs from 04.01.2015/08.01.2015 until 27.10.2016, given their inclusion in the BPTA and statutory planning under Section 29(4) of the Electricity Act, 2003.
  • Whether APTEL correctly interpreted Regulation 4(3)(ii) of the Tariff Regulations, 2014 in directing CERC to revisit the already-approved COD of the LILOs.
  • Whether the generator’s delay in constructing its DTL warranted placing liability on the generating company for the period between commissioning of the LILOs and commissioning of the DTL on 27.10.2016.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • Actual Use and Evacuation Through Pooling Station: Examining the evacuation arrangement and the generator’s own pleadings before APTEL, the Court found that power evacuated via the Tuticorin JV–Madurai line was routed through the LILOs and Tuticorin Pooling Station for onward transmission and supply to TANGEDCO. Delay in the upstream Tuticorin–Salem–Madhugiri transmission line did not prevent evacuation or use of the LILOs during the disputed period.
  • Statutory Scheme, DTL Obligation, and COD: Under Section 10 of the Electricity Act, 2003, constructing the DTL was the generating company’s duty. Under Regulation 3(53) and Regulation 4 of the Tariff Regulations, 2014, COD was validly accepted by CERC based on RLDC trial operation certification, CEA safety certification, and scheme approvals, and Regulation 4(3)(ii) did not require reopening COD where regular service of the LILOs was not prevented.
  • CERC’s Regulatory and Adjudicatory Powers: Relying on PGCIL v. Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Co. Ltd., PTC India Ltd. v. CERC, and Energy Watchdog v. CERC, the Court held that CERC’s imposition of liability on the defaulting generator for the period prior to DTL commissioning (up to 27.10.2016) was valid and within jurisdiction.
  • Reading of CERC Order: The Court noted that paragraph 72 of CERC’s order recorded TANGEDCO’s submission rather than CERC’s final finding, whereas paragraphs 73–77 placed liability on the generating company based on the 30th SCM and BPTA framework.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court answered the questions of law in favour of PGCIL, set aside the impugned APTEL orders in the appeals, restored the CERC order, allowed the appeals, and disposed of pending applications.

2026 INSC 1237

Power Grid Corporation of India Limited v. Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited (TANGEDCO) & Ors. (D.O.J. 18.11.2026)

Loading Viewer...

Next Story

Upholding Arbitral Autonomy and Restricting Judicial Interference

In this case, the Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. (RVUNL) filed a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution to challenge a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court rendered under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The High Court had reversed a Commercial Court order that had set aside an Arbitral Tribunal’s award and additional award in favor of Parsa Kente Collieries Limited (PKCL). The underlying dispute arose from claims regarding coal mining and delivery operations under a Coal Mining and Delivery Agreement (CMDA) following the cancellation and reallocation of the PEKB coal block. The Supreme Court examined the limited parameters of judicial review under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act as well as the discretionary scope under Article 136. The Court held that the Commercial Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by reappraising evidence and substituting its own plausible views for those of the Arbitral Tribunal, and that the High Court had correctly restored the arbitral awards. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, reinforcing the principle of minimal judicial intervention in arbitral matters.

  • Background and Arbitral Proceedings: PKCL initiated arbitration against RVUNL concerning nine distinct claims arising from the operation and reallocation of the PEKB coal block. The Sole Arbitrator passed an Award on January 15, 2021, allowing several claims in full or part, and subsequently passed an Additional Award on July 5, 2021, allowing a claim for land acquisition costs.
  • Commercial Court’s Interference: Under Section 34 of the Act, the Commercial Court upheld findings on certain claims but set aside findings on multiple other claims (including stamp duty, legal fees, project-affected families, and the vocational training centre), and set aside the Additional Award on limitation grounds. Finding it lacked modification powers, it set aside both awards in their entirety.
  • High Court’s Appellate Ruling: On appeal under Section 37, the Rajasthan High Court held that the Commercial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by treating the proceedings like a regular appeal and reappraising evidence, thereby restoring both the main Award and the Additional Award.
  • Scope of Judicial Review under Sections 34 and 37: The Supreme Court reiterated that courts exercising powers under Sections 34 and 37 must not act as regular appellate courts. An arbitral award cannot be set aside merely because an alternative view is possible or because of an erroneous application of law, unless it suffers from patent illegality or perversity.
  • Evaluation of Claims: The Supreme Court conducted a claim-by-claim scrutiny and found that the Arbitral Tribunal’s interpretations of the CMDA and Supplementary Agreement were plausible, well-reasoned, and free from patent illegality. It held that the Commercial Court erred in interfering with the tribunal’s findings, and that the High Court’s restoration of the awards was legally sound.
  • Final Order: The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, emphasizing respect for the autonomy, finality, and minimal judicial interference intended under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

2026 INSC 1234

Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. v. Parsa Kente Collieries Limited (D.O.J. 16.11.2026)

Loading Viewer...

Next Story

Resolving Land Exchange Disputes and Protecting Homebuyer Rights

In this case, the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (Housing Board) and the State of Uttar Pradesh filed civil appeals against the Allahabad High Court’s judgment, which had partially allowed writ petitions filed by M/s Gaursons India Pvt. Ltd. The dispute arose from a long-standing land exchange history originating from the Vasundhara Scheme, where the Housing Board acquired land from the first respondent’s predecessors-in-interest, later failed to provide unencumbered alternative land due to a conflicting bird sanctuary notification, and eventually executed a fresh exchange deed in 2016 under the Siddharth Vihar Scheme. The Chief Secretary subsequently issued an order demanding Rs. 388 crores at current bulk sale rates and imposing land use restrictions, which the High Court set aside. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgment, ruling that the original use restrictions were tied to the specifically acquired land rather than perpetually attached to any substitute parcel, that the 2016 Exchange Deed permitted residential construction, and that the Housing Board—having fully monetized the high-value land surrendered by the predecessors without paying compensation—could not arbitrarily demand further payment. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and extended the time for deciding the EWS/LIG flat allotments.

  • Background and Original Acquisition: The Housing Board notified the Vasundhara Scheme in Ghaziabad in 1982 and 1987, acquiring 12.047 acres of land owned by the predecessors-in-interest of the first respondent. Following litigation, a compromise was recorded by the Supreme Court on March 20, 1995, adjusting the land within the scheme with a stipulation regarding water purification use and providing that no party would pay any value or compensation for the exchange.
  • Failure of the 2004 Exchange Deed: An exchange deed was executed in September 2004, allotting lands in Khasra Nos. 948 and 1454. However, these parcels had already been resumed by the District Magistrate for a bird sanctuary, rendering the allotment unusable through no fault of the purchasers. The first respondent, who purchased the land in 2005, faced prolonged litigation and administrative hurdles.
  • Execution of the 2016 Exchange Deed: Following directions from the High Court, the Housing Board executed a second exchange deed on January 25, 2016, allotting a residential plot under the Siddharth Vihar Scheme where the first respondent constructed homes for thousands of buyers.
  • Chief Secretary’s Order and Demand Notice: In 2022, the Chief Secretary passed an order demanding Rs. 388 crores at current bulk sale rates to protect homebuyers and reimposing water purification use restrictions on the alternative land. The High Court set aside these conditions, prompting appeals by the State and the Housing Board.
  • Supreme Court’s Findings: The Supreme Court affirmed that the use restrictions applied specifically to the original land surrendered, not in perpetuity to any substitute parcel. Furthermore, because the Housing Board retained and commercially developed the higher-value Vasundhara land without paying monetary compensation, it could not demand additional bulk sale payments for the substituted land.
  • Final Order: The civil appeals filed by the State and the Housing Board were dismissed, and the time granted by the High Court for deciding the allotment of 450 EWS/LIG flats was extended by three months.

2026 INSC 1233

Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad & Anr. v. M/s Gaursons India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (with connected appeals) (D.O.J. 17.11.2026)

Loading Viewer...

Recent Articles